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Introduction 
 
 
 
“The way parties operate and create linkages 
of accountability and responsiveness to 
citizens is likely to have major consequences 
for the viability of democracy and the quality 
of its outputs” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 15) 
 
More than a quarter century has elapsed since the ‘Third Wave’ of democratic transition in 
Latin America (Huntington, 1991), but political systems in the region still struggle with 
achieving democratic quality. Representative institutions in this region have not yet reached a 
self-enforcing equilibrium and continue to produce unfavourable outcomes (Kitschelt et al., 
1999). As a consequence, after two decades of research on democratic transition and the 
consolidation of democracy in Latin America, researchers became increasingly sceptical and 
concerned with the quality of democratic representation. Several deficits have been identified 
ranging from the weaknesses of vertical accountability mechanisms (e.g. Moreno, Crisp, & 
Shugart, 2003; Roberts, 2002; Coppedge, 2001) and institutions of horizontal accountability 
(e.g. Mainwaring & Welna, 2003; O’Donnell, 1994) to the persistence of historical legacies 
such as clientelism and populism (e.g. Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Levitsky & Loxton, 
2013). Dysfunctional democratic representation, moreover, fosters growing distrust in 
political parties and dissatisfaction with democracy and endangers achievements of 
democratic consolidation that have already been made (e.g. Kitschelt et al., 1999; Dalton, 
1999; Diamond & Gunther 2001). Hence, the ‘crisis of representation’ in Latin America lies 
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at the heart of any study concerned with the quality of democracy in this region (e.g. 
Diamond & Morlino 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano, & Pizarro, 2006; Hagopian, 1998).  
But what are the standards used to evaluate the quality of democratic representation? In line 
with the competitive model of democracy the quality of democratic representation is usually 
judged according to the realization of accountability and, especially, policy responsiveness 
(Schumpeter, 2008 [1942]; Bartolini, 1999, 2000). While repeated elections make political 
actors accountable to their electorate, competition between these actors for public office and 
power is believed to make them responsive to the policy preferences of their voters. 
Developed with a focus on advanced democracies, traditional theories on democratic 
representation rest upon the prevalent assumption of policy-based competition between 
political actors – an assumption which is not directly applicable to the context of new 
democracies.
1
 
In new democracies political parties are not necessarily linked to their voters based on 
coherent policy programs and may pursue additional or completely different electoral 
mobilization strategies like clientelism and personalistic linkages (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 
2007; Hagopian, 2009). The idealization of policy-based representation through 
programmatic competition thus hampers awareness from other modes of political 
representation (Kitschelt, 2000). Linkage strategies that differ from the classic programmatic 
ones have to be integrated into the concept of party competition if new democracies are to fall 
into the range of a comprehensive theory of democratic representation (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007; Powell, 2004). To understand how democratic representation is affected by 
different linkage strategies we need to investigate how these relationships between political 
parties and their voters may affect both mechanisms of accountability and policy 
responsiveness.  
                                                          
1
 The assumption even fails to hold in all established democracies since non-programmatic competition is also 
observable in some of them, e.g. Italy, Greece, or Belgium (see Piattoni, 2001; Roniger, 2004). 
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This dissertation contributes to the research agenda on the quality of democratic 
representation in three ways:  
(1) I focus on the input-side of the representative process and systematically analyse 
dysfunctions of policy-based representation. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
variety of mechanisms that establish the representative link between parties and voters. The 
different linkages which political parties pursue to connect themselves with the electorate ‘set 
the tone’ for democratic representation on the system level (see Moreno, Crisp, & Shugart, 
2003). Hence, with this dissertation I highlight the importance of party-society linkages for 
both democratic accountability and policy responsiveness in democratic representation. As 
Biezen and Saward (2008) frame it the focus lies more on the ‘software’ of democratic 
representation – i.e. the mediating function of political parties – than on the ‘hardware’ of 
democracy – i.e. the institutions of representative democracy.  
(2) By concentrating on a geographical region that has rather been omitted during the 
development of traditional theories on democratic representation and party competition I 
challenge their implicit assumptions and generalizability and help to re-assess them. Hence, 
with the focus on Latin America I seek to delimit travelling potential of concepts to new 
democracies, and pave the way for them to feedback on explanations of new developments in 
representative systems of established democracies.  
(3) Finally my empirical contribution lies in the creation of an original dataset on populist 
presidents and parties in Latin America and the compilation of a database on party-society 
linkages that merges micro-, meso-, and macro-level information from public opinion 
surveys, expert surveys, and election statistics covering over 20.000 citizens and more than 
80 political parties in 18 Latin American countries. 
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows: in section one I discuss the 
theoretically beneficial connection between democratic representation and political 
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competition with respect to democratic accountability and responsiveness. In section two I 
elaborate on different party-society linkages and their consequences for the quality of 
democratic representation. In section three I introduce the case selection and the data sources. 
The last section gives an overview of the four articles that form part of this cumulative 
dissertation.  
 
Democratic Representation: Accountability and Responsiveness 
A key feature of the functioning of representative democracy is competitive interaction 
between political parties for public office and power. The development of the competitive 
model of representative democracy dates back to the 1940s and 1950s, with Schumpeter 
(2008 [1942]), Schattschneider (2009 [1942]), and Downs (1957) as famous defenders of the 
unintended positive effects of party competition for the public. Although competition is by 
far not the only form of social interaction possible in a democratic setting
2
, its importance for 
the quality of democratic representation has often been emphasized in the literature (e.g. 
Sartori, 1987; Strøm, 1992). More specifically, political competition is believed to create, as 
unintended by-products, desirable societal outcomes such as responsiveness (see Bartolini, 
1999, 2000; Downs, 1957) and innovation (Franzmann, 2011).
3
 Electoral systems and within 
them political competition are seen as the basic institutional arrangements to implement 
democratic representation (Powell, 2000).
4  
Accountability and policy responsiveness are at the core of both theories on democratic 
representation and political competition (Pitkin, 1967; Strøm, 1992). Repeated, free, open, 
secret, and fair elections make political actors accountable to their electorate, and political 
competition between these actors induces them to be responsive to their voters’ policy 
                                                          
2
 E.g. negotiation and cooperation in consensus democracies (Ljiphart, 1999).  
3
 Franzmann (2011) mentions innovation as a positive by-product of political competition. However, this 
dissertation focuses on those aspects of democratic representation that impinge on responsiveness. 
4
 See Powell (2000) on the two visions of electoral systems as instruments of democratic representation.  
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preferences. Policy responsiveness may, thereby, originate in two ways: Firstly, in line with 
an accountability perspective on democratic representation political competition enables 
voters to hold their representatives accountable by rewarding or punishing them 
retrospectively, dependent on their performance in the previous term (see Manin, Przewoski, 
& Stokes, 1999). Thereby, institutional mechanisms ideally induce responsive behaviour of 
representatives to the policy interests of citizens, since these are (according to theory) the 
voter’s criteria to evaluate whether to sanction them or not. If such institutional accountability 
arrangements function well, incumbent public officials are induced to be directly responsive 
to public opinion changes due to ‘rational anticipation’ of the threat of turnover (see Manin, 
Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995; Wlezien & Soroka, 
2007).
5
 Secondly, according to the mandate perspective of democratic representation, 
responsiveness may also originate indirectly when voters select representatives prospectively 
according to their policy promises and when these representatives are credible to their 
promises, implementing the policies desired by their voters (see Manin, Przeworski, & 
Stokes, 1999). 
But, elections alone are not sufficient to make representatives accountable for their actions. 
Like all principal-agent relationships, democratic representation may also be jeopardized by 
shirking, possibly precluding the institutional mechanisms of accountability from inducing 
responsive behaviour of elected officials (see Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Persson, Roland, 
& Tabellini, 1997). Hence, citizens need to be informed to evaluate the behaviour of their 
elected representatives in office to hold them effectively accountable (e.g. Manin, Pzeworski, 
& Stokes, 1999; Schmitter, 2005). Horizontal accountability mechanisms, for example, may 
provide citizens with necessary information to effectively use vertical accountability 
mechanisms (see Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 1997; Moreno, Crisp, & Shugart, 2003).  
                                                          
5
 This logic is based on the assumptions that public officials are interested in reelection and have access to 
information about public opinion (Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995). 
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However, elected representatives will only respond to the policy preferences of their voters 
(both directly and indirectly) if they are judged and selected by this logic, and voters can only 
select politicians on this basis if they are offered a clear choice between different and 
coherent policy programs (Powell, 2000, p. 16). The assumption that democratic 
representation and political competition are substantially ‘programmatic’ is, however, 
particularly problematic for emerging democracies. Representative institutions only structure 
political parties’ scope of action but do not determine they link themselves to their voters 
(Kitschelt et al., 1999). Consequently, the quality of democratic representation depends on 
the type of interaction between political parties and voters, i.e. the type of party-society 
linkages that take hold in a political system. With different forms of party-society linkages 
prevailing, political competition may foster different forms of accountability and 
responsiveness. Thus, we need to understand how other forms of accountability relationships 
may affect the process of democratic representation and we need to understand how policy 
responsiveness, as one of the most desirable by-product of policy-based competition, is 
affected by various linkage strategies. 
 
Linking Citizens and Political Parties 
This dissertation investigates how political parties’ organizational and substantive links with 
their voters affect the quality of democratic representation, i.e. the realization of 
accountability and policy responsiveness. Since political parties are the main actors selecting 
political elites for elected positions in democratic states their importance for democracy has 
often been emphasized in the literature (Sartori, 1976; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). They 
have been labelled “the agents of interest mediation” (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 5), or “the 
organizations that institutionalize democracy” (Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008, p. 664). Thus, 
political parties play a dual role in representative democracies. Contingent on their mediating 
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position between the electorate and political institutions of the state, they are at the same time 
actors of the state and social organizations (Poguntke, 2002, p. 43). To fulfil their 
representative function and their role within contemporary democracies, political parties need 
to be linked with the society. To establish such a representative link with society, political 
parties, on the one hand, need to build extra-parliamentary organizations to structure their 
communication with citizens in a durable way. On the other hand, they can pursue different 
substantive linkage strategies based on programmatic, clientelistic, or personalistic appeals to 
mobilize electoral support. 
 
The organizational link 
To enable political parties to fulfil their mediating function in representative democracies, 
political competition has to provide at least a minimum of stability. Therefore political parties 
need to invest in organizational structures in order to connect themselves with the electorate 
in an on-going way. The strength of organizational party structures is usually captured by the 
institutionalization concept (Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Huntington, 1968; Panebianco, 
1988). Political parties institutionalize when they establish regularized and rule-guided intra-
organizational processes (routinization) and/or when they invest in the emotional attachment 
of their followers through organizational incorporation (value infusion) (Panebianco 1988, p. 
49; p. 53). Such institutionalized party organizations are crucial for the stability of intraparty 
competition and, therefore, one foundation to assure vertical accountability of political 
representatives to citizens. Weakly institutionalized political parties do not provide channels 
of communication between citizens and elites, they increase the uncertainty of electoral 
outcomes, and deprive voters of meaningful choices (e.g. Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; 
Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). Furthermore, political parties that are organizationally linked 
with society can help counter anti-party sentiments and alienation from politics that are wide-
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spread among citizens in Latin American democracies (see Payne, 2006). The reasons why 
political parties invest in extra-parliamentary organizations, their contribution to the 
institutionalization of party systems, and the viability of vertical accountability are analysed 
in the first article of this dissertation (Chapter 2). However, organizational stability is only 
one factor of meaningful intraparty competition, political parties also need to represent their 
voters’ policy interests and aggregate them into coherent policy programmes to assure the 
beneficial outcomes of the competitive model of democracy. Hence, I now turn to such 
substantive linkages between citizens and political parties. 
 
The linkage concept 
The substantive relationship between political parties and the electorate is illustrated through 
the linkage concept (Kitschelt, 2000; Poguntke, 2000, 2002). In general, the concept 
describes an interactive connection between the electorate and the state mediated by political 
elites. This linkage is driven by political parties’ needs for votes to win elections and to 
secure their survival, irrespective of their office, vote or policy motivations (Poguntke, 2000, 
2002). 
Linkage forms are usually distinguished according to three factors: (1) Electoral appeal: To 
connect themselves with the electorate, political parties may address voters either in a direct 
way (e.g. personal contact, mass media) or in an indirect way (e.g. policy pledges). (2) 
Character of organizational relations: Political elites may connect themselves to the voter 
through organizational structures (e.g. collateral organizations, social networks). Formal 
organizational ties are based on the integration of other political actors into a party’s 
decision-making process, whereas informal ties are based on loyalty, pressure or 
blackmailing (Poguntke, 2002, p. 47). (3) Kind of exchanged goods: Political parties may 
offer either private, club, or public goods in exchange for the vote of their constituency. 
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Roberts (2002) adds another dimension to distinguish party-society linkages: (4) their degree 
of contingency. This characteristic refers to the time it takes to build a specific linkage type, 
i.e. how much they rely on the generation of trust, loyalty, and credibility. In this respect 
linkages may be distinguished according to their short-, medium- or long-term character.  
Classically three forms of linkages between political parties and society are mentioned in the 
literature: programmatic, clientelistic, and personalistic linkages (see Table 1 for an overview 
of the characteristics of each linkage strategy). These linkage forms are not mutually 
exclusive. Political actors may pursue different forms of linkages at the same time. It may 
even be a viable strategy of risk avoidance to pursue a strategic mix of linkage forms (see 
Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estévez, 2007).  
 
Table 1: Linkage strategies of political parties 
  Linkage Types 
  programmatic clientelistic personalistic 
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 
Electoral  
Appeal 
indirect  
(policy pledges) 
direct 
(quasi-personal) 
direct 
(personal) 
Organizational 
Structure 
formal and 
informal  
mostly informal  
normally weakly 
institutionalized 
Exchanged 
Goods 
public goods and 
club goods 
individual goods 
and club goods 
depends 
Degree of 
Contingency 
long-term  long-term  
short- and 
medium-term  
 
Programmatic Linkage  
In line with the model of ‘responsible party government’ (APSA, 1950; Downs, 1957), 
political parties pursuing a programmatic linkage strategy appeal to their voters with policy 
programs. These programs entail an ideal of the greater good to the advantage of the whole 
10 
 
society (Pappi, 2000). In this sense parties make indirect policy pledges to a large range of 
voters which have their own policy preferences and base their electoral decision on them.  
To root themselves in society political parties maintain formal and informal organizational 
relations with their social base. The most obvious connection between party elites and their 
voters is a party membership organization. Other organizational linkages are collateral 
organizations – like unions or churches – and social movements. Characteristic of these forms 
of organizations is a horizontal bottom up style that enhances participation and interest 
aggregation (Kitschelt, 2000; Roberts, 2002). As programmatic parties base their policy 
programmes on an ideal of the greater good, they are able to offer public policy to their 
voters. But political parties may also concentrate on specific, distinguishable social groups 
and, hence, provide club goods (pork-barrel politics). Programmatic party competition may in 
this sense be directed at the general public as well as particularistic groups (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007).  The more informally or formally attached programmatic parties are to 
civil society organizations, the more durable and stable is their linkage (Poguntke, 2000, 
2002). Thus, linking a political party in programmatic ways to the electorate may be labelled 
a long-term strategy. Accordingly, the programmatic linkage demands heavy investments of 
political elites. Firstly, they have to bear the costs of building organizational structures to 
solve collective action problems and offer mechanisms of interest aggregation (Kitschelt, 
2000). Secondly, programmatic linkages are based on trust and credibility and prone to path 
dependency effects. If victorious political parties defect from their policy pledges or engage 
in extreme policy switches over time they may lose the support of even loyal voters in 
subsequent elections (Stokes, 1999). Hence, political parties linked to their supporters 
through policy pledges ideally hold themselves responsive to their voters’ policy preferences 
(Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes 1999). Furthermore, programmatic parties that link themselves 
to the society based on coherent policy pledges provide for other modes of political 
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participation than just voting. Voters may partake in procedures of interest aggregation 
through party membership organizations or as members of collateral organizations linked to 
political parties based on congruent policy positions (Kitschelt, 2000). The connection 
between a programmatic linkage strategy and the policy congruence between political parties 
and their supporters plays a role in the third article of this dissertation (Chapter 4). But, 
political parties in new democracies are often not linked to their voters based on coherent 
policy programs. They may also pursue other linkages with society like clientelistic and 
personalistic linkages (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 3). I turn now to these other forms of 
party-society linkages. 
 
Clientelistic Linkage 
The concept of clientelism is widely used and referred to in very different contexts. Thus, it is 
prone to conceptual stretching (Piattoni, 2001). Different definitions of clientelism are owed 
to the changing role of patron-client relationships over time and to different research 
interests. According to the origins of the concept, traditional clientelism describes a dyadic, 
personal relationship between unequals that builds on fear or obligation as bonds
6
. But 
modern clientelism differs from this older version in some aspects. First of all, the patron 
becomes a political party that wants to mobilize electoral support. In addition, the 
contemporary clientelistic linkage is no more limited to face-to-face contacts but may also be 
based on group relations (see for example Roniger, 1994, 2004; Piattoni, 2001; Hopkin, 
2006).  
I follow a conception of clientelism that focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon which 
directly relate to the electoral process (see Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; 
Piattoni, 2001; Stokes, 2007).The clientelistic linkage is defined as a “direct exchange of a 
                                                          
6
 This depiction of clientelism refers to “an archaic phenomenon of traditional and agrarian societies” (Roniger, 
2004, p. 355). 
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citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and 
services” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2). This general definition covers both patronage 
and vote buying, as specific subtypes of clientelistic exchange. Following Stokes, these 
subtypes are defined as follows: patronage is “the proffering of public resources (most 
typically, public employment) by office-holders in return for electoral support” (2007, p. 606, 
italics original), whereas “vote buying is a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, 
protections) for one’s own vote” (2007, p. 606, italics original).7 Clientelistic exchange, thus, 
takes place closely before or after an election was held (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). 
Furthermore, the clientelistic linkage is characterized through conditionality, i.e. a quid pro 
quo. In order to avoid the risk of opportunistic defection, clientelistic parties need to build 
enforcement mechanisms (i.e. monitoring) to guarantee the exclusiveness of the clientelistic 
exchange. Target identifyability and excludability are important features of clientelistic 
exchange relationships. Potential groups for this exchange, thus, have to be clearly 
delineated. Therefore clientelistic parties have to make investments in organizational 
infrastructure to identify and monitor potential voters (Kitschelt, 2000). These organizational 
ties are mostly informal and structured in a hierarchical top down manner (Gay, 1998). 
Clientelistic parties rely on vertical exchange networks between party elites, party brokers, 
and clients that organize the complex transport of benefits from the top level of the party 
organization to the bottom in exchange for votes (Roberts, 2002; Levitsky, 2001). The role of 
party brokers in these networks is to connect party elites with their constituencies. In this 
respect, informality should not be confounded with lack of organization or institutional 
weakness (Levitsky, 2001). 
                                                          
7
 Other materially oriented political strategies are pork-barrel politics and programmatic redistributive politics. 
But both of these strategies do not deliver small-scale exclusive goods, although pork-barrel politics may be a 
source of patronage when realized (Stokes, 2007). 
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Due to their direct appeal, goods offered for exchange by clientelistic parties are first and 
foremost characterized by exclusiveness, i.e. they provide mainly private and club goods.
 8
 
Thus, clientelism “focuses the popular sector’s attention on the immediate acquisition of 
localized and small-scale goods and services as opposed to a series of more significant, 
generalized and long term demands” (Gay, 1998, p. 11). Since the clientelistic linkage relies 
on direct material inducements, this strategy becomes more likely the more voters value such 
side payments and the lesser they value future benefits from the provision of public goods 
(Kitschelt, 2000).
9
 
Concerning the degree of permanence, clientelistic linkages have a long-term character. In 
general the decline of clientelism has often been predicted, but in fact it has proven to be a 
highly adaptive strategy even in democratic contexts (see Roniger, 2004; Gay, 1998). This 
may be because the relationship with the voter is often marked by a dependency aspect and 
built on repetition (Stokes, 2007). In addition, the party organization as a social network 
plays an important role in binding voters over time. Thus, similar to programmatic parties, 
clientelistic practices are based on trust and credibility and thus also prone to path 
dependency effects (Roniger, 1994).  
Political parties that choose a clientelistic linkage strategy have to invest in mechanisms of 
voter supervision, i.e. monitoring, and they have to build “organizational hierarchies of 
exchange between electoral clients at the ground floor of the system, various levels of brokers 
organized in pyramidal fashion, and patrons at the top” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007,p. 8). 
Thus, transaction costs for providing the exchanged benefits are high.  
Since the relationship between clientelistic parties and their voters is often marked by a 
dependency aspect and built on repetition, clientelistic parties may take advantage of poverty 
                                                          
8
 Stokes (2007) distinguishes clientelistic club good provision from pork-barrel politics by means of a 
distributive criterion: benefits from pork-barrel politics are distributed in a whole district and, therefore, non-
clientelistic voters in this district cannot be excluded. 
9
 See Stokes (2007, pp. 617-619) for a comprehensive overview of the relationship between clientelism and 
poverty. 
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and lack of autonomy of poor voters (see Taylor-Robinson, 2010; Fox, 1994; Bruso, 
Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004). This may lead to situations of ‘perverse accountability’ with 
respect to the electoral process (Stokes, 2007; Stokes, 2005). The more dependent clients are 
on material benefits and the better clientelistic party brokers can monitor their behaviour, the 
more likely clients can be held accountable for not voting for the clientelistic party. 
Furthermore, clientelistic linkages as opposed to programmatic linkages “reduce parties to 
their most basic, self-referential political function: electing candidates from their ranks into 
public office” (Roberts, 2002, p. 29). On the one hand, parties pursuing a clientelistic strategy 
do not provide their voters with mechanisms of interest aggregation; they do not offer 
orientation in the policy space to their voters, and may even cut across cleavages and cater for 
highly heterogeneous clients (Gay, 1998; Roberts, 2002). On the other hand, voters in 
clientelistic relationships, in turn base their voting decision on the exchange of material 
benefits. The voting act thus loses its capacity to signal policy preferences. Consequently, 
votes obtained in this way do not entail any information about the policy interests of the voter 
and are therefore useless for the prospective or retrospective evaluation of a representatives’ 
policy responsiveness (see Schaffer, 2007; Stokes, 2007; Zechmeister, 2010). Although there 
may be some kind of clientelistic responsiveness, in order to evaluate the quality of 
democratic representation only policy responsiveness is of relevance. The effect of the 
clientelistic linkage on the quality of democratic representation is analysed in two articles of 
this dissertation. The third article investigates the negative and distortive effects of 
clientelism on party-voter congruence as an indicator of policy responsiveness (Chapter 4). 
The fourth article focusses on the effect of clientelism on voters’ uncertainty in the political 
realm and their ability to form clear and structured policy preferences (Chapter 5). 
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Personalistic Linkage 
This linkage form may also be labelled charismatic or populist appeal. Political parties that 
maintain such bonds with their voters base their strategy on the personal skills of one or a few 
(charismatic) leaders. Often these parties are referred to as mere electoral vehicles (Roberts, 
2002; Kitschelt, 2000). A personalistic party reaches its voters through a direct, personal 
appeal (often combined with marketing techniques). Its organizational structure tends to be 
weakly institutionalized, since party leaders do not want to limit their leverage on the 
intraparty decision-making process (Weyland, 1999; Kitschelt, 2000). In analogy to this, the 
pledges personalistic parties make to their voters remain opaque. Party leaders “tend to 
promise all things to all people to maintain maximum personal discretion over the strategy of 
their party vehicle” (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 849). 
If political parties are mere electoral vehicles for a charismatic leader they are likely to be of 
short- or medium-term character since the bond with their voters will probably dissolve as 
soon as the charismatic leader dies or finishes her career. Therefore, to secure the long-term 
success of a personalistic party “charismatic leaders or their successors will be forced to 
routinize authority relations and put them on a different grounding” (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 855). 
Only when the personalistic linkage is combined with a long-term linkage strategy, the risk of 
an ephemeral life-span may be diminished. The charismatic linkage is combinable with all 
the linkage types already mentioned (Roberts, 2006). For itself, the personalistic linkage does 
neither solve collective action problems nor offer alternative forms of participation and 
techniques of interest aggregation to voters (Kitschelt, 2000).  
Closely related to the personalistic linkage type is the phenomenon of populism. Populist 
parties usually exhibit a direct, unmediated electoral appeal through charismatic leaders, 
hence, they have an affinity to the personalistic linkage type (Weyland, 2001). In general, the 
populist ideology is based on the division of the society in two homogeneous and antagonistic 
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groups: the people versus the elite (Mudde, 2004; Barr, 2009). The exact content of this 
ideology depends on secondary elements that may be combined with such an appeal (Abts & 
Rummens, 2007). Regarding the organizational structure populism is normally associated 
with an uninstitutionalized form of party organization. In the extreme populists use their 
parties as mere electoral vehicles (again in line with the personalistic linkage type). But there 
are also populist parties which invested in the institutionalization of their organizational 
structure (e.g. traditional populist parties). Furthermore, the kind of exchanged goods depends 
on whether a populist party integrates other ideological elements, pursues specific policy 
programs, or relies on the support of specific groups of voters. Regarding the degree of 
contingency, populist appeals are often used by new political parties or new politicians within 
an existing political party. As such populism seems to be a viable electoral entry strategy to 
challenge established elites. But populism is also often said to be a transitory phenomenon. 
Many populists face the problem to maintain the electoral support of the (heterogeneous) 
discontent mass they promised to represent as soon as they achieve government 
responsibility. And soon after those populist challengers emerged and took over government 
(or participated in it), they faded away (Weyland, 2001, Taggart, 2004).  
It has been argued in the literature that populism in power has a fierce relationship with 
democratic representative institutions (e.g. Rovira, 2012; Plattner, 2010). Populism in power 
may severely affect both the horizontal and vertical dimension of democratic accountability. 
Especially in presidential systems like those in Latin America, populist presidents face 
incentives to change the political regime to their own benefit through institutional reform, 
manipulation of democratic rules, or through the execution of a coup d’état. Therefore, the 
second article of this dissertation systematically analyses the opportunity structure of populist 
presidents incentivizing a radical change of checks and balances in Latin American 
democracies (Chapter 3). 
17 
 
Case Selection and Data 
Research on democratic representation identified great differences of political parties and 
party systems between new and established democracies respectively. For example, Latin 
American party systems are barely institutionalized and volatility in the region is much 
higher than in Western European democracies (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & 
Torcal, 2006). Moreover, party organizations are less based on party membership than their 
Western European counterparts and competition structures between political parties are often 
shaped by clientelistic and personalistic means (Coppedge, 2001; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 
2007). Furthermore, comparing Latin American democracies, Kitschelt et al. (2010) show 
that the degree of programmatic party system structuration differs greatly in the region. On 
the one hand, we thus find differences in the structuration of democratic representation 
between new and established democracies as well as variation within the Latin American 
region with respect to the utilization of different linkage strategies. Therefore, Latin 
American democracies offer suitable units of observation to investigate the influence of 
party-society linkages on the quality of democratic representation. On the other hand, Latin 
American democracies are ‘most similar cases’ with respect to their institutional and socio-
economic contexts (see Przeworski & Teune, 1970). For example, many Latin American 
countries experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s and phases of re-
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005; O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1986). In addition to this, all countries in this study are presidential regimes and 
share similar structures of vertical and horizontal accountability (Linz, 1994; O’Donnell, 
1994; Mainwaring & Welna, 2003). Latin American presidents are usually perceived to be 
powerful actors within their political systems, either because they possess strong 
constitutional powers – like a presidential veto or executive decree authority – or because 
they rely on strong partisan powers – i.e. majority support in the legislative branch and high 
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party discipline (Shugart & Carey 1992; Mainwaring & Shugart 1997). Furthermore, most of 
the countries studied here deploy pure PR electoral systems for the lower chamber of their 
legislatures, and the two exceptions, Bolivia and Mexico, use semi-proportional electoral 
systems (Wills-Otero, 2009, pp. 38–39). With respect to the socio-economic context, Latin 
America is a region plagued with high income inequality, a large informal sector, and 
‘truncated’ welfare states, benefiting only those with formal employment (Díaz-Cayeros & 
Magaloni 2009; Rudra, 2004). Furthermore, the Latin American region shares a historical 
legacy of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) era that led to continuing financial 
crisis in the 1980s as well as the adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1990s (Huber & 
Stephens, 2010; Filgueira & Luna, 2009; Remmer, 1990).  
Both presidential regimes and economic inequality are features that are related to different 
party-society linkages. Presidentialism, on the one hand, incentivizes the use of a 
personalistic linkage type through a higher degree of personalization and a direct, unmediated 
legitimacy of the president (O’Donnell, 1994, Linz, 1994). High poverty rates and high 
degrees of income inequality, on the other hand, make the clientelistic linkage type more 
viable for political actors (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2007). Thus, differences in 
regime type and socio-economic conditions may cause political actors to pursue linkages 
other than the programmatic one, accounting for their variation compared to established 
democracies and the variation between Latin American democracies. However, the main 
focus of this dissertation lies on the association between different organizational and 
substantive linkages between citizens and political elites on the quality of democratic 
representation. Consequentially, the general institutional and socio-economic contexts in 
Latin America are either controlled for in the statistical analysis or considered a scope 
condition in this study. 
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To assess the relationship between party-society linkages and the quality of democratic 
representation this dissertation makes use of the growing availability of comparative data 
based on public opinion, elite-, and expert surveys. For the statistical analyses in this study, 
the following data sets have been combined to address different questions on the quality of 
the representational link in Latin America: 
(1) Micro level data on citizens in Latin American democracies is provided by two public 
opinion surveys: the Latinobarometer and the Americas Barometer. Firstly, the Corporación 
Latinobarómetro conducts its public opinion survey on a yearly basis including a large range 
of questions on attitudes, values, and the behaviour of citizens as well as socio-demographic 
information about the respondents (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2010). Starting with eight 
democracies in 1995 more and more countries have been added over the years, and since 
2004 the survey covers the following 18 Latin American democracies: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Furthermore, the survey instruments have been refined over time and the representativeness 
of the country samples has been increased to approximately 100% covering both urban and 
rural regions (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2010). Secondly, the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) issues the AmericasBarometer on democratic values and 
behaviours every two years since 2004. The survey is based on face to face interviews with 
voting-age adults in 26 countries in North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. 
Systematic pre-tests in each country and probability samples ensure the representativeness of 
the survey both on national and subnational levels (see LAPOP, 2012).  
(2) Meso level data on political parties’ linkage strategies is provided by the recently 
compiled Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (DAES - Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt 
et al., 2009). This survey was specifically designed to uncover the different relationships 
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political parties may pursue with their voters in representative democracies. The research 
instruments are based on the concept of party-society linkages proposed by Kitschelt (2000) 
and, therefore, they tie in perfectly with the theoretical arguments made in this dissertation. 
Besides questions on these linkages, the survey includes questions on political parties’ 
organizational structures as well as their policy positions on several issue dimensions. The 
whole project covers 85 electoral democracies in Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, 
and the Middle East. More specifically, for the Latin American part of the survey experts 
have been asked to rate over 80 political parties. This rich source of data is further extended 
by original qualitative information on political parties based on case studies and online 
resources (more detailed information is provided in the respective articles of this 
dissertation). 
(3) Macro level data on party system characteristics have been systematically compiled by 
the author merging several sources. Comparative cross-national information on political 
parties’ vote and seat shares in Latin American legislatures are scarce and often diverge 
dependent on the purpose and scope of the respective source (e.g. Nohlen, 2005; IPU, 2013; 
OIR, 2013). Problematic are especially the handling of small parties, the information on party 
splits and mergers, as well as the treatment of the frequent praxis in the region of renaming 
political parties. Therefore, to systematically evaluate party system characteristics in Latin 
American countries these comparative cross-national databases have been compared with 
national election statistics as well as research notes on specific legislative and presidential 
elections resulting in a unique data set that includes small parties and accounts for party 
splits, party mergers, as well as party renaming. 
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Overview  
This dissertation consists of four articles each highlighting a different aspect of the 
association between political parties’ linkages with society and the quality of democratic 
representation. The first and the second article (Chapter 2 and 3), thereby, are concerned with 
the relationship between party-society linkages and mechanisms of democratic 
accountability, the third and fourth article (Chapter 4 and 5) assess the relationship between 
party-society linkages and policy responsiveness. 
 
Chapter two focusses on the empirical diversity of party organizations and the incentive 
structure of political elites to invest in extra-parliamentary party building in Latin America. 
By specifying the conditions that make the adoption of an institutionalized party organization 
more likely, this co-authored article (with Nicole Bolleyer) addresses an important empirical 
gap.
10
 Furthermore, it contributes to the debate on the important role political parties play 
with respect to the viability of vertical accountability mechanism in the context of new 
democracies (Diamond & Gunther, 2001; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano, 
& Pizarro, 2006). 
In this article we refer to the institutionalization concept that has been fruitfully applied to 
study party evolution in various contexts already (Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Huntington 
1968; Panebianco 1988). In terms of parties’ organizational evolution discussions evolved 
around two core dimensions of institutionalization that shape the nature of parties’ internal 
life: value infusion and routinization (e.g. Panebianco, 1988; Levitsky, 1998). Using expert 
survey data covering organizational characteristics of more than 80 parties within 18 Latin 
American countries we map out the diversity of party organization in Latin America across 
parties and countries. By doing so, we examine the usefulness of the conceptual tool in an 
                                                          
10
 Both authors contributed equally to this article. 
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environment where cleavage structures were not decisive for the emergence of political 
parties and the state itself gained tremendous influence on the development of political 
parties and party systems. We show that Latin American parties spread across three of four 
possible structural configurations of (high or low) routinization and value infusion (i.e. we 
find a considerable number of ‘mixed’ cases) – reflecting the importance of this distinction. 
Consequently, we theorize which conditions enable and motivate elites to set up structures 
conducive either to routinization, value infusion or to both.  
 
Chapter three addresses the question which factors enable populist presidents in Latin 
America to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change to secure their survival in power. 
More specifically, the focus lies on the first signs of institutional depletion, i.e. the 
undermining of horizontal accountability (checks and balances) in favour of the executive 
branch. Thereby, the article applies an actor-centred approach focusing on the institutional 
context and the constellation of other political actors in the system that make a radical 
strategy of institutional change a viable option for populist presidents. Three conditions are 
considered most decisive in this respect: Firstly, the existence of a ‘power vacuum’ in the 
political arena, secondly, the presence of divided government between the executive and the 
legislature, thirdly, the distribution of public support. By means of a Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) causal combinations of these conditions for the presence or absence of 
institutional change are identified. Most importantly, the results of the analysis show that 
popular support in favour of populist presidents is a crucial factor with respect to their 
success in undermining institutions of democratic accountability.  
 
Chapter four is concerned with the impact of different party-society linkages on the 
congruence and incongruence between political parties’ advocated policies and the policy 
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interests of their supporters in the economic domain. Party-voter congruence is often used in 
studies on democratic representation as an indicator of policy responsiveness. However, the 
effect of different linkage strategies on the degree of policy congruence has never been tested 
since studies on policy congruence usually assume a programmatic link between political 
parties and their voters. To close this gap this article draws on a dataset covering information 
of 80 political parties and party supporters in 18 Latin American democracies. Results of 
multinomial logit analysis show that programmatic and clientelistic linkage strategies affect 
party-voter congruence in completely opposite ways. While programmatic parties are likely 
to be more state interventionist than their supporters, political parties emphasizing a 
clientelistic linkage strategy are more likely to advocate a stronger free market position than 
their supporters. Finally, in line with the expectations, the personalistic linkage type has no 
significant effect on party-voter congruence. 
 
The fifth and final Chapter of this dissertation analyses the influence of clientelism on 
citizens’ political orientation in Latin America. Consistent perceptions of the political space 
in the citizenry are central in traditional theories of political competition. However, I argue 
that clientelism hinders the development of consistent political orientations by increasing 
uncertainty in the political realm and inducing indifference of clientelistic voters towards 
other parties’ policy programs. Thereby, clientelism alters parties’ strategic behaviour in 
competitive contexts and, finally, leads to reduced policy responsiveness. These arguments 
are tested by means of logistic multilevel regression analyses based on two hierarchical 
survey data sets covering up to 18 Latin American countries. The empirical analyses, with the 
main independent variable measured on different analytical levels, confirm the hypothesized 
negative effect of clientelism on citizens’ political orientation. 
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Party Organization in Latin America: 
Conceptualizing and Accounting for Diversity 
 
 
Nicole Bolleyer and Saskia Pauline Ruth 
 
 
 
Introduction: Cross-national Research on Party Organization in Latin America 
In a widely cited review article on research on Latin American parties, Levitsky urged us 
more than ten years ago to develop more nuanced conceptual frameworks able to differentiate 
various dimensions of party organization such as organizational density, level of 
institutionalization or degree of state penetration, immediately conceding that such efforts are 
seriously constrained by the lack of data (2001, pp. 106-7). This paper addresses this gap by 
first conceptualizing and mapping out the diversity of party organization across 18 Latin 
American democracies, second, by theorizing the conditions that enable or motivate party 
elites to invest in and build different types of extra-parliamentary party structures and third, 
by empirically testing these claims across more than 80 parties in Latin America.  
Patterns of party building are important for the viability and functioning of Latin American 
democracy because institutionalized parties are conducive to the stabilization of patterns of 
party competition as well as the anchoring of political parties in society. While 
institutionalized party systems provide one foundation for meaningful party competition and 
thus meaningful choices of voters, linkages of parties as organization to local communities 
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simultaneously facilitate the channelling of preferences from citizens to those party elites that 
operate in democratic institutions.
 
Both are crucial elements to assure the electoral 
accountability of political representatives to citizens (e.g. Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; 
Randall & Svåsand, 2002; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Svåsand, 2013). 
While the party literature on advanced democracies tries to account for the decline of extra-
parliamentary party structures (usually associated with an elaborate membership organization 
with local branches set up across the country) and the simultaneous strengthening of party 
representatives in public office, the puzzle in new democracies is why overall elite-dominated 
parties should invest in extra-parliamentary structures in the first place. If parties are born in 
the state and if creating a structural and permanent anchoring in society as associated with the 
mass party model is indeed time-consuming, labour-intense and only chosen when no other 
feasible option is available (Biezen, 2005, p. 155), (relatively) weakly organized parties as 
widely observed in Latin American parties seem an obvious outcome. Further considering the 
diversity of Latin American party organization, the puzzle we encounter in Latin America is 
reversed: why do parties that operate in an environment incentivizing electoral, ‘catch-all’ 
strategies that prioritize manoeuvrability
11
 invest in the creation of permanent extra-
parliamentary structures at all, rather than investing scarce resources only temporarily during 
election time? Similarly, when and why do they build up and maintain a permanent social and 
community presence? 
To address these questions, we provide a systematic mapping of extra-parliamentary party 
structures using the concept of institutionalization as our analytical starting-point. We 
conceptualize and capture two separate properties contributing to institutionalization –
routinization and value infusion- as distinguished by Panebianco (1988). He associates 
routinization with increasingly rule-guided and regularized intra-organizational processes, 
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 Presupposing a high level of manoeuvrability and flexibility of the party leadership to respond to changes in 
public opinion and increasingly volatile electorates, these strategies are in tension with stable ties to particular 
groups and their interests able to cultivate long-term loyalties (Kirchheimer, 1966).  
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while value infusion denotes followers’ growing socialization into the organization, implying 
their emotional affiliation to the party organization as such (Panebianco 1988, p. 49; p. 53; 
see on this also Janda, 1980; Levitsky, 1998). We show that Latin American parties spread 
across three of four possible structural configurations of (high or low) routinization and value 
infusion (i.e. we find a considerable number of ‘mixed’ cases) – reflecting the importance of 
this distinction. Consequently, we theorize which conditions enable and motivate elites to set 
up structures conducive either to routinization, value infusion or to both. We do so drawing 
on the prolific literatures on party organization (their formation and evolution) in old and new 
democracies
12
, conditions that can be systematically grouped, being tied either to the nature 
of party-state relations, to dynamics of party competition in the political arena or to party-
societal relations.  
To test our framework, we estimate logistic random-intercept multilevel models with 
routinization and value infusion as dependent variables using the recently compiled 
Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (DAES – Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt et al., 
2009) which provides us with structural proxies for routinization and value infusion 
respectively. Testing our framework, we find that, with the exception of a party’s access to 
presidential office and the sequence of party and regime formation, which positively affect 
both routinization and value infusion, each property conducive to parties’ overall  
institutionalization is significantly affected by different explanatory variables: while party 
system fragmentation and strong ties to unions significantly increase a party’s probability of 
having a routinized party structure, party ideological extremeness significantly increases a 
party’s probability of investing in value infusion.  
Our findings highlight that routinization and value infusion neither always go together, nor 
are they necessarily shaped by the same variables, reinforcing Levitsky’s point (1998) that 
                                                          
12
 See, for instance, Duverger 1951, Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1995; Biezen 2005; 
Birnir 2005; Kitschelt 2000; Levitsky 1998; 2001; Kitschelt and Kselman 2010.  
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institutionalization needs to be treated as a multifaceted phenomenon for scholarship to arrive 
at a nuanced understanding of party development, not only in Latin America but also in other 
regions. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for Latin 
American democracy and for cross-national party research more generally. 
 
Extra-parliamentary Party Building in Latin America 
To map out the diversity of extra-parliamentary party structures in Latin America, we refer to 
a concept that has been fruitfully applied to study party evolution in various contexts already: 
party institutionalization, capturing an organization’s development towards consolidation 
(e.g. Panebianco, 1988; Janda, 1980; Huntingon, 1968; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; 
Levitsky, 1998; Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Drawing on Panebianco’s seminal book (1988), 
discussions on parties’ internal life tended to evolve around two core dimensions of 
institutionalization: value infusion and routinization (e.g. Levitsky, 1998; Randall & Svåsand, 
2002; Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006).
13
 Routinization takes place when processes within 
parties become more rule-guided, regularized and less dominated by the idiosyncratic choices 
of leaders, a process becoming visible in an increasingly elaborate infrastructure (1988, p. 49; 
p. 53). Value infusion shows when party followers –through their socialization into an 
organization – start caring about the survival of the party as such, rather than seeing it as a 
mere instrument to achieve a set of ideological goals or being solely attached to the current 
leader. It denotes the development of an emotional attachment to the party as such. As a 
consequence, a highly institutionalized organization is separate from and can survive without 
its present leadership (Janda, 1980, p. 19) and more fundamentally without its party founder 
(Levitsky, 1998, p. 82). 
                                                          
13
 A party’s autonomy from its environment, a third dimension Panebianco considered as important – which 
Randall and Svåsand (2002, p. 13) classified as the ‘external dimension’ of party institutionalization – is not 
considered here, due to the focus on the party’s internal dynamics. Further note that Randall and Svåsand use a 
different terminology to capture routinization and refer to ‘systemness’ instead. 
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Naturally, Panebianco’s classical conceptualization reflects his empirical focus on (long-
established) parties in Western Europe and, with it, the importance of the mass party as 
template, an organization in which high routinization and value infusion are linked 
(Duverger, 1951). Yet while a routinized organization that is also strong in generating 
organizational loyalty can be considered more institutionalized than an only routinized 
organization (since both routinization and value infusion contribute to a party’s stability and 
resilience), they do not necessarily go together. The concepts target qualitatively distinct 
phenomena: routinization becomes manifest in the nature of party procedures and processes, 
while value infusion refers to emotional attachment of followers to the organization. This also 
suggests that they become manifest in different organizational features, through which elites 
of newly formed parties can attempt to foster routinization or value infusion respectively (see 
2.1). 
Confronted with patterns of party organization in Latin America distinct from Western 
Europe, Levitsky (1998) saw the need to differentiate between the two more clearly and 
urged scholars to unpack the concept and to examine to which extent the two dimensions 
routinization and value infusion really coincide. Levitsky’s work on the Justicialist Party (PJ) 
in Argentina (2003) has served as his prime example of an institutionalized party with high 
value infusion without strong routinization, a configuration successively observed in other 
Latin American parties such as for example the Peruvian APRA (Graham, 1992; Burgess & 
Levitsky, 2003). Simultaneously, recent work on new parties in established democracies has 
highlighted that organizationally new parties formed by individual entrepreneurs (be these 
defecting politicians or political outsiders) often attempt to routinize procedures to support 
intra-parliamentary and intra-party coordination as well as conflict resolution with little 
interest in extra-parliamentary party building conducive to value infusion (Bolleyer, 2013, pp. 
216-217). This pattern of functionally driven routinization is relatively wide-spread among 
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new parties in advanced democracies and can be dominant in new democracies (Svåsand, 
2013, p. 265). Biezen’s work on Eastern-Central Europe showed parties to create a branch 
structures typical for Western Europe, without cultivating an active membership (2005, pp. 
155-156), a discrepancy also found in Latin America (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006, p. 179). 
Consequently, Levitsky’s work on party institutionalization (a concept that originated in 
Western Europe) in Latin America and its successive application in other regions (including 
old and new democracies) highlights that – if the assumptions driving concept formation are 
made explicit –conceptual travel can be a fruitful enterprise. 
 
Measuring Institutionalization: Organizational Properties Conducive to Routinization and 
Value Infusion 
While institutionalization is a suitable conceptual choice, it is rarely measured directly in 
large-N studies. Strictly speaking, institutionalization denotes the process towards 
consolidation (Panebianco, 1988, pp. 18-20; pp. 53-55) rather than a fixed organizational 
property. Furthermore, particularly value infusion is difficult to measure directly across a 
wide range of cases, since cross-nationally comparable survey data capturing party members’ 
orientations are rare. To circumvent these limitations, rather than capturing the two 
dimensions directly, we look at whether party elites have invested in structural mechanisms 
likely to foster routinization or value infusion respectively or whether they don’t. These 
structural mechanisms can be measured directly. 
Routinization of the extra-parliamentary party organization is supported by the presence of a 
permanent infrastructure on the local level as opposed to punctual use of local staff and local 
offices at election time. The presence of permanent structures is not equivalent with the 
creation of formal party branches in the traditional (Western European) sense but can be 
assured by networks of local intermediaries (Kitschelt & Kselman, 2010, pp. 3-4; see also 
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Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006), i.e. permanence does not presuppose a particular 
organizational form. Neither does it imply that these structures serve a particular purpose or 
are used for particular activities, as earlier reference to the discrepancy between the presence 
of an infrastructure and the absence of member activism illustrated.
14
  
This leads us to a second dimension relevant to generate institutionalization: the activities for 
which local structures are used. This usage of structures gives us an indication of whether 
they are likely to foster value infusion among followers. Wilson’s seminal book on political 
organization (1973) has stressed that most organizations will try to combine the provision of 
different incentive types to followers to stabilize voluntary support which voluntary 
organizations such as parties continuously depend on, since their membership is non-
compulsory and can exit any time. He distinguishes selective incentives available to 
individual followers (e.g. career opportunities or access to material resources) from collective 
incentives (e.g. party identification linked to particular ideological convictions) and solidary 
incentives (e.g. involvement in social activities) available to party members generally. Value 
infusion can be associated with the latter two incentive types, since it captures followers’ 
non-instrumental attachment to the organization. In terms of structural mechanisms, such an 
attachment is likely to be fostered by on-going, local activities reinforcing the collective 
attachment to the party as a social group and promoting a cause, while providing solidary 
incentives by giving members the possibility to socially engage with others in such activities.  
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 Note that differentiation is equally applicable in old and new democracies. Other than the programmatically 
structured party systems in advanced democracies party competition in Latin America can be also strongly 
shaped by clientelistic and charismatic linkages (Kitschelt et al., 2010). However, these linkages do not generate 
different kinds of extra-parliamentary party organization. While programmatic parties tend to use party 
membership organizations or collateral organizations to cultivate a shared attachment to policy positions, 
clientelistic parties may use similar structures to distribute selective incentives, identify and monitor potential 
clients (Kitschelt, 2000). Similarly, personalistic linkages can be maintained through a range of organizational 
structures (Roberts, 2002).  
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Party Organization in 18 Latin American Democracies: An Analytical Mapping 
The DAES survey contains items that allow us to capture whether parties a) have established 
permanent local structures or not
15
 (a central mechanisms supportive of routinization) and 
whether parties maintain a social and community presence by holding social events for local 
members or by sustaining ancillary social groups or not
16
 (a central mechanism supportive of 
value infusion). Note that the use of the particular indicator for routinization focuses on 
permanency and therefore does not create a bias in favour of formal organization (what 
Kitschelt and Kselman (2010) call ‘formal extensiveness’). It embraces both formal and 
informal structures. While the DAES survey contains an item measuring party reliance on 
local intermediaries (‘informal extensiveness’) separately, cross-tabulation shows that there 
are no parties that heavily rely on local intermediaries without having permanent local 
infrastructures as well. Table 1 shows an empirical mapping of the 88Latin American parties 
based on the two variables. 
 
Table 1: Routinization and Value Infusion in Extra-Parliamentary Parties 
  Routinization 
  Low High 
V
a
lu
e 
In
fu
si
o
n
 
Low 
 
Weakly Institutionalized 
Parties 
N=25 
 
 
Functionally Routinized 
Parties 
N=24 
High 
 
Value Infused, Non-
routinized Parties 
N=0 
 
Strongly Institutionalized 
Parties 
N=39 
 
Notes: Based on DAES data. 
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 Question A1: “Do the following parties or their individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the 
local or municipal-level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?” 
Questionnaire DAES, https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html (accessed 7 January 2013). 
16
 Question A2: “Do the following parties’ local organizations maintain a permanent social and community 
presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining ancillary social groups such as party 
youth movements, party cooperatives or athletic clubs?” Questionnaire DAES, 
https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html (accessed 7 January 2013). 
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Table 1 provides several interesting insights. Most fundamentally, the relatively even spread 
of parties across three of our four categories reflects a high level of diversity in how Latin 
American parties organize, as frequently stressed by experts (e.g. Levitsky, 2001; Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007). Most parties adopt structural mechanisms conducive to either high 
routinization/high value infusion or low routinization/low value infusion of extra-
parliamentary structures, indicating that the two dimensions of institutionalization are 
empirically linked. At the same time, the number of functionally routinized parties underpins 
Levitsky’s point that we cannot simply assume such a link ex ante. 24 parties – nearly 30% – 
have adopted permanent local structures without engaging in ongoing local activities 
conducive to value infusion among followers, echoing work on party organization in new 
democracies in Latin America (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006) but also in Central-Eastern 
Europe (Biezen, 2003; 2005) and Africa (Svåsand, 2013). Latin American examples are the 
Republican Proposal Party (PRO) in Argentina, the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) and the 
Patriotic Society Party (PSP) in Ecuador. We do not find parties that maintain a community 
presence and foster value infusion without relying on permanent structures at least in some 
constituencies. The most strongly populated category contains parties that have invested in 
(some) permanent structures in which membership activities take place on an ongoing basis 
and ties to ancillary groups are cultivated.  
While the literature tends to stress the weakness of party organization in Latin America, 
Table 1 suggests that while these parties might be less institutionalized than parties in 
established democracies, strategies of social incorporation should not be simply dismissed as 
‘least likely strategy’ of party elites to stabilize a support base in new democracies. In this 
context it is important to note that this category of (relatively) strongly institutionalized 
parties includes state-centred party machines such as the Colorado Party (ANR) in Paraguay, 
labour-based patronage parties such as the Justicialist Party (PJ) in Argentina, and 
10 
 
programmatic mass-parties such as the Brazilian Workers Party (PT). Consequently, our 
operationalization avoids dismissing any party organization distinct from the mass party 
model as weakly institutionalized. 
The overall distribution suggests a permanent infrastructure facilitates the maintenance of a 
community presence and the latter is one (but not the only) reason why local party building is 
worthwhile. The ‘mixed configuration’ of functionally routinized parties suggests that there 
are other motivations than maintaining societal linkages that lead to investments in permanent 
local structure such as purely electoral motivations or the distribution of selective incentives 
(e.g. Social Party of National Unity (PU) in Colombia; Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE)). In 
the next section we present our framework on factors that shape the capacity and motivation 
of party elites to invest in the formation or permanent structures and to use them to cultivate 
an active and loyal membership. 
 
A Framework on Conditions for Party Building in New Democracies: Capturing the 
Capacity and Motivations of Elites 
How can we account for whether Latin American party elites build permanent branch 
structures (our proxy for routinization) and whether they attempt to maintain a community 
presence(our proxy for value infusion)? Drawing on the theoretical literature on party 
formation, evolution and adaptation, we specify – taking an elite-centred perspective – three 
sets of factors that either enable or motivate party elites to invest in such structures in Latin 
American democracies, contexts that are commonly considered as unfavourable to extra-
parliamentary party building. 
Models of party organization developed in Western Europe are prominent analytical tools and 
frequently referred to in studies on party organization in new democracies. ‘Conceptual 
travel’, however, has proved a challenging enterprise. Biezen (2005), for instance, highlights 
11 
 
the ‘transformative bias’ of theory building on parties through party organizational models 
which tend to be conceptualized as responses to ‘predecessor models’ (e.g. Kirchheimer’s 
catch-all party (1966) or Panebianco’s ‘electoral professional’ party (1988) are considered as 
successors of Duverger’s mass party (1951)). Yet ‘predecessors’ usually do not exist in the 
case of relatively recently formed parties in new democracies leading to a conflation of party 
formation and party change (Biezen, 2005, p. 149; see also Biezen, 2003).  
Thus, the question to be asked in new democracies is which structures do these newly formed 
parties adopt and why, not how they adapt their structures already in place. Furthermore, as 
we may not conflate formation of new structures with the change of old ones, we also should 
avoid conflating elites’ motivations driving party building with their capacity to make certain 
organization choices, two analytical distinctions that underpin the following hypotheses that 
specify conditions incentivizing the formation of party structures conducive to routinization, 
value infusion or to both. 
 
Differences in Party-State Relations and Patterns of Party Institutionalization 
Taking seriously the difference between party change and formation, we need to consider 
problems of resource scarcity that affect party building in new democracies, where parties 
were – after transition –suddenly confronted with the pressure to run democratic elections 
and win over volatile electorates. Rather than to expect that state resources weaken elite 
motivations to maintain an already formed membership organization as argued in the 
literature around the cartel party theorizing party change (Katz & Mair, 1995; 2009), access 
to state resources such as permanent party subsidies or resources linked to government office 
should have a positive effect on parties’ capacity to build an infrastructure.17 Thus, 
permanent state subsidies received by the party organization (rather than received by 
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 See for a study that shows the positive link between party system institutionalization and state funding in new 
Eastern democracies Birnir (2005). For a study that shows a significant negative effect of low access barriers to 
formal party funding on the likelihood of new party death in advanced democracies see Bolleyer (2013). 
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individual candidates) should increase the capacity of elites to build a permanent 
infrastructure (a mechanism conducive to routinization), since the latter is a resource-
intensive process. Simultaneously, there is no direct link between permanent subsidies and 
the specific purposes elites use these structures for such as social activities to strengthen 
member attachment, i.e. value infusion. We therefore arrive at the following hypothesis: 
 
H1 (Permanent Subsidies Hypothesis): Parties operating in a system with access to 
permanent subsidies to the party organization (rather than electoral subsidies) are 
more likely to be routinized than those that operate in systems without such funding 
access. 
 
Moving to indirect resource access through government office, the occupation of the 
presidency is doubtlessly the biggest prize a party can acquire in presidential regimes, 
especially in Latin America where presidential dominance is a common feature (see for a 
systematic overview Mainwaring and Shugart1997; with respect to the concept of delegative 
democracy see O’Donnell 1994). The link between such indirect resource access through 
presidential office and routinization is equivalent to the effect we expect from party subsidies, 
i.e. it should increase a party’s capacity to build a permanent infrastructure. Moving to value 
infusion, unlike permanent subsidies that tend to be accessed by the large majority of parties 
gaining parliamentary representation (which all parties studied in this paper have achieved) 
including very minor ones (Casas-Zamora, 2005), presidential parties tend to be major 
players in their party systems. They need to gather and sustain support across a wide range of 
relatively diverse constituencies, which positively incentivizes active attempts to cultivate 
loyalties (also) through the provision of solidary and collective incentives, rather than to rely 
solely on selective incentives that are most effective when targeting specific groups (Kitschelt 
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& Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2007). A party’s time in presidential office should therefore not 
only affect its capacity to routinize but also its motivation to generate value infusion through 
organizational means positively. 
 
H2 (Presidential Office Hypothesis): The longer a party has taken over presidential 
office in the regime it currently operates, the more likely to be routinized and to 
generate value infusion. 
 
Catch-All Strategies, Party Competition and Patterns of Party Institutionalization 
Arguing that ‘it is difficult to think of a major Latin American party that has not been 
described as a catch-all party’, Levitsky warned us of ‘uncritical conceptual borrowing’ 
covering differences between organizationally very distinct parties (2001, p. 107). This 
drawback seems to at least partially root in the insufficient differentiation between parties’ 
electoral strategies and their organizational characteristics, which reflects the close 
entanglement of changing patterns of party competition on the system level with adaptation 
processes on the party-level (Kirchheimer, 1966; Katz & Mair, 1995). Major parties with 
weak societal roots – facing electorates in which party identification is weak and volatility 
high – might indeed tend towards ‘catch-all strategies’, electoral strategies not directed 
towards mobilizing clearly delineated group support that try to reach all corners of society, a 
negative specification indicating that the catch-all model is conceptualized in terms of its 
deviation from the mass party (Biezen, 2005: 149). The picture starts to blur, however, once 
moving into a Latin American context, where parties are often born in the state and elite-
dominated from their inception (Levitsky, 2001, p. 104-6; Biezen 2005, p. 154). Applying 
Western party models, party organization in Latin America appears as generally weak and we 
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fail to account for ‘the wide array of party types’ that exist (Levitsky 2001, p. 107), as 
visualized by our above mapping (see Table 1).  
Clearly, a simple transfer of concepts has its limitations. Yet adopting again an elite-centred 
perspective and focusing on catch all behaviour as electoral strategy, we can theorize 
contextual conditions incentivizing this strategy from the perspective of party elites. Such a 
strategy presupposes a high level of manoeuvrability and flexibility of elites (e.g. to moderate 
the party’s position or blur its ideological profile) associated with the catch-all party, which 
disincentivizes the creation of stable and permanent linkages to particular groups or interests 
and thereby those mechanisms conducive to institutionalization associated with the mass 
party. Those conditions that incentivize the engagement in electoral catch-all strategies can 
therefore be expected to compromise the extra-parliamentary party building, a tension that 
underpins the following hypotheses. It suggests that in countries where incentives for 
pursuing catch-all strategies are lower and for parties for which catch-all strategies are more 
difficult to pursue, investments in an institutionalized extra-parliamentary structure are more 
likely. More specifically, we can derive two hypotheses linking the nature of party 
competition to the benefits party elites are likely to associate with their organization’s 
institutionalization.  
Unlike the hypotheses capturing party-state relations predominantly concerned with questions 
of capacity for party building, the following hypotheses refer to elite motivations to build an 
institutionalized organization. The rationale to invest in the latter is stronger for ideologically 
extreme parties and for parties that operate in fragmented party systems. Under such 
conditions, catch-all strategies are difficult to pursue. Since both the creation of permanent 
structures and the cultivation of loyalty through these structures help to build stable group ties 
as alternative to catch-all organizational strategies, the following two hypotheses do not 
differentiate between routinization and value infusion. 
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H3 (Party Extremeness Hypothesis): The further away a party is from the ideological 
centre, the weaker the incentives for party elites to pursue a catch-all electoral 
strategy, thus, the more valuable organizational investments and activities to create a 
stable support base, i.e. the more likely elites invest in routinized structures and 
structures/activities supporting value infusion. 
 
H4 (Fragmentation Hypothesis): The more competitors a party faces in its party 
system, the weaker the incentives for party elites to pursue a catch-all strategy, the 
more valuable organizational investments and activities to create a stable base, i.e. the 
more likely elites invest in routinized structures and mechanism structures/activities 
supporting value infusion. 
 
Party-Society Relations and Patterns of Party Institutionalization 
We find significant differences in the extent to which parties can rely on other types of 
support unrelated to the current regime, which brings us to our last set of explanatory factors. 
Support of societal groups can help relatively fluid party organizations to stabilize (Randall & 
Svåsand, 2002). They  are  able not only to provide resources but also a recruitment pool of 
loyal followers for the party, which generates the capacity of party elites to build a  
permanent infrastructure and the motivation to cultivate loyalty through social activities and 
ancillary organizations.  
While parties can be associated with different types of groups (Allern & Bale, 2011; Bolleyer 
& Bytzek, 2013), ties to labour movements have been stressed as particularly important in the 
Latin American context (e.g. Collier & Collier, 1991; Murillo, 2001; Burgess, 1999; 
Valenzuela, 1994; Murillo & Schrank, 2005). The impact on institutionalization of union ties 
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can be expected to be particularly strong not only because these organizations tend to possess 
wide-spread local infrastructures that should facilitate the formation of permanent party 
structures. Unions –similar to traditional mass parties in Western Europe that profited from 
union ties – tend to pursue a strategy of social incorporation aiming at the cultivation of 
strong identities, identities that unlike other groups effectively link a strong economic with a 
strong ideological dimension. We therefore expect union ties to be particularly conducive to 
institutionalization. Parties with strong union ties do not only have the resources to build an 
organization but are likely to adopt strategies of social incorporation similar to those 
employed by unions, which suggests a positive impact on routinization and value infusion. 
 
H5 (Union Ties Hypothesis): In a party with historical ties to unions, elites are more 
likely to invest in routinized structures and structures/activities supporting value 
infusion than in a party without such ties. 
 
While many parties are created in the current democratic regime, we also find parties that 
have already existed before and thus outside of it. By default, these parties must have been 
able to rely on other support than resources made available post-transition. Otherwise they 
would not have survived the transition. They also cannot have been fully dependent on 
resources linked to the predecessor regime, otherwise they would have died with it, instead of 
surviving its downfall thanks to loyalties transcending the latter.
18
 Similarly, parties that were 
outlawed in the predecessor regime but re-emerged after the return to democracy must have 
been able to rely on durable loyalties separate from the former or current regime (Geddes & 
Frantz, 2007; Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011).
19
 We therefore need to consider the timing of party 
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 Examples are the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in El Salvador, the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in Panama.  
19
 Examples are the Broad Front (FA) in Uruguay, the Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh), and the Justicialist Party 
(PJ) in Argentina. 
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formation in relation to the set-up of the current democratic regime, since it shapes a party’s 
relative dependency on the latter. We can hypothesize that parties that predate the current 
regime (although their respective position in the predecessor regime might have been 
different) have a bigger capacity to institutionalize (both in terms of routinization and value 
infusion) after transition than parties formed during or post transition, since the former had 
already successfully mobilized support before the current regime was even established.
20
 
 
H6 (Formation Sequence Hypothesis): In a party that was formed before the last 
democratic transition, elites are more likely to invest in routinized structures and 
structures/activities supporting value infusion than in a party that was formed in the 
current regime. 
 
Data, Measurements and Model Choice 
To test our six hypotheses, the following analysis draws on a cross-sectional data set that 
combines expert ratings on political parties’ organizational characteristics and electoral 
statistics in 2008 with data on chief executives from 1978-2008 in 18 Latin American 
democracies
21
. By focusing on the Latin American region we minimize the need for country-
level controls. All countries in this region are presidential regimes and share similar 
structures of horizontal accountability (Mainwaring & Shugart ,1997; O’Donnell. 1994) and 
most of them experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s or 1980s and phases of re-
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s (see for example Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005). 
Our analysis includes all parliamentary parties covered in the Democratic Accountability 
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 The status of a party in relation to the current regime as captured by H6 is not to be equated with differences 
in party age. Recognizing the possible influence of the latter variable though, we add a control capturing party 
age to both of our models. 
21
 Those are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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Expert Survey (DAES –Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt et al., 2009)22 which leads to 88 
political parties from 18 countries (for a list of the parties covered per country see Appendix 
Table A2). 
 
Operationalization of Dependent and Explanatory Variables  
We capture routinization and value infusion as core dimensions of institutionalization 
through party organizational characteristics, which are measureable via the DAES data set: 
item A1 – the establishment of permanent local party structures (routinization) and item A2 – 
the maintenance of a social and community presence by a party (value infusion).
23
 As item 
A1 is measured on a 4-point scale we merge two categories to build a dummy variable where 
the value 1 indicates that the political party permanently maintains local offices in some or 
most districts, while the value 0 refers to political parties that either maintain local office only 
during national elections or do not maintain local offices at all. This coding reflects our 
conceptual focus on the difference between permanent and temporary structures, rather than 
the latter’s territorial scope. Item A2 is already constructed as a dummy variable and is 
introduced in our models as such (1 if the party maintains a permanent social and community 
presence; 0 if not). 
Moving to the explanatory variables, six variables are included in our two models, as 
specified in our theoretical framework. We further add one control variable to assure the 
robustness of our findings –party age.24 Two of our variables are measured at the system-
level, the remaining five at the party-level. The former are operationalized as follows: Direct 
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For more detail on the survey see https://web.duke.edu/democracy/. For most parties each item from the 
DAES used in our analysis is covered by at least 5 experts. For eight parties at least one item is covered by only 
4 expert ratings, for these parties we inspected each expert rating and in case of different accounts used 
additional qualitative data to validate the coding. Further note that the results reported in section 5 remain 
unchanged when excluding these cases. 
23
 See footnotes 6 and 7 for the exact wording of the questions. 
24
Randall and Svåsand stress – building on Huntington - that the time dimension is crucial to institutionalization. 
They argue that a party cannot be considered institutionalized if it is not able to survive over time (1999, p. 10). 
Turning this argument around, party building takes time, which is why we control for party age it in both of our 
models. 
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state funding for political parties is wide-spread in Latin America, yet existing funding 
regimes differ in whether they provide permanent subsidies supporting party organizations or 
whether they provide electoral subsidies only. Consequently, we create a dummy Permanent 
State Subsidies to test H1 based on the information provided by Casas-Zamora’s seminal 
study on comparative party funding (2005, p. 30-31, Table 1.6): in 11 of the Latin American 
countries we cover parties receive such permanent subsidies [1], in seven they do not [0]. 
Party System Fragmentation (H4) is measured based on seat shares capturing the effective 
number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). To calculate the index 
we use seat shares from the last election before 2009
25
 (see for descriptive statistics Appendix 
Table A1).  
Moving to the party-level variables, we measure the time period during which a party held 
Presidential Office to test H2. For each political party in the study we coded the number of 
years the party held the presidency since 1980 or the latest return to democratic rule.
26
 To 
measure a political party’s degree of extremeness relative to its competitors on the left-right 
ideological dimension (Party Extremeness) (H3) we adapt the ‘party nicheness’ index 
proposed by Meyer and Miller (2013).
27
 Data on left-right positions of political parties is 
taken from item D6 in the DAES data set.
28
 The indicator is calculated as follows: 
 
    √(    ̅  )
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 Data for the distribution of seats is provided online by most countries, detailed resources are available on 
request from the authors. 
26
 Data on presidents and their parties stem from www.rulers.org and www.ipu.org/parline/ . 
27
 Recent research on Latin America has shown that political elites consistently differentiate themselves and 
their political parties on a general left–right dimension (Saiegh, 2009; Zoco, 2006). The same picture arises 
when experts are asked to assess the positioning of political parties on the same dimension (Altman et al., 2009; 
Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009).  
28
 Question D6: “Overall Left-Right Placement: [1] Party is best located at the “left” of the national political 
spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework. [10] Party is best located at the 
“right” of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.” 
Questionnaire DAES, https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html (accessed 7 January 2013). 
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where    stands for a party’s position on the left-right scale and  ̅   for the average left-right 
position of all other parties in the party system. Thereby,  ̅   reflects the average left-right 
position in a hypothetical party system without party p. In two-party systems (e.g. Honduras 
in the present study)  ̅   is identical to the left-right score of the competitor party.
29
 
We further include a dummy variable Union Ties to test H5. Coding is based on item A8 in 
the DAES data set which asks Latin American experts to indicate the most relevant civil 
society organization a political party is strongly linked to.
30
 The dummy takes on the value 1 
if at least 50% of the experts regard unions as the most relevant civil society organization the 
party is linked to. In all other cases the dummy is coded 0. The dummy variable Formation 
Sequence (H6) captures the timing of party formation, i.e. whether a party has been formed 
before [1] or after [0] the latest transition to democratic rule, using the year of the first 
election since the latest transition to democracy as the reference date. Finally, a party is more 
likely to be institutionalized the older it is. Therefore we add a control variable capturing 
party age in years from foundation to formal dissolution or up to 2008 to each model. 
 
Model Choice 
Due to the binary nature of both dependent variables the statistical estimations rely upon a 
logistic regression model (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Long, 1997). Furthermore, the 
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 The indicator has several advantages compared to other proxies of ideological extremeness: firstly, it is 
measured on the party level and therefore more closely related to the causal argument made in the previous 
section than classical measures of party system polarization (Dalton, 2008; Taylor & Herman, 1971). Secondly, 
the measure accounts for differences between party systems so that a party’s extremeness is relatively high in 
polarized party systems compared to party systems with low ideological distance. Thirdly, it captures the 
concept in a single variable compared to the squared party mean solution 
30
 Question A8: „Political parties often have more or less routine and explicit linkages to civil society 
organizations such as unions, business or professional organizations, and cultural organizations based on 
religion, language, or ethnicity. The linkages might include leadership and membership overlap, mutual 
financial support, reserved positions for representatives of the organizations at National Conventions, etc. Do 
the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organizations. 
”Categories are [1] Unions, [2] Business associations and professional associations, [3] Religious Organizations, 
[4] Ethnic/ linguistic organizations, [5] Urban neighbourhood or rural associations/ movements, [6] Women’s 
organizations.  Questionnaire DAES, https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html (accessed 7 January 
2013). 
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application of multilevel estimation techniques is recommended because the data set is 
structured hierarchically – with parties nested in countries (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). 
Multilevel analysis accounts for hierarchical data structures where observations within the 
same context are not necessarily independent from each other. The variance component 
analysis shows that a considerable intra-class correlation of ρ=0.36 is given for routinization 
and a moderate intra-class correlation of ρ=0.07 for value infusion (see Snijders & Bosker, 
1999), indicating the appropriateness of multilevel analysis for our purposes. Statistical 
estimations for both dependent variables rely upon a logistic random- intercept model 
(Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010). The model is specified as follows: 
 
   (
   
      
)                    
 
subscript i (=1,…,N_j) denotes the level-1 units – here: parties – and subscript j (=1,…,J) 
refers to the level-2 units – here: countries. The linear predictor of the log odds of a party’s 
probability to have a routinized party structure is modelled by an intercept β0, a vector of 
coefficients of the party-level covariates βXij and a vector of coefficients of the country-level 
covariates βZj. For the country-level random effect U0j a normal distribution with a zero 
mean and a variance of σε
2
 is assumed. Party-level residuals follow from the probability of yij 
and are therefore not included in the equation (Snijders & Bosker 1999).
31
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In line with a logistic distribution the residual variance of level-1 is π2/3 (Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 224). 
Further note that we are aware that our sample size is relatively small. To avoid over-fitting the models we 
therefore limit our analysis to two country-level explanatory variables and five party-level variables. Prior to the 
estimation of each full model, we examined bivariate relationships with each explanatory variable. All variables 
in the analysis were either significant in the bivariate or the multivariate case. Goodness of fit measures indicate 
that both full models are preferable to all respective bivariate models.  
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Results and Discussion 
Results of logistic-random intercept estimations for both dependent variables are reported in 
Table 2, with Model 1 and 2 explaining the effects on routinization and Model 3 and 4 
explaining the effects on value infusion. To ease interpretations we report average marginal 
effects for all predictor variables in the full model (Table 2) as well as predicted probabilities 
of all significant effects (Table 3). 
Concerning model fit both full models (Model 2 and 4) are preferable to the respective base 
line model (Model 1 and 3) indicated by the goodness of fit measure (deviance decreases) as 
well as the amount of country-level variance. For Model 2 the country-level variance 
decreases from 1.84 in the null model to 1.04 in the full model and for Model 4 it decreases 
from 0.26 in the null model to 0.00. This conforms to a decrease of 12 percentage points of 
the intra-class correlation coefficient of the routinization model and 7 percentage points in the 
value infusion model. 
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Table 2: Results of random-intercept logistic multilevel analysis 
 DV = Routinization DV = Value Infusion 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Marginal 
effects Model 3 Model 4 
Marginal 
effects 
Country-Level 
   
   
Permanent State 
Subsidies
32
  
1.41  
(1.09) 
0.17  
(0.13) 
 
0.25  
(0.71) 
0.03  
(0.10) 
Fragmentation  
 
0.48* 
(0.25) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
 
0.12  
(0.13) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
 
Party-Level 
      
Presidential Office 
 
0.32** 
(0.13) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.33*** 
(0.09) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Union Ties 
 
2.63* 
(1.46) 
0.32* 
(0.17) 
 
0.49  
(0.81) 
0.07  
(0.11) 
Party Extremeness 
 
0.45  
(0.32) 
0.06  
(0.04) 
 
0.73** 
(0.30) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
Formation Sequence 
 
1.60  
(0.98) 
0.20* 
(0.12) 
 
2.06*** 
(0.76) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
Party Age 
 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
       
Constant 
1.23*** 
(0.48) 
–4.79** 
(1.88) 
 
-0.22  
(0.26) 
-4.95*** 
(1.42) 
 
Country-level 
variance 
1.84 1.04  0.26 0.00  
N (countries) 18 18  18 18  
N (parties) 88 88  88 88  
Intra-class 
correlation 
0.36 0.24  0.07 0.00  
Deviance 97.96 68.20  120.46 74.67  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Logistic random-intercept coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Average 
marginal effects are reported.  
 
For a graphical overview of the significant results in our analysis see Figure 1. Since the 
coefficient of the sequence of party formation in Model 2 misses conventional significance 
levels only narrowly (p=0.104), while the average marginal effect is significant at the 90 per 
cent confidence level, we include this effect in the graphical overview as well. As 
theoretically expected, political party’s experience in presidential office (H2), party system 
fragmentation (H4), party-union ties (H5), and a party’s formation sequence (H6) have 
significant effects on routinization. A political party’s time in presidential office (H2), its 
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 Although H1 (unlike H2-6) expects only an impact of state subsidies on routinization, we included the 
variable in both models to assure the comparability of our results 
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extremeness on the left-right dimension (H3), and the sequence of party formation (H6) have 
significant effects on value infusion. All effects have the theoretically expected positive sign, 
i.e. they increase the probability that structures conducive to party institutionalization have 
been created. Figure 1 also shows that only two variables have significant effects on both 
dependent variables, while another three shape one dimension alone, substantiating our 
emphasis on the need to analyse routinization and value infusion separately. 
 
Figure1: Overview of Explanatory Variables with Significant Effects 
 
Presidential Office (H2)  
 
Fragmentation (H4)  
  Routinization 
Party-Union Ties (H5)  
 
Party Formation Sequence (H6)  
 
 
Presidential Office (H2)  
 
Party Extremeness (H3)  Value Infusion 
 
Party Formation Sequence (H6)  
 
Notes: Explanatory variables affecting both dependent variables in italics. 
 
We discuss the results grouped along the three sets of factors distinguished in our framework: 
explanatory variables linked to the sphere of party-state relations, dynamics of party 
competition, and party-society relations in each of which we found relevant conditions 
shaping the capacity and/or motivation of elites to invest in organizational mechanisms or 
activities conducive to our two dimensions of institutionalization.  
Considering differences in party-state relations we hypothesized that access to permanent 
party subsidies provided by the state (H1) or government resources (H2) should increase a 
party’s capacity to build an infrastructure. While, the Permanent State Subsidies Hypothesis 
(H1) – which was only expected to impact the probability of a party’s routinization – cannot 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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be confirmed, the analysis reveals a positive and highly significant effect of a party’s 
experience in presidential office on its probability of having both a routinized party structure 
and infused value for party members, thereby confirming the Presidential Office Hypothesis 
(H2). Each additional year in presidential office increases the probability of routinizationby4 
percentage points (see average marginal effect of model 2). Furthermore, parties with more 
than 5 years in presidential office have a predicted probability of more than 80 per cent of 
being routinized. For parties with an experience of more than 10 years in presidential office 
the average predicted probability of having a routinized party structure even exceeds90 per 
cent (see Table 3). Figure 2 also indicates that parties that were able to win the presidency 
repeatedly (>5 – as most presidents are elected for a four or five year term)have a much 
higher probability of possessing a routinized party structure. The presidency provides these 
parties with a comparative resource advantage, thereby, facilitating the capital intensive 
building of permanent party structures. This finding yields to an interesting conclusion, while 
presidentialism in Latin America is said to reduce horizontal accountability (O’Donnell, 
1994) it seems to be conductive to electoral accountability as it induces political parties to 
routinize their party organization thereby increasing party system institutionalization 
(Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). 
Furthermore, an additional year in presidential office increases the probability of a political 
party to infuse their organizations value on average by 5 percentage points (Model 4). The 
predicted probability of value infusion for parties with more than 15 years of experience in 
presidential office exceeds 90 per cent, while those parties with no or very few years in 
presidential office have, on average, a predicted probability of only 24 to 51 per cent (see 
Table 3 and Figure 2). These results indicate that winning the presidency not only 
incentivises the building of permanent local party structures but also the maintenance of a 
party’s community presence. The findings are also in line with arguments made in the 
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literature that parties holding the presidency face incentives to behave as disciplined, 
coherent actors, thereby, strengthening the visibility of ideological positions vis-à-vis their 
supporters and increasing the value of the party label for rank and file members (Mainwaring 
& Shugart, 1997; Hicken & Stoll, 2011). 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Presidential Office (H2) 
 
 
Moving on to the dynamics of party competition and their impact on elites’ motivations to 
invest in extra-parliamentary structure we hypothesized in the theoretical part that these 
motivations should be stronger for ideologically extreme parties (H3) and parties that operate 
in fragmented party systems (4). With respect to the former, a political party’s extremeness 
on the ideological dimension within the party system has a positive and significant effect only 
on the probability that a party organization incentivises value infusion. A one unit increase in 
party extremeness induces an average marginal effect of 10 percentage points on a party’s 
probability of having infused value. Predicted probabilities of value infusion increase from a 
28 per cent chance for a party with nearly no extremeness to an82 per cent chance for a party 
with high extremeness (see Table 3). This effect is in line with the argument made above that 
extreme parties cater for homogenous voter groups and thereby differentiate themselves more 
clearly from their competitors. They do not only invest in the decidability of the offer within 
their party system, they also increase the potential identification of their voters with the 
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party’s ideological position or the group identity they address (Bartolini, 2000; Inglehart & 
Klingemann, 1976). For example, the most extreme party in the data set - the FMLN in El 
Salvador has a very distinct ideological outline and its supporters show high levels of 
attachment to their party due to the polarized nature of the party system and its extreme 
position compared to the other contenders in this system (Azpuru, 2010; Zeeuw, 2010). 
Concerning the Fragmentation Hypothesis (H4) the analysis confirms a significant and 
positive effect on a party’s probability to possess a routinized party structure, while no 
significant effect can be found on a party’s probability to invest in value infusion. As shown in Table 
3, the predicted probability of parties having built permanent local structures favourable to 
routinization increases from 56 per cent in party systems with an ENPP of 2 to a 91 per cent in a party 
system with eight effective parties. Thus, confirming our theoretical argument that political elites face 
stronger incentives to invest in extra-parliamentary party building conducive to routinization in highly 
fragmented party systems compared to party systems with few contenders. 
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Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Routinization and Value Infusion 
Dependent  
variable 
Explanatory  
variables 
Score 
Predicted  
probability
a
 
Confidence  
interval 
Routinization Country-Level 
   
 Fragmentation  2 0.56 0.37-0.75 
  4 0.69 0.57-0.82 
  6 0.82 0.68-0.95 
  8 0.91 0.77-1.05 
 Party-Level    
 Presidential office  0 0.60 0.44-0.75 
  5 0.82 0.70-0.93 
  10 0.94 0.85-1.03 
  15 0.99 0.94-1.03 
  20 0.99 0.98-1.01 
 Union ties 0 0.70 0.60-0.80 
  1 0.94 0.83-1.04 
 Formation Sequence 0 0.64 0.50-0.79 
  1 0.84 0.72-0.96 
Value Infusion Party-Level    
 Presidential office 0 0.24 0.13-0.35 
  5 0.51 0.40-0.63 
  10 0.78 0.62-0.94 
  15 0.93 0.82-1.04 
  20 0.98 0.94-1.03 
 Extremeness 0 0.28 0.17-0.39 
  2 0.45 0.37-0.52 
  4 0.63 0.49-0.78 
  6 0.82 0.59-1.05 
 Formation Sequence 0 0.28 0.14-0.41 
  1 0.61 0.47-0.75 
a Fixed proportion only. 
 
Finally the implications of party-society relations for party institutionalization have been 
theorized in the Union Ties Hypothesis (H5) and the Formation Sequence Hypothesis (H6). 
While the former is only significant for the routinization dimension, the formation sequence 
of a political party significantly impacts both routinization and value infusion. 
Concerning hypothesis 5, the probability of a routinized party structure is on average 0.32 
higher for parties with strong ties to unions compared to parties without such ties. As Collier 
and Collier (1991) showed, labour movement inclusion within Latin American political 
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systems in the first half of the 20
th
 century was often shaped by party incorporation. Several 
political parties in the region established ‘stable, institutionalized alliances’ with labour 
unions that were either formally or informally structured. To uphold these alliances and 
secure a long-term electoral support base, labour-backed political parties’ elites faced strong 
incentives to invest in the building of permanent party structures to coordinate their 
interaction with labour leaders (see Burgess, 1999, pp. 106-111).  
Finally, we argue that the sequence of party formation influences on party elites’ capacity to 
institutionalize their party’s organization. In line with hypothesis 6we find that for parties 
formed before the current regime the probability of routinization is on average 20 percentage 
points higher than for those formed during the current regime. The predicted probability of 
party routinization amounts to 84 per cent for parties formed before the current regime 
compared to 64 per cent for parties formed after the last transition to democratic rule (see 
Figure 3).Furthermore, the sequence of party formation (H6) relative to the latest democratic 
transition has a highly significant average marginal effect of 28 percentage points on a party’s 
probability of value infusion. The predicted probability of value infusion amounts to a 61 per 
cent chance for parties formed before the current regime compared to a 28 per cent chance for 
parties formed after the last transition to democratic rule. These results are in line with 
Geddes & Frantz finding that “authoritarian regimes that repress or outlaw parties freeze the 
pre-existing party system so that when competition is again allowed, the old parties usually 
emerge from repression, as from a deepfreeze, little changed and able to command substantial 
loyalty from voters” (2007, p. 26). Examples for such parties are the Broad Front (FA) in 
Uruguay or the Justicialist Party (PJ) in Argentina. 
To sum up, as already highlighted by Figure 1, routinization and value infusion are 
influenced by a different set of factors and do not necessarily need to coincide in one party. 
Simultaneously, we find that a political parties experience in presidential office as well as the 
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sequence of party formation and regime transition both exhibit a significant effect on a 
party’s probability of having a routinized party structure and infused value.  Finally, our 
analytical framework that focused on conditions shaping elite capacities and motivations to 
invest in institutionalized extra-parliamentary structures (in contexts that are commonly 
considered as unfavourable for party building) led us to identify conditions across three core 
spheres in which political parties need to operate, characterized by parties’ relations with the 
state, dynamics of party competition and their relations with society. Both dimensions of 
institutionalization are significantly affected by conditions located in each sphere (Table 3), 
which substantiates our decision against a more parsimonious approach, starting out from an 
either state- or a society centred perspective instead. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper examined under which conditions Latin American parties in 18 countries that 
operate in an environment incentivizing electoral, catch-all strategies invest in the creation of 
permanent extra-parliamentary structures, rather than investing scarce resources in 
organizational activities only temporarily during election time. Similarly, it assesses when 
they build up and maintain a permanent social and community presence. These two 
organizational features can be associated with the core dimensions of party 
institutionalization – routinization and value infusion respectively – whose presence or 
absence are crucial in the context of relatively young democracies where linkages between 
political elites and citizens tend to be only weakly developed. Political parties are 
traditionally seen as main mechanisms to assure a connection between the electorate and their 
representatives. Thus, the conditions under which parties create an infrastructure that allows 
citizens to engage politically on an on-going basis and, more importantly, to do so (also) for 
social purposes and thereby form an emotional attachment rather than solely engaging in 
31 
 
politics for functional reasons (e.g. to receive material benefits through clientelistic party 
networks) have important practical as well as normative repercussions. Mechanisms 
conducive to value infusion can help counter anti-party sentiments and alienation from 
politics that are wide-spread among citizens in Latin American democracies (see Payne, 
2006) strengthening the legitimacy of the regime. Simultaneously, party organization can 
provide a channel of communication from citizens to elites, a core element to assure the 
electoral accountability of representatives (e.g. Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Randall & 
Svåsand, 2002; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). By specifying the conditions that make the 
adoption by political parties of such an infra-structure likely, this article thus not only 
addresses an important empirical gap – theoretically driven large-N studies on the nature of 
Latin American party organization are rare (see for an exception Kitschelt & Kselman, 2011). 
It contributes to an important debate on the quality of democracy and the contribution parties 
are likely to make in the context of new democracies (Diamond & Gunther, 2001; Diamond 
& Morlino, 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano, & Pizarro, 2006). 
By employing concepts and theories mainly developed in the context of advanced 
democracies to specify core factors shaping the capacity and the motivations of party elites to 
invest in particular infrastructures, we demonstrate the usefulness to engage in ‘conceptual 
travel’ and derive systematic hypotheses around variables identified as important in other 
regional contexts. This does not necessarily imply the adoption of the same hypotheses, since 
we need to consider the difference between the formation of new party structures and the 
change of old ones (Biezen, 2005) and between elites’ motivations to engage in party 
building with their capacity to do so. Yet as far as parties as organization have to cope with at 
least partially similar challenges in old and new democracies, variables identified as 
important in old democracies should not be dismissed as irrelevant from the outset, they 
might exercise an effect in new democracies as well, even though we might – due to 
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contextual differences – expect a different one.33 Rather than a simple transfer of concepts or 
theories from one region to another that might lead to ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori, 1978), 
we propose their contextualization. While doing so takes seriously the specificities of 
respective contexts, it allows us to systematically specify similarities and differences between 
party development in old and new democracies in future research.  
Levitsky’s work on party institutionalization is not only a core example for this strategy, it 
has been one conceptual pillar of this paper. Classifying Latin American parties based on our 
proxies for routinization and value infusion respectively, confirms Levitsky’s important 
insight (1998) that routinization and value infusion – although as two dimensions of 
institutionalization they can be complementary, they need to be treated as separate 
phenomena. Not only do they not necessarily go together, our empirical analysis showed that 
they are not shaped by the same set of variables. While this paper contributed to the debate on 
the conditions for certain types of party organizations to emerge, future research will have to 
explore the actual effects of different dimensions of party organization on the democratic 
process. Party institutionalization – a precondition for party system institutionalization – is 
generally considered as beneficial for democracy (Huntington 1968; Mainwaring & Scully, 
1995). But once taking seriously that party institutionalization is multidimensional, the 
challenge becomes to differentiate its various effects. Research has stressed that a permanent 
local organization can be an important tool for clientelistic parties to allocate selective 
incentives (Kitschelt, 2000; Levitsky, 2001). This implies that some parties adopt routinized 
structures that establish functional linkages without contributing to value infusion, the 
cultivation of an emotional attachment of followers to the party and possibly an identification 
with the regime in which party representatives occupy core positions. Such functional 
linkages might support the survival of parties and support internal coherence, which, in turn, 
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 We expected an opposite effect of access to state funding or government resources on parties in Latin 
America than ‘cartel theory’ did in Western Europe. 
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helps stabilizing party competition. Yet this is not equivalent with possible effects of value 
infusion as specified earlier. Once understanding the conditions for different modes of party 
formation, future research faces the challenge to understand its consequences. Thanks to the 
availability of new datasets such as Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (DAES –
Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt et al., 2009) this will be possible, allowing us to go beyond 
general proxies of party institutionalization (e.g. party electoral volatility) and capture the 
nature of Latin American party organization in a more immediate and nuanced fashion. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Number Mean SD Min Max 
Country level      
Permanent State Subsidies 18 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Fragmentation 18 4.65 2.32 2.1 9.3 
      
Individual level      
Presidential Office 88 3.94 5.39 0 21 
Union Ties 88 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Party Extremeness 88 1.99 1.47 0.11 7.05 
Formation Sequence 88 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Party Age 88 38.88 42.12 2 172 
Notes: Calculations based on data from Casas-Zamora (2005), DAES, national election data, www.rulers.org and 
www.ipu.org/parline/.  
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Table A2: List of political parties 
Country Political parties 
Argentina Justicialist Party (PJ), Radical Civic Union (UCR), Front for Victory (FPV), 
Republican Proposal (PRO) 
Bolivia Movement for Socialism (MAS), Social and Democratic Power (PODEM(1)), 
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), National Unity Front (UN(1)) 
Brazil Liberal Front Party (PFL), Liberal Party-Party of the Republic (PL-PR), 
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), Progressive Party (PP(1)), 
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), 
Workers' Party (PT), Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), Democratic Labour Party 
(PDT), Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Popular Socialist Party (PPS(1)) 
Chile Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD), Independent Democratic Union 
(UDI), Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh), National Renewal (RN), Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC(1)), Party for Democracy (PPD) 
Colombia Colombian Liberal Party (PLC(1)), Colombian Conservative Party (PCC), 
Social Party of National Unity (PU), Radical Change (MCR), Alternative 
Democratic Pole (PDA), Citizens' Convergence (CC), Team Colombia 
Movement (MEC) 
Costa Rica Citizen's Action Party (PAC), National Liberation Parties (PLN(1)), 
Libertarian Movement Party (PML), Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) 
Dominican  
Republic 
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD(3)), Social Christian Reformist Party 
(PRSC), Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) 
Ecuador Social Christian Party (PSC(2)), Democratic Left (ID), Ecuadorian Roldosist 
Party (PRE), Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement (MUPP), Institutional 
Renewal Party of National Action (PRIAN), Patriotic Society Party (PSP) 
El 
Salvador 
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN), Party of National Conciliation (PCN), Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC(2));  
Guatemala Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), Grand National Alliance (GANA), 
National Advancement Party (PAN(1)), Patriotic Party (PP(2)), National 
Unity of Hope (UNE) 
Honduras Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH), National Party of Honduras (PNH) 
Mexico Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN(2)), 
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD(1)), Ecological Green Party of 
Mexico (PVEM), Convergence (CONV) 
Nicaragua Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN), Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC(2)) 
Panama Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD(2)), Panameñista Party (PA), 
Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIR), Solidarity Party(PS), 
Democratic Change (PCD), National Liberal Party(PLN(2)) 
Paraguay National Republican Association(ANR), Authentic Radical Liberal Party 
(PLRA), Beloved Fatherland Party (PPQ), National Union of Ethical Citizens 
(PUNACE), Democratic Progressive Party(PDP), Tekojoja Movement (MPT) 
Peru Union for Peru (UPP), American Popular Revolutionary Alliance(APRA), 
National Unity (UN(2)), Alliance for the Future (APF), Center Front (FDC) 
Uruguay National Party (PN), Colorado Party (PC), Broad Front (FA) 
Venezuela Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), For Social Democracy(PODEM(2), 
Fatherland for All (PPT), Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) 
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Figure A2a-b: Predicted Probabilities of Routinization 
a) b)  
 
Figure A3a-b: Predicted Probabilities of Value Infusion 
a) b)  
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Chapter 3 
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Populism in Latin America and  
the Deconstruction of Horizontal Accountability 
 
 
Saskia Pauline Ruth 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The phenomenon of populism poses many challenges to comparativists around the world. 
Due to different perspectives on the topic researchers especially struggle with conceptual 
clarity. For the purpose of this article, populism will be defined as a “thin-centred ideology”
34
 based on the division of the society in two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the 
people versus the elite. It is this kind of rhetoric that unites populists around the world. 
Especially in Latin America populism has a long history, many countries in this region 
experienced traditional forms of populism in the first half of the 20
th
 century. After the third 
wave of democratic transition put an end to military rule, populism as well returned, although 
in different shapes
35
. The reasons for the success of populist contenders are manifold: 
discontent with political elites, erosion of traditional partisan ties, mediatisation of politics, 
among other things
36
. By mobilizing these discontent citizens, populists around the world 
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even achieved government positions – either in coalition with established parties or through 
winning presidential elections
37
.  
However, comparative research on populism in public office only recently arose.
38
 Especially 
with respect to the relationship between populism and democracy it is important to investigate 
the consequences of populism in public office. Rovira emphasizes that populism may, on the 
one hand, serve as a corrective to democracy through addressing the underprivileged and 
incorporating citizens that were not or did not feel represented by established elites. On the 
other hand, populism may have a fierce relationship with institutions of liberal democracy.
39
 
This potential threat to liberal democracy should not be underestimated, especially in the 
context of new democracies with presidential systems like those in Latin America. According 
to Linz presidentialism is conducive to populism for two reasons: firstly, because the 
personalization of presidential elections enables the access of political outsiders to power, and 
secondly, because the style of presidential politics – due to the plebiscitarian legitimacy of 
presidents – is easily combined with a populist appeal40. Moreover, O’Donnell argues that 
presidential systems in Latin America resemble characteristics of delegative democracies, 
where majoritarian elements are strong while republican and liberal elements, like checks and 
balances or minority rights, are less pronounced
41
. Such delegative democracies are not only 
beneficial for the rise of populist newcomers, they also foster radical behaviour of populist 
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presidents vis-à-vis representative institutions
42
. Thus, a populist strategy may be perfectly fit 
to gain public office playing by the rules of the democratic game, but once in power positions 
the same populists may turn against core representative institutions to maintain power over 
time. Therefore, Torre generally opts for the analytical distinction between “populism as 
regimes in power ... [and] populism as wider social and political movements seeking 
power”43. This article follows the first analytical perspective. Due to the focus on presidential 
systems in Latin America throughout this article public office will be defined in a narrow, 
power related sense, which means that a populist party has to win the presidency to be 
considered as a case. Thus, a populist party is understood here as the party of a president 
elected via a populist mandate. 
The aim of this article is to investigate the behaviour of populist presidents towards 
representative democracy in Latin America since the 1980s. More specifically, the research 
question centres on the conduct of populist presidents towards institutions of horizontal 
accountability. Therefore I take an actor-centred approach focusing on specific constellations 
in the political arena that shape populist presidents’ behaviour towards these institutions.  
The article is organized as follows: The next section elaborates on the definition of populism 
and its relationship to representative democracy. The third chapter concentrates on the 
incentive structure of populist presidents. Research design and case selection are discussed in 
section four. Section five presents the results and the last section summarizes the theoretical 
arguments and concludes. 
 
Populism and democracy 
Populism poses a conceptual challenge to comparative researchers. It has been defined along 
the lines of feature lists or narrow core characteristics (e.g. organizational structure, social 
                                                          
42
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University Center for International Studies, 2000), p. 10. 
4 
 
base) which led to many versions of populism with adjectives
44
. Instead of focusing on a 
narrow definition of populism, a minimal conceptualization will be deployed here
45
. In line 
with the common reference to an anti-status quo discourse, populism is defined as “an 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”46. 
The content of the rather vague ideology is not part of the concept but determined through 
other ideological, programmatic or personalistic elements (e.g. socialism or neo-liberalism). 
The combination of the populist discourse with these elements determines the nature of the 
antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Thus, the recurrence to an anti-elite rhetoric 
and the statement to be the true party or person to represent ‘the good people’ in terms of their 
general will unites all populists. Whereby, other elements help to distinguish different forms 
of populism – such as left- or right-wing populism, neopopulism, or indigenous populism47.  
Concerning the relationship between populism and democracy Rovira as well as Mudde and 
Rovira have recently advanced the debate about the ambivalence between these two 
concepts.
48
 Building on Dahl’s definition of democracy these authors theorize potential 
positive or negative effects of populism alongside the dimensions of public contestation and 
political participation.
49
 
As mentioned before, a populist appeal is often used by new political parties or challengers 
within an existing party. As such populism seems to be a viable electoral entry strategy to 
challenge established elites. Several authors show that populism resembles a political strategy 
of mass mobilization, where a personalistic leader appeals to a heterogeneous group of 
                                                          
44
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45
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citizens that was formerly neglected by the political elite or excluded from political 
representation
50
. In this respect the election of a president via a populist mandate may be a 
response to a crisis of representation and a corrective to democracy itself
51
.  
Then again, the antagonistic nature and the moralistic style of the populist discourse are often 
directed against liberal democracy, which is based on political pluralism and the constitutional 
protection of minorities. Through the anchorage of populism in the imaginary concept of ‘the 
good people’, populism excludes those parts of society that do not fit into the (however 
defined) picture
52
. Hence the populist ideology is rooted in the representation of the people as 
a homogeneous group and negates the diversity of society inherent in the liberal principle of 
democracy, thus, resembling a similar logic with authoritarianism
53
. Taken together populism 
fosters a democratic practice based on plebiscitarian participation that runs counter to 
representative democratic institutions, especially parliaments
54
.  
This inherent tension between populism and liberalism is the reason why populists are 
perceived as a threat to democracy itself. Furthermore, as soon as populists gain government 
responsibility they face “problems of credibility”55, i.e. they risk to be perceived as unreliable 
if they behave like their opponents did. Assuming that populists are primarily office seekers – 
since they aspire to replace the incumbent political elite – the moment a populist party reaches 
government for the first time is a crucial phase in its lifespan. The transition from opposition 
to government evokes immense pressures on a populist party, especially if the content of the 
                                                          
50
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populist antagonism not only involved anti-elite appeals but is also directed against aspects of 
the political system as such
56
. 
To adapt to this pressure populists in public office may radicalize and turn themselves against 
established liberal democratic institutions. Institutional change triggered by populist 
presidents may pass through three stages: In the first place a populist president may try to 
debilitate the horizontal axis of accountability, (re)enforcing delegative democratic 
structures
57
. Instruments in this context are for example the excessive use of executive 
decrees, institutional reforms to weaken the legislature, majoritarian electoral reforms or the 
co-optation of the judiciary
58
. In a second stage, radical populist party behaviour may be 
directed against the vertical axis of accountability leading to types of political regimes 
labelled as competitive authoritarianism
59
. Typical forms of actions in this respect are the 
limitation of oppositional forces, manipulation of election results, and the excessive use of 
proactive referendums
60
. The third and final stage leads to the abolition of any kind of 
democratic facade, for example through a coup d’état. Thus, in the extreme case populism 
may lead to the abolition of democracy. However, populists may also abandon their 
antagonistic rhetoric once in office, “choose a path of moderation”61, and engage in ‘politics 
as usual’62. I argue in this article that the political context in which a populist president acts 
influences her behaviour towards established liberal-democratic institutions. Based on the 
literature, the next section identifies relevant conditions that build the incentive structure of 
populist presidents.  
                                                          
56
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Incentives for populist institutional change 
Institutional context Especially in the context of Latin American political systems the 
populist threat should be taken seriously, as Fujimori in Peru and Chávez in Venezuela show. 
Although the thresholds of success to gain public office in presidential systems are high, they 
provide favourable conditions for populist challengers, due to the high degree of 
personalization through the nationwide, direct election of the executive
63
. Furthermore, 
O’Donnell insightfully notes that some Latin American presidential systems are prone to be 
delegative democracies
64
. Although vertical accountability is normally implemented, they 
lack effective horizontal checks and balances necessary for liberal democracies to consolidate. 
Thus, delegative democracies resemble institutional characteristics favourable for the populist 
strategy. 
As mentioned before, populist presidents may try to change the political regime to their own 
benefit through institutional reform, manipulation of democratic rules, or through the 
execution of a coup d’état. Institutional change thus may affect both the horizontal and 
vertical dimension of democratic accountability. But which factors enable or hinder a populist 
president to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change? The behaviour of political actors 
is necessarily interrelated with the context in which they act
65
.  
There are several factors that constrain the room to manoeuvre of a populist president and it is 
important to systematically analyse these conditions. Thus, this article addresses the question 
which factors enable populist presidents to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change. 
Here the focus lies on the first signs of institutional depletion, i.e. a change of horizontal 
checks and balances in favour of the executive. Thereby, this article takes an inclusive 
approach with respect to the identification of radical populist behaviour. 
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Working hypotheses In this section I identify three conditions that constitute the incentive 
structure of populist presidents with respect to their behaviour towards the deconstruction of 
horizontal accountability. Firstly, the existence of a ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena, 
secondly, the presence of divided government between the executive and the legislature, 
thirdly, the distribution of public support. 
 
Power vacuum 
One condition that has been identified by several researchers as conducive to the rise of 
populism as well as the radical behaviour of populist presidents towards liberal-democratic 
institutions is the existence of a ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena66. The decay of 
established political elites may be exploited by populist challengers to carry out their radical 
agenda of institutional change, either by the adoption of new constitutions or the informal 
depletion of checks and balances
67
. Mayorga identifies two reasons that create such a ‘power 
vacuum’ in the political arena: the decay and breakdown of traditional party systems and/or a 
crisis of governability due to executive-legislative deadlocks
68
. An anti-status quo appeal 
combined with low rates of trust in established political elites and democratic institutions 
make institutional change viable for populist presidents
69
. Thus, institutionalized party 
systems and parties with stable societal roots may be a safeguard against radical institutional 
change. In such circumstances the existing political elite may exert a ‘moderating pull’ on 
those forces inclined to induce institutional change
70
. 
Hypothesis 1: A ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena leads to the deconstruction of 
horizontal accountability. 
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Divided government
 
 
Although presidential regimes are conducive to the rise of populist challengers to power, 
institutional provisions of checks and balances in those systems may considerably constrain 
populist presidents in realizing their political agenda. Executive-legislative conflicts are at the 
heart of what Linz conjured as the perils of presidentialism
71
. Cooperation between these two 
branches of government heavily depends on the seat share of the president’s party (or 
coalition) in either the single or both chambers of the congress
72
. Especially in Latin-
American presidential systems that combine plurality or majority run-off presidential 
elections with proportional representation formula for the election of their legislatures, 
situations of divided government frequently occur
73
. Divided government will be understood 
here as a situation where either an opposition party or stable coalition holds an absolute 
majority in at least one chamber of the congress (1), or the party (or stable coalition) of the 
president holds a minority or a plurality of less than 45% of seats in at least one chamber of 
the congress (2)
74
.  
Populist presidents that assume power in a context of divided government, face incentives to 
change or circumvent the institutional constraints by the legislature.  
Hypothesis 2: Divided government between a populist president and the legislature 
leads to the deconstruction of horizontal accountability. 
However, several studies provide evidence that situations of outright conflict between 
presidents and legislatures often result in the impeachment or declaration of incapacity of 
presidents
75. This seemingly ‘congressional supremacy’ does, however, not always result 
                                                          
71
 Linz. 
72
 Mainwaring and Shugart. 
73
 Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination,” Comparative 
Political Studies, 26 (July 1993), 198-228. 
74
 Mainwaring and Shugart; Matthew S. Shugart, “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided 
Presidential Government,” The American Political Science Review, 89 (June 1995), 327-343. 
75
 E.g. John M. Carey, “Presidentialism and Representative Institutions,” in Jorge I. Domínguez and  Michael 
Shifter, eds., Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
10 
 
from the strength of legislatures. While the military has been the ‘moderating power’ in 
solving executive-legislative conflicts before the 1980s – a fact that contributed to the 
conclusion of Linz that presidential systems are prone to regime instability
76
 – Hochstetler 
illustrates that since the third wave of democracy, the public resumes the role of a moderator 
in executive-legislative dissolution processes
77
. This leads us to the third and final condition. 
 
Popular support 
In presidential systems the executive is not only constrained by the legislature or other 
institutions of checks and balances but also by its principal. Electorates are not necessarily a 
‘passive but cheering audience’ 78 after they elected a president but rather take an active role 
in presidential falls and executive-legislative conflicts. The possibility that a presidential 
mandate may be withdrawn through popular protest challenges one central characteristic of 
presidentialism: the fixed term limits
79
.  
However, while Anderson shows that informal vertical accountability mechanisms – like 
popular mobilization – may restrain presidential dominance in executive-legislative 
relationships, strong popular support in favour of the president may foster presidential 
dominance and even radical behaviour of presidents to restructure liberal-democratic 
institutions
80
. Thus, the margin of safety of presidents and their ability to pursue a radical 
strategy of institutional change depends on their skill to sustain popular support.  
Hypothesis 3: High popular support for populist presidents leads to the deconstruction 
of horizontal accountability. 
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The behaviour of populist presidents towards horizontal accountability follows a complex 
pattern and cannot be explained by a single condition alone. Thus, I assume an interactive 
pattern of conjunctural causation with respect to the conditions that make up the incentive 
structure of populist presidents. Neither condition is expected to be individually necessary and 
sufficient to bring about the outcome, but the combination of these conditions may result in 
different causal paths that lead to a reduction of horizontal accountability.  
 
Research design and operationalization 
The present study constitutes a first empirical sketch of the conditions that shape populist 
presidents’ incentives to interfere with institutions of horizontal accountability. The three 
hypotheses stated in the previous chapter will be tested by means of a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis – QCA – which allows to model situations of complex causality.81 
QCA is especially suited for research designs with low- or medium numbers of cases. Based 
on Boolean algebra the method helps to identify those conditions that bring about a defined 
outcome. With crisp set QCA both the conditions as well as the outcome are binary coded, 
classifying their presence (=1) or absence (=0) for each case. 
 
Case selection The definition of populism is a debated topic which makes the selection of 
cases a matter of debate as well
82
. As the arguments in the former section are based on the 
concept of a populist mandate, the units of analysis in the present study necessarily need to be 
elected presidents that used a populist discourse in their electoral presidential campaign. 
Interim presidents as well as those who have not finished at least one term by the end of 2011 
are excluded. Reelections are only considered if the respective candidate was out of office for 
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at least one term. Finally, only elections under minimal democratic conditions are considered, 
using a polity2 score of 6 or higher as the benchmark
83
. Based on these criteria a data set has 
been compiled covering 18 Latin American democracies from 1978-2011 including 89 
presidents. 
To identify those presidents that based their electoral campaign on a populist discourse I 
proceeded in two steps: First, I conducted an intensive literature review covering research 
notes and articles on presidential elections, party systems and electoral systems. Resulting 
from this review 17 presidents with a populist mandate were pre-selected. However, for two 
cases the literature yields conflicting accounts as to the populist nature of the presidential 
campaign (see Table 1) and therefore these cases were marked as ambiguous. Second, to 
validate this coding the data set including comments on the 17 pre-selected cases was send to 
several experts in the field to benefit from their expertise. The experts were asked to comment 
on the pre-selection of populist presidents based on the definition described above which was 
provided with the data set. Overall expert comments clearly objected three pre-selected cases, 
indicated three additional potential cases, and showed conflicting evaluations of the populist 
discourse of three pre-selected presidents. Table 1 lists 20 potential cases indicated either by 
the literature review or expert comments. 
In the remainder of this section I will explain which criteria were used to exclude cases and 
why some cases with conflicting accounts were included in the analysis. Firstly, cases are 
excluded from the analysis due to opposing accounts from at least one expert – without 
conflicting accounts in favour of the coding by another expert. Several experts objected the 
classification of Alejandro Toledo and Carlos Perez as populist presidents. At least one expert 
contradicts the coding of Joaquín Balaguer as populist president. No accounts were made in 
favour of the coding of these presidents by other experts.  
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Secondly, the inclusion or exclusion of cases with contradictory accounts needs to be 
justified: For Carlos Menem in Argentina expert judgments range from “borderline case” and 
“moderately populist in the campaign” to “populist”. Accounts in the literature predominantly 
evaluate Menem as populist
84
. Thus, I code him as a populist since he based his presidential 
campaign on an – albeit moderate – populist discourse. With respect to Néstor Kirchner 
(Argentina) experts judged him capable of a populist campaign but also remarked that he was 
not very consistent with it and that his campaign was rather mild compared to other populists 
in this sample. In a similar way, Fernández characterizes Kirchner’s discourse as a 
“populismo atemperado”85. However, the analysis of Kirchner’s discourse shows that he did 
centre his rhetoric on a victimized “pueblo” and identified the economic elite as the culprit of 
their poor situation
86
. Therefore, Kirchner will be included as a case in the present study. 
Concerning Álvaro Uribe in Colombia, a case which was not included in the pre-selection due 
to opposing accounts in the literature
87
, expert comments yield conflicting evaluations with 
respect to his coding as non-populist (one in favour and one against). I follow the reasoning of 
Dugas in this respect as he shows that, although Uribe broke with the (traditional) Liberal 
Party prior to his election, he neither based his presidential campaign on an anti-elite appeal 
nor did he try to address the poor masses in a direct, unmediated way
88
. Thus, Uribe will not 
be considered as a president with a populist mandate. 
An additional case indicated as a potential populist by one expert is Manuel Zelaya 
(Honduras). However, accounts in the literature indicate that before and during his 
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presidential campaign “Zelaya appeared to be a typical Honduran career politician”89. It was 
in his second presidential year when he took a turn to the left aligning with Hugo Chávez and 
initiating a phase of inter-branch conflict that finally led to a military coup in June 2009
90
. 
Thus, Zelaya will not be coded as a president with a populist mandate in this study. 
Alan García’s second term as Peru’s president was not included in the pre-selection due to 
accounts in the literature with respect to his moderate appeal during the presidential election 
in 2006
91
. However, his discourse might have been perceived as non-populist due to the 
strong populist discourse of his direct competitor Ollanta Humala in the 2006 race. New data 
from Hawkins indicates that García’s discourse clearly qualifies as populist during his second 
presidential campaign as well
92
.  
Finally, the two cases that experts indicated as borderline – Hipólito Mejía and Mireya 
Moscoso – are included in the analysis based on a re-assessment of the literature93. Using both 
literature review and expert ratings 15 cases were finally selected for the analysis. 
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Table 1: Case selection 
Country President 1
st
 Term Pre- 
Selection 
Expert  
Statements 
Final
α
 
ARG Carlos Menem 1989-1995 Conflict Conflict Yes 
ARG Néstor Kirchner 2003-2007 Yes Conflict Yes 
BOL Evo Morales 2006-2010 Yes Yes Yes 
BRA Fernando Collor de Mello 1990-1992 Yes Yes Yes 
COL Álvaro Uribe 2002-2006 No Conflict No 
DOM Joaquín Balaguer 1986-1990 Yes No No 
DOM Hipólito Mejía 2000-2004 Yes Borderline Yes 
ECU Jaime Roldós 1979-1981 Yes - Yes 
ECU Abdalá Bucaram 1996-1997 Yes Yes Yes 
ECU Lucio Guitiérrez 2003-2005 Yes Yes Yes 
ECU Rafael Correa 2007-2009 Yes Yes Yes 
HON Manuel Zelaya 2006-2009 No Yes No 
PAN Mireya Moscoso 1999-2004 Yes Borderline Yes 
PER Alan García I, 1985 1985-1990 Yes Yes Yes 
PER Alberto Fujimori 1990-1995 Yes Yes Yes 
PER Alejandro Toledo 2001-2006 Confl. No No 
PER Alan Garíca II, 2006 2006-2011 No Yes Yes 
VEN Carlos Perez 1989-1993 Yes No No 
VEN Rafael Caldera 1994-1999 Yes Yes Yes 
VEN Hugo Chávez 1999-2000 Yes Yes Yes 
α 
Cases were excluded from the final selection if opposing accounts of at least one expert exists without accounts 
in favour of the coding by another expert. Cases with conflicting and borderline accounts were included or 
excluded based on a re-assessment of the literature (see discussion above). 
 
Operationalization The outcome variable of changes in constraints on presidential power 
will be captured by the item on “Executive Constraints” from the Polity IV dataset94. This 
item is measured on a 7point scale with high values indicating high degrees of constraints on 
executive power. To build a dummy variable the yearly ratings of “Executive Constraints” 
during the first term of the populist president were inspected, if these ratings decrease the 
outcome takes on the value 1, if ratings increase or stay the same the outcome takes on the 
value 0. Furthermore, a closer look on the data indicates that before the rise of the populist 
president all cases fall either into the highest category of the scale, described as “parity or 
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subordination” (7) or into the second highest category (6) that takes an intermediate position 
between “parity or subordination” (7) and “substantial limitations” (5)95.  
Three conditions are expected to be conducive to a decrease in executive constraints: the 
existence of a power vacuum, a situation of divided government, and ongoing popular support 
(see Table 3 in the Appendix for details on each case). The binary coding of the condition 
indicating the existence of a power vacuum is based on the analysis of qualitative case studies 
and electoral data.96 The condition takes on the value 1 in the case of a party system 
breakdown – where electoral support for traditional parties fell below 50% before or during 
the rise of the populist president – or a severe crisis of governability in the year before the 
election of the populist president. The construction of a binary condition indicating a situation 
of divided government during the term of the populist president is based on the distribution of 
seats in the congress.
97
 The condition takes on the value 1 if the presidential party (or 
coalition) had less than 45% of seats in one chamber or if an opposition party (or coalition) 
had a majority of seats in at least one chamber.
98
 Popular support figures for the president are 
captured by public opinion surveys. If available the coding of the condition is based on data 
from the Latinobarometer surveys that inter alia asked respondents to indicate their approval 
with or confidence in the president. For the cases not covered by the Latinobarometer 
                                                          
95
 Ibid, 24-25. 
96
 Henry A. Dietz, and David J. Myers, “From Thaw to Deluge: Party System Collapse in Venezuela and Peru,” 
Latin American Politics and Society, 49, (Summer 2007), 59-86; Mark P. Jones, “Evaluating Argentina’s 
Presidential Democracy: 1983-1995,“ in Scott Mainwaring, and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and 
Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 259-299; Mark P Jones, Wonjae 
Hwang, and Juan Pablo Micozzi, “Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: 
Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis,” Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1 
(2009), 67-96; Ernesto Sagás, “The 2000 Presidential Election in the Dominican Republic,” Electoral Studies, 20 
(September 2001), 495–501; Jeffery R. Webber, “Carlos Mesa, Evo Morales, and a Divided Bolivia (2003—
2005),” Latin American Perspectives, 37, (May 2010), 51-70; as well as Conaghan; Davila; Graham; Martz; 
Montúfar; Panizza; Schmidt; Singer 2005; and Torre 1998.  
97
 Data on legislative seats was taken from http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/ and http://www.ipu.org/parline/. 
98
 Data on governmental coalitions was mostly taken from Octavio Amorim Neto  "The Presidential Calculus: 
Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas," Comparative Political Studies, 39 (May 
2006), 415-440. For the countries and years not included in Amorim Neto’s study information was gathered 
from several sources, available on request from the author. 
17 
 
information from additional surveys and case studies were used to code the condition.99 The 
condition is coded 1 if the populist president experienced continuous popular support figures 
over 50%.  
 
Results and interpretation 
Based on the binary coding of the cases the Boolean algebra constructs a truth table covering 
all possible configurations of the three conditions. With three conditions eight configurations 
are logically possible. The 15 cases in this study cover six of these configurations, leaving 
two logical remainders. In line with a conservative approach the outcome of these logical 
remainders is coded absent to exclude them from the analysis
100
. Furthermore, the QCA 
yields no contradictory cases with respect to the empirically observed configurations and the 
outcome. 
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Table 2: Truth table 
Conditions Outcome Cases 
V D S C 
No. of 
Cases 
Presidents 
1 0 1 1 1 CM 
1 1 1 1 4 EM, RCo, AF, HC 
0 0 1 0 1 NK 
0 1 0 0 3 AB, LG, MM 
0 0 0 0 3 HM, AG-I, AG-II 
1 1 0 0 3 FCM, JR, RCa 
1 0 0 - 0 Logical remainder 
0 1 1 - 0 Logical remainder 
Notes: V= power vacuum, D= divided government, S= public support, C=executive constraints. For details on 
the acronyms of the presidents see Table 1. 
 
Explaining the presence of the outcome There is one sufficient path leading to the 
presence of the outcome: the presence of a power vacuum in the political arena (V) AND 
strong popular support for the populist president (S). This also means that both of these jointly 
sufficient conditions are individually necessary for the presence of the outcome (C).
101
 
VS = C 
The five cases that are covered by this causal solution are Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, 
Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, and Evo Morales. All five populist presidents that pursued a 
deconstruction of horizontal accountability, did craft new constitutions.
102
  
As stressed by the ‘power vacuum’ hypothesis populist presidents may rise to power in times 
where a process of democratic deconsolidation might already have begun
103
. In such 
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situations populists may capitalize on a weak momentum of representative democracy to their 
own gain. The finding acknowledges the argument made by Mudde and Rovira that the threat 
of populism is most severe in unconsolidated democracies, where institutions of democratic 
representation are weakly entrenched in society
104
. Furthermore, the joint negative effect on 
executive constraints of a power vacuum in the political arena and on-going public support 
confirms the thesis of Levitsky and Loxton that populist presidents are invested with a 
populist mandate to disempower those– usually representative – institutions controlled by the 
existing and distrusted political elite
105
. Thus, if a populist contender is able to exploit a 
power vacuum and at the same time manages to maintain ongoing public support she may 
easily change the rules of the game to her benefit. 
Assessing the sensitivity of the results shows that dropping the case of Carlos Menem from 
the analysis yields a more complex solution leading to the presence of the outcome, more 
specifically divided government has to be added as a necessary condition
106
. The exclusion of 
any other case fails to affect the result of the QCA. 
VDS = C  
In the case of Menem the reduction in executive constraints was due to his excessive use of 
executive decree authority at the beginning of his first term
107
. Unlike the other positive cases, 
Menem had a near majority in the Chamber of Deputies and a majority in the Senate. In 
combination with the extensive use of executive decrees, that could only be rejected through 
the normal legislative process – including a presidential veto – there were few possibilities for 
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the opposition to check the presidential agenda
108. However, when it came to Menem’s 
ambition to reform the constitution as to enable him to stand for a second term as president, 
he needed to negotiate with the opposition which limited his influence on constitutional 
design. In exchange for the inclusion of immediate reelection the opposition managed to 
incorporate substantial checks on presidential power into the new constitution
109
.  
Contrary to the limiting effect of the Argentinean Constitution in 1994 on executive power, 
constitutional reforms in the other four cases clearly benefited the executive branch.  
A plethora of beneficial changes with respect to constitutional presidential powers 
110
 were 
introduced in these new constitutions: the Bolivarian Constitution of 2009 includes the 
immediate reelection of the president as well as lowered congressional hurdles for presidential 
appointees
111
. The Constitution of Ecuador from 2009 introduced the immediate reelection of 
the president, expanded the regulation of government-initiated referendums
112
, and the power 
to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections
113
. The Peruvian Constitution from 1993 
introduced the immediate reelection of the president, established the abolition of 
bicameralism, and expanded as well as eased executive decree authority
114
. The Constitution 
of Venezuela from 1999 introduced the immediate reelection of the president, established the 
abolition of bicameralism, introduced the possibility of government-initiated referendums, 
and expanded and eased the regulations of executive decree authority
115
.  
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Furthermore, with respect to partisan powers these presidents faced incentives to engage in 
institutional engineering of electoral systems to overcome divided government. In line with 
arguments in the literature that malapportionment works as a check on powerful presidents 
through the separation of purpose between the executive and legislative branch
116
 in all four 
cases of divided government changes of electoral procedures increased majoritarian elements 
and decreased proportionality: in Bolivia’s mixed-member system the number of multi-
member districts was reduced to include special indigenous single-member districts
117
, in 
Ecuador a change from proportional representation to a mixed-system with a high share of 
single-member districts took place
118
, in Peru the separation of purpose was minimized by the 
abolition of bicameralism and the reduction of the size of the Congress
119
, in Venezuela 
bicameralism was abolished as well, furthermore, the share of single-member seats in the 
mixed-member system was increased by 10 percentage points at the expense of the multi-
member districts and compensatory seats for minority parties were eliminated
120
.  
In sum, the analysis showed that the reduction on executive constraints in the case of Menem 
was due to an informal practice of executive decree authority, while in the other cases formal 
constitutional engineering led to the reduction of both constitutional and partisan powers. This 
leads to the conclusion that in situations with divided government populist presidents face 
stronger incentives to formally change the institutional balance of power in their favour, while 
in situations of unified government informal or de facto changes in executive-legislative 
relations may suffice to enforce the presidential agenda. However, in each case the presidents 
need to uphold the approval of their conduct within the public. 
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Explaining the absence of the outcome The analysis of the absence of the outcome 
identifies a solution with two sufficient paths: the absence of a power vacuum in the political 
arena (v) AND the absence of a situation of divided government (d) OR the presence of 
divided government (D) AND the absence of strong public support for the populist president 
(s). 
vd + Ds = c 
To evaluate the relative importance of these causal paths we can refer to their coverage 
scores
121
. Two types of coverage measures are available: raw coverage, which denotes the 
percentage of the cases covered by the causal path in relation to all cases with the same 
outcome, and unique coverage, which refers to the percentage of cases that are uniquely 
covered by the respective causal path. In the present analysis no case belongs to more than 
one configuration, thus, raw and unique coverage scores are identical. The first causal path – 
vd – has a coverage of 40%, while the second causal path – Ds – has a coverage of 60%. Both 
paths are completely consistent, i.e. no contradictory cases arise. 
The first causal path explaining the absence of the outcome covers four cases: Néstor 
Kirchner, Hipólito Mejía, and both terms of Alan García (1985 and 2006). These presidents 
did not rise to power against the background of a governmental crisis or party system 
breakdown and with their party (or coalition) at the same time managing to gain near or full 
majority control of the legislature. Therefore, they did not face incentives to reduce executive 
constraints once in office, since presidents with strong partisan powers can outweigh the lack 
of constitutional powers and override classical checks and balances
122
.  
Assessing the sensitivity of the results shows that dropping Néstor Kirchner from the analysis 
yields a more complex solution with respect to the first path, i.e. low public support has to be 
added to the path – vds – while the second path remains unchanged. Thereby, public support 
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becomes a necessary condition for the absence of the outcome. The exclusion of any other 
case fails to affect the result of the QCA. 
vds + Ds = c  
Kirchner can be characterized as a powerful president with both strong constitutional and 
partisan powers, and although he witnessed ongoing public support he did not change the 
rules of the democratic game and take an authoritarian turn
123
. Two reasons may account for 
this outcome: firstly, , the president’s party – the Justicialist Party (PJ) – had a structural 
advantage vis-à-vis other parties in the system through its dominant position in the 
Argentinean Senate and a fragmented opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. De facto the PJ 
developed into a dominant party in the Argentinean party system since 2001
124
. Secondly, the 
populist discourse of Kirchner was mainly directed against the economic elite and not against 
the democratic system as such
125
. Thus, Kirchner did not face strong incentives to increase 
executive powers, even though he managed to maintain broad public support throughout his 
presidential term.  
Hipólito Mejía in the Dominican Republic rose to power with a comfortable majority of his 
party in both chambers of the Congress and he managed to uphold popular support until after 
the mid-term elections in 2002
126
. Thus, he did not face incentives to change the electoral 
system, as it already invested his party with control over the Congress but he had an interest 
in reforming the constitution as to enable his immediate reelection. After reforming the 
constitution, however, his popularity decreased immensely prior to the election in 2004 which 
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he ultimately lost against his predecessor Leonel Fernández from the Dominican Liberation 
Party (PLD)
127
.  
Alan García (Peru) managed to win the presidential elections in 1985 and 2006 as candidate 
of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) – a traditional populist party 
machine.
128
 However, he assumed office in times of no power vacuum, depended on the 
support of a coalition of parties in the Congress in both terms – centre-left in 1985 and centre-
right in 2006 – and was unable to maintain public support in both terms and therefore unable 
to further any considerable change in the rules of the game – not even a re-election bid.129 
To sum up, we may conclude that both Kirchner and Mejía faced favourable conditions in 
their political systems that structured their expectations of future success as to leave the 
system of checks and balances unchanged, while García found himself in the need of sharing 
power with other political parties and at the same time lacked continuous public support 
which made it impossible for him to manipulate the rules of the game unilaterally.  
The second causal path – the joint positive influence of divided government and low public 
support on executive constraints – covers six cases: Abdalá Bucaram, Rafael Caldera, 
Fernando Collor de Mello, Lucio Guitiérrez, Mireya Moscoso, and Jaime Roldós. This part of 
the solution confirms the arguments made in the literature on the importance of the public as a 
moderating force in times of executive-legislative deadlock
130
. All cases in the present 
analysis where the legislative prevailed in executive-legislative conflicts are covered by this 
path. Bucaram has been declared mentally incapable by Congress after only seven months in 
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office and in a situation of extensive public protest against him
131
, Collor de Mello was 
impeached by Congress with broad support of the public following the discovery of 
corruption charges against him
132
, and Guitiérrez – who most excessively tried to alter 
institutions of horizontal accountability in his favour – had been impeached by Congress in an 
emergency session and against the background of a strong anti-government mood in the 
public
133
. Each of these populist presidents maintained a confrontational political style 
towards the opposition dominated congress but without the possibility to resort to 
plebiscitarian tactics due to the lack of public support and each president lost the support of 
the public because she did not meet the expectations raised in her presidential campaign, e.g. 
anti-corruption politics, integration of marginalized groups, economic improvement for the 
poor
134
. Thus informal vertical accountability mechanisms – like popular mobilization – may 
help to restrain presidential dominance in executive-legislative relationships
135
.  
While the remaining three cases were able to finish their presidential terms, they were no 
more successful in changing the executive-legislative balance. Roldós not only faced political 
challengers in Congress but also within his own party and the situation might have resulted in 
open executive-legislative conflict if not a sudden plane accident ended his life in 1981
136
. 
Caldera and Moscoso both had to govern with an opposition controlled Congress and were 
unable to implement their economic programs and prevent economic crisis in their countries. 
Since they failed to deliver the promised social welfare benefits they rapidly lost support in 
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the public
137
. However, other than the three presidents that had to leave their office early, they 
did not maintain a confrontational style towards congress. 
To sum up, the cases covered by this causal path confirm the important role of the public in 
presidential systems, especially in situations of outright conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches.  
 
Conclusion 
The present article showed that populism in power does not always have to lead to a 
deconstruction of horizontal accountability. It depends on the institutional context and the 
constellation of other political actors in the system to make a radical strategy of institutional 
change a viable option for populist presidents. By means of a QCA I identified several 
combinations of conditions that are crucial in this respect. The strength or weakness of the 
traditional political elite, the distribution of power in the legislative branch as well as the 
presence or absence of public support in favour of a populist president are decisive factors 
that in different combinations shape the incentive structure of populist presidents.  
The empirical analysis showed that in one third of the cases in this study populism posed a 
threat to liberal democratic institutions. In combination with a power vacuum in the political 
realm these populist presidents were able to win the public’s favour and mobilize support for 
their agenda of institutional change. A bad reputation of the political elite may thus be 
exploited by populist presidents to undermine the power centres of their opponents which are 
most likely parliaments.  
Furthermore, the analysis showed that – in line with Hochstetler’s plea not to underestimate 
the power of the public in executive-legislative conflicts
138
 – popular mobilization is a crucial 
factor with respect to populist presidents’ success in restructuring liberal democracy. In cases 
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of conflict between a populist president and an opposition controlled legislature the support of 
the public turns the balance. Thus, similar to Schedler’s argument that weak legislatures may 
lead to authoritarianism
139
 we may also conclude that institutionally powerful legislatures that 
are dominated by a weak, discredited, and unpopular political elite may induce populist 
presidents to change the institutional order into the direction of electoral authoritarianism. 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Condition coding 
Populist 
President 
First 
Term 
Power Vacuum Divided Government (1st term) Popular Support (1st term) 
Carlos Menem 
1989-
1995 
Crisis of governability 
Near majority (>45%) in the lower chamber 
and absolute majority in the upper chamber  
Strong Popular Support 
Nestor Kirchner 
2003-
2007 
None 
Absolute majority in both chambers of the 
congress 
Strong Popular Support 
Evo Morales 
2006-
2009 
Crisis of governability & party system 
breakdown 
Absolute majority in the lower BUT 
opposition majority in the upper chamber 
Strong Popular Support 
Fernando Collor de 
Mello 
1990-
1992 
Crisis of governability 
Minority president without stable coalition in 
both chambers of the congress 
Declining & Low Popular Support  
Hipólito Mejía  
2000-
2004 
None 
Absolute majority in both chambers of the 
congress 
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Jaime Roldós  
1979-
1981 
Democratic transition 
Plurality with <45% in the unicameral 
congress without stable coalition  
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Abdalá Bucaram  
1996-
1997 
None  
Minority president without stable coalition in 
the unicameral congress  
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Lucio Gutiérrez  
2003-
2005 
None 
Minority president without stable coalition in 
the unicameral  congress  
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Rafael Correa  
2007-
2009 
Party system breakdown 
The presidents' party had no seats in the 
legislature. 
Strong Popular Support 
Mireya Moscoso  
1999-
2004 
None 
Minority president AND opposition majority 
in the unicameral congress. 
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Alan García 
1985-
1990 
None 
Absolute majority in both chambers of the 
congress 
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Alan García 
2006-
2011 
None 
Minority president with stable coalition in the 
unicameral congress. 
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Alberto Fujimori 
1990-
1992 
Party system breakdown 
Minority president without stable coalition in 
both chambers of the congress. 
Strong Popular Support 
Rafael Caldera 
1994-
1998 
Crisis of governability 
Minority president with opposition majority 
in both chambers of the congress. 
Declining & Low Popular Support 
Hugo Chavez 
1999-
2000 
Party system breakdown 
Minority president with no stable majority 
coalition in both chambers of the congress 
Strong Popular Support 
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Linkage Strategies and Policy Congruence  
in Latin American Democracies 
 
 
Saskia Pauline Ruth 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In line with a substantive conception, democratic representation is understood as the 
connection between citizens’ preferences and the preferences or behaviour of their elected 
representatives (see Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967; Powell 2004). 
Empirical research on this topic has a long history in advanced democracies (e.g. Blais and 
Bodet 2006; Huber and Powell 1994; Miller and Stokes 1963) and has recently been applied 
to new democracies like those in Latin America (e.g. Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Otero-
Felipe and Rodríguez-Zepeda 2010). 
However, assumptions frequently made in studies on advanced democracies may not be easily 
transferred to contexts of new democracies. As research on party politics shows, the role of 
political parties in new democracies seems less central and political parties and politicians 
maintain other forms of relationships with society than the classic programmatic linkage form 
predominant in (most) advanced democracies (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Especially 
outside Western European democracies political parties do not compete just in programmatic 
ways, they may pursue additional or completely different electoral mobilization strategies like 
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personalism and clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The idealization of policy 
representation through programmatic competition, therefore, hampers awareness of other 
modes of political representation (Kitschelt 2000). 
The aim of this article is to investigate the impact of party-society linkages on congruence or 
incongruence between political parties’ advocated policies and the policy interests of their 
supporters. More specifically, the research question is twofold: On the one hand, I address 
how different linkage strategies affect the degree of policy congruence between political 
parties and their supporters. On the other hand, I examine the direction of misrepresentation in 
case of incongruence between political parties and their supporters. Do political parties 
position themselves to the right or to the left of their supporters preferred policy interests?
140
 By answering these question, this study contributes to the research areas on democratic 
accountability and democratic representation in new democracies. 
Taking the literature on political representation and party-society linkages into account, 
theoretical arguments about the relationship between different linkage strategies and policy 
congruence will be discussed. The basic assumption in the literature on political congruence is 
that political parties form a programmatic linkage with their supporters. Such programmatic 
parties mobilize electoral support by making policy pledges to voters (Kitschelt 2000). 
Therefore, they need to be credible to their policy pledges and refrain from extreme policy 
switches over time; otherwise they lose the support of voters in subsequent elections (Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Stokes 1999). On the baseline, the more a political party 
pursues a programmatic linkage strategy the more we would expect this party, ceteris paribus, 
to be congruent to their supporters’ policy preferences. However, political parties may also 
pursue personalistic and clientelistic linkages with their supporters. The policy pledges 
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charismatic parties make to their voters usually remain opaque as personalistic party leaders 
do not want to limit their leverage on the party strategy (Weyland 1999). As voters of 
personalistic parties base their decision on the personal qualities of the party leader and not on 
the program the party pursues, the match between their policy interests and the policies the 
party pursues is based on chance. Thus, a personalistic linkage strategy is hypothesized to 
have no systematic effect on a political party’s policy congruence with its voters.  
Furthermore, clientelistic practices are most efficient when directed to low income voters as 
they value material benefits more than higher income groups (Dixit and Londregan 1996, 
1998; Stokes 2007a). Assuming that it is rational for clientelistic parties to address poor 
voters with a vote buying strategy while securing the support of party brokers or private 
investors with (most likely conservative) policy concessions (Stokes 2005), the policy 
preferences of poor constituencies will be underrepresented. Thus, on the one hand a 
clientelistic linkage strategy is expected to reduce, ceteris paribus, a political party’s degree 
of policy congruence. On the other hand, it is expected to distort, ceteris paribus, policy 
representation by skewing political parties’ advocated policies to the right end of the 
economic policy spectrum. 
These hypothesized effects will be tested using multinomial logit analysis covering 80 
political parties from 18 Latin American democracies. Latin American parties offer suitable 
cases for a cross-national comparison as they share similar institutional and socio-economic 
contexts. Furthermore, they show large variance in their usage of different linkage strategies 
as well as variance in their degree of party-voter congruence.  
The article is organized as follows: In the first part of this article the relevant issues in the 
literature on democratic representation and party-society linkages are highlighted and 
theoretical arguments on the relationship between three different linkage strategies and policy 
congruence are presented. In the second part of the article these arguments are then tested 
statistically. Finally I conclude and propose an agenda for further research. 
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Democratic representation, policy congruence, and party-society linkages 
Political representation is usually described as a principal-agent relationship, in which a 
principal selects an agent who is then supposed to act in the best interest of the principal. In 
representative democratic terms this means that the citizens (principal) select – by some 
voting rule determined by the electoral system – their representatives (agents) for public 
offices. These elected representatives are expected to act in accordance with the interests of 
their voters. By means of this substantive representative link citizens may, therefore, insert 
their interests or policy preferences into the democratic process. Thus, the connection between 
citizens’ policy preferences and preferences or behaviour of policymakers is at the heart of 
representative democracy (see Dahl 1989; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967). 
A common measure of this substantive representational link between a principal and her 
agents is the congruence of voters’ policy preferences with their parties’ policy pledges. There 
are several types of policy congruence and each emphasizes alternative aspects of the 
representational link. Usually these types differ in relation to four themes: the comparative 
approach, the scope of content, the timing, and the actors involved.  
Concerning the comparative approach it is possible to investigate the representativeness of 
political actors with respect to their voters’ policy interests at one point in time – cross-
sectional perspective – or over time – dynamic perspective (see Ezrow 2010; Spies and Kaiser 
2012; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). 
Concerning the scope of the content a distinction can be made between issue and ideological 
congruence. Empirical research on substantive representation started in the 1960s with Miller 
and Stokes (1963) seminal study on policy congruence in specific issue domains (see Achen 
1978; Iversen 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Later studies turned their attention to the 
policy bundles political parties offer to the voter, thereby, evaluating ideological congruence 
(e.g. Huber and Powell 1994). 
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Concerning the distinction in relation to the timing within the democratic process, citizens’ 
policy preferences may be compared to the policy preferences of political agents or their 
behaviour in the policy-making process, i.e. policy decisions. In the former case the matching 
of signals is measured. This measure of political representation centres on an early stage of 
the democratic process, i.e. the agents’ quality of being policy advocates (see Cox 1997; 
Powell 2004). Alternatively the focus may lie on the relationship between citizens’ policy 
preferences and public policy decisions (e.g. Soroka and Wlezien 2005).
141
 
Finally, concerning the type of actors involved one may distinguish between dyadic or 
collective congruence. While dyadic congruence refers to the correspondence of policy 
preferences between political parties and their supporters on the meso or party level
142
, 
collective congruence evaluates aggregated, institutional correspondence of citizens’ 
preferences with the preferences of entire legislatures or governments on the system level 
(Powell 2006; Weissberg 1978). This may lead to different evaluations of policy congruence 
on different analytical levels, since collective congruence results from the aggregation of 
dyadic congruence measures, weighted by seat shares, vote shares or cabinet portfolios. Even 
if party-voter dyads display considerable low degrees of policy congruence, collective 
congruence may still be high on the system level as long as the distortions of policy 
congruence are distributed equally around the country mean (Weissberg 1978: 542). Thus, by 
evaluating collective congruence only, representational deficits of individual parties may be 
overlooked because of the problem of ecological inference (King 1997). Moreover, 
misrepresentation in party-voter dyads is most severe for the quality of representation if its 
distribution is systematically biased to one side of the country mean. 
                                                          
141
 Another research field is interconnected with both of these views on policy congruence that is the 
investigation of the link between parties’ proposed policy programs and the policies they actually pursue once in 
office (Klingemann et al. 1994). 
142
 Dyadic congruence may refer to the link between citizens and their individual district representative or their 
preferred political party (Barnes 1977; Dalton 1985; Thomassen 1994). If the representational link between 
citizens and legislators is mediated by political parties, the units of analysis should be party-voter dyads instead 
of district-legislator dyads (Dalton 1985: 278). 
5 
 
Until now researchers came up with several explanatory factors of policy congruence on 
different analytical levels. On the national level especially electoral system rules have been at 
the centre of interest. Other macro level factors affecting policy congruence are the number of 
political parties and the degree of party system polarization (e.g. Huber and Powell 1994; 
Pierce 1999). However, empirical findings are somewhat inconclusive. On the party level the 
effects of several party characteristics, like government participation, candidate selection 
processes, or the ideological position, on congruence in several issue dimensions have been 
tested (e.g. Dalton 1985; Spies and Kaiser 2012).  
Hence, the congruence literature explicitly focusses on the programmatic link between 
political parties and their supporters. Comparative research on the effects of other linkage 
strategies on party-voter congruence is missing.
143
 This may be due to the sometimes implicit 
application of models of programmatic party competition (like ‘the responsible party model’) 
in representational studies on advanced democracies which may have hindered the travelling 
of empirical research on policy congruence to new democracies (Powell 2004; Thomassen 
1994). This article, therefore, centres on the influence of different party-society relations on 
policy congruence. 
The linkage concept is a useful analytical tool to study the relationship between political 
parties and the electorate and, consequently, the quality of democratic representation outside 
established democracies and without a predetermined focus on programmatic party 
competition (e.g. Kitschelt 2000). In general, the concept describes an interactive connection 
between the electorate and the state mediated by political elites. Linkages are driven by 
political parties’ need for votes to win elections and to secure their survival, irrespective of 
whether they are motivated by office-, vote-, or policy-seeking (Poguntke 2000, 2002; Strøm 
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1990). The literature on representational linkages usually distinguishes between three forms 
of party-society relationships: programmatic, personalistic, and clientelistic linkages.  
Political parties may mobilize electoral support following a programmatic linkage strategy 
and appeal to their voters with policy programs. These programs consist of policy bundles 
concerning a range of solutions to the problems of a society. Political parties’ policy promises 
are important for the electoral process because they serve as information short cuts for voters, 
which have policy preferences and base their electoral decision on them (Downs 1957). In this 
regard, parties that pursue a programmatic linkage strategy induce voters to signal their policy 
preferences at election time and thus directly foster an important informational prerequisite of 
policy congruence. 
Political parties may also maintain personalistic bonds with their voters and base their 
strategy on the personal skills of a (charismatic) leader. Hence, personalistic parties are often 
referred to as mere electoral vehicles for ambitious party leaders (Coppedge 2001; Kitschelt 
2000; Roberts, 2002). The promises personalistic parties make to their voters remain opaque. 
Their party leaders “tend to promise all things to all people to maintain maximum personal 
discretion over the strategy of their party vehicle” (Kitschelt 2000: 849). In turn, voters of 
personalistic parties hardly reveal explicit information about their policy preferences at 
election day.
144
 
Finally, political parties may rely on a clientelistic linkage strategy and directly appeal to 
voters. Due to this direct appeal, goods offered for exchange by clientelistic parties are first 
and foremost characterized by exclusiveness. Therefore, clientelism is defined as a “direct 
exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, 
goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2, italics original). This general 
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definition covers both patronage and vote buying, as specific subtypes of the clientelistic 
exchange.
145
 Following Stokes, patronage is “the proffering of public resources (most 
typically, public employment) by office-holders in return for electoral support” (2007b: 606, 
italics original), and “vote buying is a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, protections) 
for one’s own vote” (2007b: 606, italics original).146  
There are two different perspectives as regards the combinability of these linkage strategies. 
One strand of literature supports the argument that political actors may pursue different forms 
of linkages at the same time and for several reasons. Such strategy mixing may be a 
consequence of either risk-aversion of political elites (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 
2007; Stokes 2007b; Wantchekon 2003) or the parallel appeal to diverse constituencies which 
according to Gibson (1997) are then combined into one ‘electoral coalition’. Research 
grouped around the trade-off hypothesis argues that programmatic, personalistic, and 
clientelistic linkages are only combinable to a small degree (Dixit and Londregan 1996; 
Kitschelt 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2001). Based on the assumption that both programmatic 
and clientelistic linkage strategies require different organizational investments parties are 
precluded to pursue both forms of linkage extensively. Furthermore, the personalistic linkage 
strategy is usually associated with a weakly institutionalized organizational structure, since 
party leaders do not want to limit their leverage on the intraparty decision-making process 
(Weyland 1999; Kitschelt 2000). The institutionalization of the party organization always 
comes at the expense of the party leader’s autonomy. However, case study research and new 
comparative data rather support the strategy mixing perspective than the trade-off hypothesis 
(see Figures 1-a to 1-c).  
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As suspected by the trade-off hypothesis, Figure 1-a shows a moderate negative relationship 
between the degree of a clientelistic and a programmatic linkage emphasis of one party (r=-
305, p<0.01). However, at least some political parties combine effectively programmatic and 
clientelistic party strategies at a high degree (see Singer and Kitschelt 2011; Magaloni, Diaz-
Cayeros and Estévez 2007; Hilgers 2009; Gibson 1997).
147
 Furthermore, no political parties 
are observed in the lower left corner of Figure 1-a. This indicates that there are no political 
parties in the studied sample which rely on a personalistic strategy alone. Thus, the 
personalistic linkage type does not appear outside a mix with a programmatic, a clientelistic 
or both linkages. 
 
  
                                                          
147
 For example, the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) was rated highly on both the clientelistic as well 
as the programmatic strategy by experts. Leonel Fernández from the PLD was reelected as president in the 2008 
elections. On the one hand, he has been accused of using public funding for large-scale clientelism during his 
election campaign (Hartlyn and Espinal 2009). On the other hand, the PLD competes on programmatic grounds 
with the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) for the centre-right, being partly responsible for the decline 
of the latter in electoral terms (Morgan, Hartlyn, and Espinal 2008). 
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Figure 1a-c: Combination of Linkage Strategies 
a)     b)  
c)  
Source: Authors calculation based on data from the EXPERT survey. Data points are mean expert positions per 
party on ordinal scales ranging from 1 to 4. Question wording and party acronyms are reported in the appendix. 
 
In addition to this, Figure 1-b shows a positive association between a clientelistic and a 
personalistic linkage strategy of political parties in the study (r=0.530, p<0.01). This confirms 
another argument made in the literature, that a personalistic appeal is most compatible with a 
party organization that is hierarchically structured, and is therefore likely to be combined with 
the clientelistic linkage strategy (see Barr 2009; Roberts 2006; Pappas 2009). Finally, the 
relationship between a programmatic and a personalistic linkage focus seems to be 
unsystematic (Figure 1-c). A personalistic linkage strategy seems to be an asset that both 
parties with a high or a low programmatic profile use if they can.  
Building upon analytical considerations of elites’ as well as voters’ behaviour in contexts 
marked by different party-society relationships, in the next section I develop hypotheses on 
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how these linkages affect policy congruence. More specifically I analyse the issue congruence 
of party-voter dyads as the matching between voters’ signalled economic policy interests and 
parties’ signalled economic policy programs at one point in time. A special focus is put on 
biased misrepresentation on the party level. 
 
Hypotheses 
The functioning of programmatic party competition can be interpreted as an ‘iterative 
signalling game’ (Kitschelt 1995: 452). Political parties signal to their potential voters a set of 
policies they promise to enact when elected into office. Programmatic voters evaluate these 
policy signals and base their voting decision on their evaluations (Downs 1957). Such 
programmatic linkage is based on trust and credibility and thus prone to path dependency 
effects. If victorious political parties defect from their policy pledges or engage in extreme 
policy switches over time they may lose the support of voters in subsequent elections. Hence, 
political parties linked to their supporters by policy pledges ideally hold themselves 
responsive to voters’ policy preferences (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Stokes 1999). 
The programmatic linkage strategy, thus, constitutes the causal mechanism to bring about 
policy congruence between political parties and their supporters. 
(Baseline) Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a 
programmatic linkage strategy, the higher is the policy congruence between this party 
and its supporters.  
In contrast to this both clientelistic and personalistic parties do not engage in this policy 
signalling game. Instead both linkage strategies “reduce parties to their most basic, self-
referential political function: electing candidates from their ranks into public office” (Roberts 
2002: 29). Votes obtained in this way do not entail any information about the policy interests 
11 
 
of the voter and are useless for democratic deliberation and the retrospective evaluation of a 
representatives’ policy responsiveness (see Schaffer 2007; Stokes 2007a; Zechmeister 2010). 
Personalistic parties, as mentioned before, tend to make opaque promises to their potential 
supporters. Voters in personalistic relationships base their voting decision on the personal 
skills of a party leader irrespective of the programmatic outline of the political party 
(Coppedge 2001; Kitschelt 2000). Furthermore, the personalistic linkage often occurs in 
combination with a clientelistic and/or a programmatic appeal in the present sample. Thus, if 
we control for other linkages the match between the policy promises of a personalistic party 
and the policy preferences of its supporters should reveal no systematic pattern.  
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, a personalistic linkage strategy is expected to have no 
systematic effect on the policy congruence between a party and its supporters.  
In a similar way, clientelistic parties offer no orientation in the policy space to their voters, 
and may even cut across cleavages and cater for highly heterogeneous clients (Gay 1998; 
Roberts 2002). Voters in clientelistic relationships, in turn, base their voting decision on the 
exchange of material benefits. Furthermore, arguments in the literature hint to the fact that 
clientelism distorts policy congruence towards the right end of the economic dimension. The 
marginal utility theorem states that clientelism builds on socio-economic disadvantages of 
some parts of the society as the costs of a vote buying strategy rise with the income of the 
targeted voters (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Stokes 
2007a). Since the clientelistic linkage relies on direct material inducements, this strategy gets 
more likely the stronger voters value such side payments and the lesser they value future 
benefits from the provision of public goods (Kitschelt 2000). Moreover, clientelistic parties 
may combine vote buying strategies to address poor constituencies with policy concessions to 
party brokers or private investors within the clientelistic network (Stokes 2005). Policy 
preferences of these patrons are assumed to be more to the right on the economic scale than 
12 
 
the preferences of poor constituencies.
148
 On the basis of these arguments two hypotheses can 
be stated:  
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a clientelistic 
linkage strategy, the lower is the policy congruence between this party and its 
supporters. 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a clientelistic 
linkage strategy, the more distorted its ideological congruence is to the right (pro free 
market) end of the economic policy dimension.
149
 
In the next sections these hypotheses will be tested by comparing cross-sectional data on 
political parties’ linkage strategies and public opinion. 
 
Data and measurement 
The following analysis draws on a cross-sectional data set of 80 political parties covering 18 
Latin American democracies. Besides the fact that different linkage strategies are prevalent in 
this region, I focus on Latin American party systems for two other reasons: (1) 
Notwithstanding the differences between new and established democracies, Kitschelt et al. 
(2010) recently showed that there are also important differences between new democracies. 
This is especially true for party-society linkages in Latin America, which vary between and 
within party systems. (2) Furthermore, Latin American countries share similar socio-
economic contexts as well as institutional set-ups. For example, all countries in this study are 
presidential regimes and share similar structures of horizontal accountability (see Mainwaring 
                                                          
148
 However, it is also argued that clientelism constitutes a functional equivalent in developing countries to social 
welfare regimes like those in advanced democracies. In this sense clientelism may be seen as an appropriate 
party strategy in places where political institutions are dysfunctional (Hilgers 2009, 2011; Kitschelt 2000). 
Furthermore, from a clients’ perspective the exchange of particularistic goods may be perceived as a viable 
solution to social problems (Auyero 1999; Hilgers 2009).  
149
 One could also argue in favour of conditional hypotheses with respect to strategic mixing of linkage 
strategies. However, pairwise comparisons of interaction effects (both two-way and three-way) were tested 
insignificant in all models.  
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and Shugart 1997). These institutional settings are treated as scope conditions in the present 
study.
150
 Additionally, many Latin American countries experienced phases of military rule 
during the 1970s and 1980s and phases of re-democratization in the 1990s.  
Two further criteria were used for the selection of political parties: (1) the inclusion of a 
political party in the Latinobarometer surveys (hereafter LAB) from 2008 or 2009 as well as 
in the expert survey on democratic accountability mechanisms in Latin America (Altman et 
al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009) compiled between 2007 and 2009 (hereafter EXPERT). (2) A 
minimum of 5 respondents per party in the public opinion survey and 5 expert evaluations per 
party in the expert survey. In total, this study covers 80 political parties from the following 
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. For a list of political parties included in the study see Table A1 in 
the Appendix. 
 
Dependent Variable 
In the present article issue congruence of party-voter dyads in the economic domain will be 
used as an indicator for substantive representation. The policy preferences of political parties 
and their respective voters are measured on a one-dimensional economic issue space. Data on 
positions of political parties are provided by the EXPERT survey which inter alia asked 
experts to rank political parties on a state-market dimension using a 10-point scale:  
“State role in governing the economy: [1] Party supports a major role for the state in 
regulating private economic activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, 
and/ or maintaining control over key services. [10] Party advocates a minimal role for 
the state in governing or directing economic activity or development” (Questionnaire 
EXPERT, 2008). 
 
                                                          
150
 For an analysis of the representativeness of presidents as opposed to political parties see Wiesehomeier and 
Benoit (2009). 
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To match these with the positions of party voters the LAB surveys from 2008 and 2009 
provide a valuable database as they ask respondents about their party preference as well as to 
place themselves on state-market dimension using a 10-point scale:  
“Some people think that the State must solve all problems because it has the resources 
to do it, while others think that the market will solve all problems because it 
distributes the resources in an efficient way. Using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 
means “State must solve all problems” and 10 means “Market must solve all 
problems”. Where would you place yourself?” (Questionnaire LAB, 2008, 2009, 
author’s translation). 
 
Another alternative would have been to use the classical left–right dimension to compare 
party-voter dyads in ideological terms. However, the use of the left-right policy space is 
debated as it may be understood differently by different units of analysis (voters, party elites, 
experts) and its understanding may differ depending on the context thereby hindering cross-
country comparison (see Golder and Stramski, 2010; Zechmeister, 2006).
151
 Therefore, the 
economic issue dimension will be used to construct the dependent variable in this study. 
Figure 2 graphically matches the party mean position on the economic scale from the 
EXPERT survey and the mean economic position of the respective party’s supporters from 
the LAB survey. 
 
  
                                                          
151
 Furthermore, while the EXPERT survey uses a 10-point scale for the left-right dimension the LAB surveys 
use an 11-point scale. Transforming one scale to match the other would only partly solve the problem, as the 
latter scale disposes of a midpoint (5) while the former does not. This could lead to substantive differences 
between the two questions. Additionally, comparing item responses in the LAB between the economic and the 
left-right selfplacement questions the amount of non-response is nearly twice as high in the latter (7 per cent vs. 
13 per cent). This might also hint to the conclusion that respondents of the public opinion survey are less familiar 
with abstract concepts like left and right compared to a more specific issue related question on the state role in 
the economy.  
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Figure 2: The Economic Policy Dimension 
 
Source: Authors calculation based on data from the EXPERT survey and the LAB survey. Question wording and 
party acronyms are reported in the appendix. 
 
Different measures of policy congruence and their properties have been extensively discussed 
in the literature (e.g. Achen 1978; Golder and Stramski 2010). To capture the degree of 
congruence and the directionality of misrepresentation the median party voter congruence 
(Golder and Stramski 2010) will be used:  
                                           , 
PM is the mean party expert position on the economic scale and MV is the median party voter 
position on the economic scale. By this operationalization we attain a measure that displays at 
the same time the degree of a political party’s congruence and the direction of its potential 
‘incongruence’ with their party supporters. The closer a political party’s MPVC value is to 
zero the more congruent the party is to its supporters. Moreover, negative values indicate that 
a political party is positioned to the left of the median party voter on the economic dimension 
– promoting a stronger state interventionist stance in economic policies – while positive 
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values indicate that a political party is positioned to the right of the median party voter on the 
economic dimension – promoting a free market stance in economic policies.  
To use this measure as the dependent variable in a multinomial logit regression political 
parties are assigned into three groups according to their value of MPVC: Congruence (C) 
referring to the group of political parties with a very high degree of congruence (range -0.5 to 
+0.5), Left distortion (LD) referring to the group of parties, which misrepresent their 
supporters to the state interventionist end of the economic domain, (for values <-0.5), and 
right distortion (RD) referring to the group of political parties, which misrepresent their 
supporters to the free market end of the economic domain, i.e. less state control of the 
economy (for values >+0.5). The cut-off points were selected as to assure comparable group 
sizes for the multinomial logit regression.
152
 
 
Independent Variables 
Comparative research on party-society linkages has been confronted with a problem of data 
availability. Due to the lack of direct and reliable comparative measures on the meso- or 
macro-level, research on political clientelism and personalism, on the one hand, relies on 
more or less adequate proxy variables, like public spending data, indices of corruption, or 
content analysis of political speeches (e.g. Hawkins 2009; Keefer 2007). On the other hand, a 
considerable degree of research on political clientelism and personalism is based on 
qualitative case studies (e.g. Auyero 1999; Gibson 1997).
153
 
A recently compiled data set on democratic accountability covering 18 Latin American 
countries provides a variety of measures of party-society linkages which are directly related to 
the concept (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009). Experts have been asked explicitly to 
rank political parties’ emphasis on three different linkage strategies. The questions are 
                                                          
152
 Wald test statistics show that each of the three categories are clearly distinguishable, confirming that we 
should not merge them (χ2 = 56.20, p < 0.000). 
153
 Notable exceptions are comparative studies based on subnational data sets (e.g. Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 
2004; Stokes 2005). 
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categorical and range from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the 
respective linkage strategy.
154
 Building the mean of the expert responses a quasi-continuous 
measure of a parties’ degree of each linkage strategy is derived.  
 
Control Variables 
In line with the research literature on policy congruence two sets of control variables are 
included in the regression models: a set of party level factors and a set of system level factors. 
Concerning the first set of factors, several party characteristics may influence on the degree of 
policy correspondence between a political party and its supporters other than their linkage 
strategies (e.g. Dalton 1985; Ezrow et al. 2011; Spies and Kaiser 2012). First, large parties 
may be assumed to cater for more heterogeneous voter groups than niche parties. Whereby, 
the latter are assumed to send clearer signals to their potential voters (Meguid 2005). Thus, 
the size of a political party is expected to have a negative effect on party-voter congruence. To 
account for differences between large and small parties their share of legislative seats will 
enter the analysis as a control variable.
155
 Second, the age of a political party may also 
influence the substantive relationship with its voters. Parties build reputation over time and 
link themselves more strongly to their supporters (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). 
Furthermore, voters are better able to evaluate political parties’ policy appeals that have been 
around for more than one electoral cycle. Thus, party age is expected to have a positive effect 
on policy congruence.
156
 Third, the ideological orientation is another party level factor that 
has been related to the degree of policy congruence of a political party. Two opposing 
arguments about this relationship can be found in the literature. On the one hand, a bell-
shaped relationship between a party’s ideological position on the policy scale and issue 
congruence is expected (e.g. Dalton 1985; Klingemann 1998). This assumed relationship is 
                                                          
154
 Question wordings are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
155
 Data for the distribution of seats is provided online by most countries, detailed resources are available on 
request. 
156
 The party age indicator is operationalized by subtracting the formation year of a political party from 2008. 
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based on the argument that parties with more pronounced positions to either end on the policy 
scale send clearer messages to their supporters than parties at the centre of the continuum 
(Downs 1957). On the other hand, a U-shaped relationship between the position of a political 
party on the policy dimension and policy congruence is assumed (Iversen 1994; Rabinowitz, 
MacDonald, and Listhaug 1991). This argument refers to the phenomenon that political elites 
take more extreme positions in the policy space than their supporters (Converse 1975). 
Centrist parties should therefore be more congruent with their supporters than parties at either 
extreme of the policy continuum. Therefore, a dummy variable accounting for centrism on the 
economic scale will enter the analysis as a control variable. A political party is assigned a 1 if 
it falls into the range of plus or minus 1 standard deviation from the party system mean on the 
economic dimension. 
The second set of control variables accounts for three important party system level factors.
157
 
First, it may be argued that the probability of voters to find a political party close to their own 
policy position increases with the number of political parties in a system (e.g. Pierce 1999; 
Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Thus, the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) is 
assumed to have a positive effect on party-voter congruence (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). 
Second, it is argued similarly that political parties differentiate themselves more clearly from 
each other in polarized party systems. This may influence both voter perceptions of policy 
differences between political parties as well as voter proximity to political parties (e.g. Huber 
and Powell 1994). Thus, party system polarization on the economic dimension is assumed to 
have a positive effect on party-voter congruence.
158
 Finally, as differences between political 
parties and voters are measured on an economic scale country specific economic contexts may 
                                                          
157
 Combining party characteristics and party system factors in one analysis is usually modelled admits multi-
level analysis. However, statistical tests revealed only a very low explanatory power of the party system level 
(intra class correlation coefficients <0.06). Therefore, the analysis presented in the next section is based on one-
level regression models with standard errors clustered by country.  
158
 The indicator is constructed using the Taylor-Herman index of party system polarization (Taylor and Herman 
1971). 
19 
 
influence on the importance and visibility of policy appeals. To account for socio-economic 
country differences the GDP per capita will enter the analysis as a control variable.
159
 
 
Statistical Analysis  
The relationship between linkage strategies and policy congruence as well as specific types of 
incongruence is analysed by employing a multinomial logit regression model.
160
 To evaluate 
H1 to H4, I apply three multinomial logit regression models with a categorical dependent 
variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Long and Freese 2006). To account for country 
specific differences the cluster option has been used. The first model includes only the three 
linkage strategies of political parties, and subsequent models control for other party and 
system characteristics. 
Table 1 is structured as follows: To ease interpretation I present three group comparisons 
within each model: the first group comparison contrast the group of right-distortive parties 
with the group of congruent parties, the second group comparison takes place between the 
group of left-distortive parties and the group of congruent parties, the final group comparison 
contrasts the group of right-distortive parties with the group of left-distortive parties. The 
reference category is always named second. For example, the first column in each model 
refers to a political parties’ probability of belonging to the group of right-distortive (pro free 
market) parties compared to the reference category, which in this case is the group of 
congruent political parties.  
In line with the baseline argument the programmatic linkage should yield a positive effect on 
a party’s policy congruence (H1), thus its beta coefficients are expected to be negative for the 
two group comparison with congruent parties as the reference category, i.e. the more 
programmatic a political party the less likely the party misrepresents its voters to the left or to 
                                                          
159
 Data for 2008 was taken from the World Development Indicator database (World Bank). 
160
 The analysis was implemented using STATA 12. 
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the right on the economic dimension. According to H2 no effect is expected concerning the 
relationship between the personalistic linkage and the dependent variable, i.e. the coefficients 
of all group comparisons should be insignificant. According to H3 I expect an inverse 
relationship between a political party’s emphasis on the clientelistic linkage strategy and 
party-voter congruence. Thus, the beta coefficient of clientelism should be positive for both 
the left- and right-distortion group compared to the group of congruent parties. According to 
H4 comparing right-distortive parties to left-distortive parties a positive significant effect of 
clientelism is expected. 
The findings in Table 1 show that in accordance with the expectations outlined in H2, the 
coefficient of the personalistic linkage strategy remains insignificant over all models. 
Confidence in these results is fairly strong as the standard errors of the coefficients are very 
high. Concerning this first group comparison (column 1), results indicate that political parties 
that pursue a programmatic linkage strategy are rather congruent than right-distortive. The 
effect remains robust when other party and system characteristics are included as control 
variables in subsequent models. This confirms one part of the baseline argument that a 
programmatic linkage is related to a higher level of party-voter congruence. However, with 
respect to the clientelistic linkage strategy the results of this group comparison reveal no 
significant effect (H3). 
As regards the second group comparison (column 2) an interesting – although counterintuitive 
– finding arises. The negative effect of clientelism in all models indicates that the more 
clientelistic a political party is the less likely it misrepresents its supporters to the left 
compared to being congruent (which is not in line with H3). This finding, however, relates to 
another argument in the literature concerning the combinability of a leftist programmatic 
appeal with a clientelistic linkage strategy. Party programs are usually grounded on 
universalistic principles which are more or less combinable with particularistic exchanges. It 
is, therefore, plausible that the kind of ideologically grounded universalistic principle impacts 
21 
 
the feasibility of clientelism. Especially left-libertarian parties that focus on social inequality 
issues and redistribution may compromise their credibility when engaging in clientelistic 
practices (see Kitschelt 2000).
161
 
 
                                                          
161
 Furthermore, with respect to the counterintuitive effect of clientelism the exclusion of non-programmatic 
voters in this study should be considered. Both policy congruence measures are based on truncated data. 
Respondents of the public opinion survey were included in the calculation only if they answered both questions 
on party preference and self-positioning on the economic scale. This procedure excludes, firstly, party voters that 
were either unable or unwilling to position themselves on the economic scale and secondly, respondents which 
did not have or communicate a party preference independent from their ability to position themselves on the 
economic dimension. Especially the first reason of exclusion poses a substantive problem in relation to 
clientelism.  
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Table 1: Explaining Left- or Right Distortion in Policy Congruence – Multinomial Logit Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables RD vs. C
α
 LD vs. C
α
 RD vs. LD
α
 RD vs. C
α
 LD vs. C
α
 RD vs. LD
α
 RD vs. C
α
 LD vs. C
α
 RD vs. LD
α
 
          
Personalistic Linkage -0.008 -0.328 0.320 -0.066 -0.999 0.933 0.016 1.304 -1.288 
 (0.353) (0.858) (0.755) (0.423) (0.646) (0.619) (0.354) (1.428) (1.531) 
Clientelistic Linkage -0.919 -1.769*** 0.850*** -0.847 -1.877*** 1.030** -0.872 -3.506*** 2.634** 
 (0.579) (0.554) (0.318) (0.680) (0.766) (0.502) (0.696) (1.488) (1.027) 
Programmatic Linkage -2.480*** 1.716 -4.196*** -2.516*** 1.334 -3.850*** -2.500*** 0.977 -3.478*** 
 (0.679) (1.081) (0.949) (0.878) (1.226) (1.198) (0.716) (1.383) (1.232) 
Party Seat Share    -0.002 0.035 -0.036    
    (0.022) (0.035) (0.038)    
Party Age    -0.001 -0.015** 0.015    
    (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)    
Centrism    -0.217 -1.725* 1.508    
    (0.554) (0.942) (0.920)    
Fragmentation       0.006 0.680** -0.674** 
       (0.123) (0.318) (0.311) 
Polarization       0.128 0.755** -0.627** 
       (0.223) (0.306) (0.301) 
GDP p.c. 2008       -0.000 -0.000** 0.000** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 11.673*** 0.130 11.543 11.872*** 3.705 8.168 11.499*** -1.397 12.896*** 
 (3.020) (3.513) (3.181) (3.964) (3.916) (4.068) (3.937) (3.827) (4.597) 
          
N 80 80 80 
Log-pseudo Likelihood -55.546 -53.176 -49.844 
Wald-χ2  117.08*** 116.41*** 159.54*** 
Pseudo R
2
  0.22 0.25 0.30 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. The second category in each column is the reference category. 
α: LD = Left Distortion (state intervention), RD = Right Distortion (free market); C = Congruence 
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Moreover, in line with H4 the third group comparison (column 3) shows that political parties 
pursuing a clientelistic linkage strategy more likely misrepresent their supporters to the free 
market end (right) of the economic dimension than to the state protectionist end (left). 
Furthermore, the opposite effect arises for programmatic parties. The unexpected strong 
negative effect indicates that programmatic parties misrepresent their supporters more likely 
to the left end of the economic scale than to the right end. Both effects are significant on a 
high confidence level as well as robust over all three models.  
Inspecting political parties’ predicted probabilities in combination with their linkage mix 
further confirms this picture as can be seen in Table 2. On the one hand, the three parties with 
the highest probability of misrepresenting their supporters to the right end of the economic 
scale score rather high with respect to their emphasis on the clientelistic linkage strategy and 
low with respect to their emphasis on the programmatic linkage strategy. On the other hand, 
the three parties with the highest probability of misrepresenting their supporters to the left 
end of the economic scale score extremely high with respect to their emphasis on the 
programmatic linkage strategy and extremely low with respect to their emphasis on the 
clientelistic linkage strategy. In line with H2 we find no clear pattern concerning these 
parties’ emphasis on the personalistic linkage strategy. 
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Table 2: Predicted Probabilities of Extreme Cases 
Right-Distortive Parties 
Party 
Name 
Predicted 
Probability 
Programmatic 
Linkage 
Personalistic 
Linkage 
Clientelistic 
Linkage 
     
PRIAN 97.02 1.9 3.9 3.9 
PP (1) 96.63 2.2 1.5 2.9 
PS-PLN 96.29 2.1 2.6 3.2 
     
Left-Distortive Parties 
Party 
Name 
Predicted 
Probability 
Programmatic 
Linkage 
Personalistic 
Linkage 
Clientelistic 
Linkage 
     
PAC 87.77 3.7 1.6 2.1 
FA 83.73 3.8 3.0 1.7 
PCdoB 80.06 3.8 3.2 1.2 
     
Note: Party acronyms are reported in the Appendix. 
 
These findings hint to an aggregative compensation between programmatically left-distortive 
parties and clientelistic right-distortive parties, corroborating the decision to analyse policy 
congruence on the party level as to avoid the ecological inference problem (King, 1997). 
Further research in this respect may uncover a possible cancelling-out effect of programmatic 
and clientelistic linkage strategies with respect to collective policy congruence in Latin 
American party systems (Weissberg 1978). Moreover, this finding urges us to theorize on 
programmatic parties possible intentions to misrepresent their supporters to the left as to 
counterbalance a systematic right-distortion of clientelistic parties on the economic policy 
dimension.  
Finally, concerning the first set of control variables party age and centrism seem to have an 
effect with respect to the second group comparison (left distortion vs. congruence). Older 
parties and parties with a centrist position on the economic scale are less likely left-distortive 
than congruent. The finding partly confirms the argument made about the effect of party age. 
Parties that are around for a longer period are expected to be more congruent than younger 
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parties. The effect of the centrism dummy confirms that centrist parties are expected to be 
more congruent – at least when compared to left-distortive parties. Finally, all three system 
level controls are highly significant for the second and third group comparison. A higher 
number of political parties in a political system and a higher polarization seem to increase the 
probability of left-distortion as compared to congruence and decrease the probability of right-
distortion compared to left-distortion.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that it is important to investigate the influence of party-society 
linkages other than the programmatic one on the degree of party-voter congruence as well as 
the direction of potential incongruence, especially in new democracies. Several arguments 
about the different effects of personalistic and clientelistic linkage strategies on party-voter 
congruence in the economic domain have been made.  
From the results of the statistical analysis some interesting conclusions can be drawn. As 
expected no systematic relationship between a personalistic linkage strategy and party-voter 
congruence was detected. With respect to the other linkage strategies the analysis confirms 
that clientelistic parties more likely misrepresent their supporters to the right (free market) 
end of the economic scale than to the left (state interventionist) end of the economic 
dimension, while  a strong emphasis on a programmatic linkage induces the opposite effect. 
Programmatic parties misrepresent their supporters more likely to the left than to the right on 
the economic dimension. This might hint to the conclusion that the two forms of 
misrepresentation cancel each other out on the macro level (Weissberg 1978), an effect that 
deserve further theoretical and empirical research.  
Moreover the analysis partly confirms our expectations formulated in H1: programmatic 
parties are more likely congruent than right distortive. Furthermore, with respect to the 
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clientelistic linkage the analysis indicates a positive association between clientelism and 
party-voter congruence when compared to left-distortion. This counterintuitive effect may 
partly be explained by an adverse relationship between a leftist position on the economic 
dimension and a clientelistic linkage strategy (Kitschelt 2000) as well as data limitations, 
more specifically, the exclusion of non-programmatic voters in the present study. As voters 
of clientelistic parties base their decision on material benefits and clientelistic parties do not 
provide orientation for their voters in the policy space, it is highly probable that non-
programmatic voters are more likely to be clientelistic party voters (Colomer and Escatel 
2005). 
These findings offer several tasks for future research: Firstly, a potential counterbalancing 
representation effect of highly programmatic and ideologically left political parties with 
respect to the misrepresentation of clientelistic parties on the system level has to be analysed 
in more detail. Secondly, the discrepancy between the spread of political parties and party 
supporters on the economic scale as well as its consequences for the quality of representation 
and the application of different models of political competition may be further investigated. 
Finally, future research should also incorporate non-programmatic voting into models of 
party competition in contexts where clientelistic linkages prevail.  
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Appendix 
Table A1a: Party Acronyms, Number of Observations by Political Party and Data Source 
Country Political Party  Acronym EXPERT LAB 
ARG Partido Justicialista PJ 21 321 
ARG Unión Cívica Radical UCR 20 118 
ARG Alianza Frente para la Victoria FPV 20 88 
ARG Propuesta Republicana PRO 9 68 
BOL Movimiento al Socialismo MAS 13 843 
BOL Poder Democrático Social PODEM(1) 13 121 
BOL Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario MNR 13 22 
BOL Frente de Unidad Nacional UN(1) 13 145 
BRA Partido da Frente Liberal PFL-DEM 17 30 
BRA Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro PMDB 17 155 
BRA Partido Progresista PP(1) 15 24 
BRA Partido Socialista Brasileiro PSB 16 11 
BRA Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira PSDB 17 124 
BRA Partido dos Trabalhadores PT 17 614 
BRA Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro PTB 16 18 
BRA Partido Democrático Trabalhista PDT 17 32 
BRA Partido Comunista do Brasil PCdoB 15 31 
BRA Partido Popular Socialista PPS(1) 16 8 
CHL Partido Radical Socialdemócrata PRSD 17 7 
CHL Unión Demócrata Independiente UDI 18 113 
CHL Partido Socialista de Chile PS 18 155 
CHL Renovación Nacional RN 18 228 
CHL Partido Demócrata Cristiano PDC(1) 18 186 
CHL Partido por la Democracia PPD 18 105 
COL Partido Liberal Colombiano PLC(1) 12 431 
COL Partido Social Conservador Colombiano PSC(1) 12 157 
COL Partido de la Unidad PU 12 408 
COL Movimiento Cambio Radical MCR 11 21 
COL Polo Democrático Alternativa PDA 12 114 
CRI Partido Acción Ciudadana PAC 18 166 
CRI Partido Liberación Nacional PLN 18 587 
CRI Movimiento Libertario ML 18 48 
CRI Partido Unidad Social Cristiana PUSC 17 109 
ECU Partido Social Cristiano PSC(2) 13 93 
ECU Izquierda Democrática ID 13 18 
ECU Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano PRE 13 24 
ECU Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik MUPP 13 10 
ECU Partido Renovador Institutcional Acción Nacional PRIAN 13 31 
ECU Parido Sociedad Patriótico PSP 12 74 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from LAB and EXPERT.  
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Table A1b: Number of Observations by Political Party and Data Source (continued) 
Country Political Party  Acronym EXPERT LAB 
ELS Alianza Republicana Nacionalista ARENA 13 307 
ELS Fte Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional FMLN 13 615 
ELS Partido de Conciliación Nacional PCN 11 18 
ELS Partido Demócrata Cristiano PDC(2) 12 13 
GTM Frente Republicano Guatemalteco FRG 10 32 
GTM Gran Alianza Nacional GANA 10 37 
GTM Partido de Avanzada Nacional PAN(1) 10 11 
GTM Partido Patriota PP(2) 10 192 
HND Partido Liberal PLH 13 564 
HND Patido Nacional PNH 13 622 
MEX Partido Revolucionario Institucional PRI 18 563 
MEX Partido Acción Nacional PAN(2) 18 412 
MEX Partido de la Revolucionario Demócratica PRD(1) 18 158 
MEX Partido Verde Ecológico de México PVEM 13 26 
MEX Convergencia (Movimiento Ciudadano) CONV 12 8 
NIC Alianza Liberal Nacional ALN 14 31 
NIC Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional FSLN 17 401 
NIC Partido Liberal Constitucionalista PLC(2) 18 285 
PAN Partido Revolucionario Democrático PRD(2) 8 437 
PAN Partido Panameñista (Arnulfista) PA 8 213 
PAN Partido Solidariadad-Partido Liberal Nacional PS-PLN 10 7 
PAN Partido Cambio Democrático PCD 7 478 
PAR Alianza Nacional Republicana ANR 14 278 
PAR Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico PLRA 14 353 
PAR Partido Partria Querida PPQ 14 6 
PAR Partido Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos PUNACE 14 38 
PAR Partido Democrático Popular PDP 5 11 
PAR Movimiento Popular Tekojoja MPT 5 24 
PER Unión por el Perú UPP 11 9 
PER Partido Aprista Peruano PAP 11 104 
PER Unidad Nacional UN(2) 11 157 
PER Alianza por el Futuro APF 10 70 
PER Frente de Centro FDC 10 12 
RDO Partido Revolucionario Dominicana PRD(3) 5 589 
RDO Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata PRSC 5 83 
RDO Partido de la Liberación Dominicana PLD 5 735 
URY Partido Nacional PN 17 387 
URY Partido Colorado PC 17 124 
URY Frente Amplio FA 17 873 
VEN Movimiento V República MVR 12 710 
VEN Por la Democracia Social PODEM(2) 12 14 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from LAB and EXPERT. 
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Table A2: Question Wordings from the LAB and EXPERT surveys 
Data Set Question Wording 
LAB Economic Scale “Some people think that the State must solve all problems because it 
has the resources to do it, while others think that the market will 
solve all problems because it distributes the resources in an efficient 
way. Using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “State must solve all 
problems” and 10 means “Market must solve all problems”. Where 
would you place yourself?” 
Party Preference “If this Sunday there were elections, for which party would you 
vote?” 
EXPERT Economic Scale “ State role in governing the economy:  
[1] Party supports a major role for the state in regulating private 
economic activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, 
and/ or maintaining control over key services. 
[10] Party advocates a minimal role for the state in governing or 
directing economic activity or development. 
Programmatic 
Linkage 
“Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize 
electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party’s 
positions on policy issues.” 
Answer categories: 1=Not at all; 2=To a small extent; 3=To a 
moderate extent; 4=To a great extent 
Personalistic 
Linkage 
“To what extent do parties seek to mobilize electoral support by 
featuring a party leader’s charismatic* personality? 
Answer categories: 1=Very little/ Not at all; 2=To a rather limited 
extent; 3=Quite vigorously; 4=Very strongly 
*Leaders have charisma, if their followers are attracted to their 
“personal magic of leadership [that] arous[es] special popular 
loyalty or enthusiasm” (Webster’s dictionary). Leaders project 
charismatic personal capabilities, if they can evoke emotion, 
affection, faith, loyalty, and even sacrifice on the part of their 
followers. Charismatic leadership is thus separate from (1) featuring 
the competence of party leaders to govern or (2) identifying the 
leader with attractive policy positions”  
Clientelistic 
Linkage 
“Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize 
electoral support by emphasizing the capacity of the party to deliver 
targeted material benefits to its electoral supporters” 
Answer categories: 1=Not at all; 2=To a small extent; 3=To a 
moderate extent; 4=To a great extent 
Source: http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp (Questionnaire LAB 2008, 2009, accessed 7 
January 2013, author’s translation); https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html (Questionnaire 
EXPERT, accessed 7 January 2013).  
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INTRODUCTION 
The quality of representative democracy depends on the presence of free, fair and regular 
elections and on the competitive interaction of political elites for public office (e.g. Sartori 
1976; Schumpeter 2008 [1942]). One of the most prominent models concerned with the 
quality of representative democracy is the responsible party model (APSA 1950; see also 
Thomassen 1994). The model rests on the prevalent assumptions of policy-based competition 
between political parties and policy-based political behavior of the electorate. In such 
circumstances political elites are induced to be responsive to the interests of their citizens 
(Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967). In this respect, it is essential for 
substantive political representation that citizens possess consistent perceptions of the political 
space. 
While the assumptions of the responsible party model are more or less met in advanced 
democracies, they may be problematic in the context of new democracies (Thomassen 1994). 
Due to different trajectories of democratization, Latin American democracies did not develop 
similar patterns of party competition compared to Western European countries which favor 
the development of responsible parties (Dalton and Klingemann 2007). Thus, the idealization 
  
 
of programmatic party competition may hamper awareness of other modes of political 
competition and their consequences for democratic representation. Especially in new 
democracies political parties do not compete only in programmatic ways; they may pursue 
additional or completely different electoral mobilization strategies, like clientelism (Kitschelt 
2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).
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Programmatic party competition only becomes feasible if citizens base their political 
behavior on the evaluation of similarities and differences of political parties’ policy offers. 
One important prerequisite for programmatic party competition is that citizens possess clear 
and structured political perceptions (Downs 1957; Kitschelt et al. 2010). Clientelism, 
however, poses incentives for citizens to base their political behavior on a different rationale 
than parties’ long-term policy programs (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007). 
“Clientelism practiced in the extreme … deprives citizens of their capacity to hold parties and 
politicians accountable for the policies they pursue in office” (Hagopian 1998, 123). Since 
most studies on political perception focus on advanced democracies (e.g. Dahlberg 2009; 
Brug 1999), the effect of clientelism on citizens’ political orientation has so far been 
neglected. 
To address this research lacuna, I analyze the causal link between clientelism and political 
perception in this article. Building upon the literature on party–society linkages, political 
behavior and political representation, I develop a theoretical model of the causal relationship 
between clientelism and citizens’ political perception. The key argument is that political 
parties following a clientelistic linkage strategy decrease the ability of citizens to develop 
clear and structured policy preferences. Thereby, they prevent citizens from developing the 
ability to compare parties’ policy proposals and, consequently, lower the overall incentive for 
political parties to act responsively in substantive terms. To test these arguments I deploy 
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 Nevertheless, non-programmatic competition is also observable in some advanced democracies, 
e.g. Italy (see Piattoni 2001). 
  
 
several multilevel regression analyses using cross-sectional data from 18 Latin American 
democracies. Political perception will be operationalized as the ability to place oneself on the 
left-right ideological dimension. The effect of clientelism on left-right orientation will be 
tested on different analytical levels: on the meso-level, I inspect the effect of political parties’ 
use of clientelistic practices on the ability of their supporters to position themselves on the 
left-right dimension. On the micro-level, I investigate the effect of individuals’ involvement 
in clientelistic exchanges on their ability to position themselves on the left-right dimension.  
In the first section of the article I highlight the relevant issues from the literature on political 
representation and political competition and develop my theoretical argument. The empirical 
analysis is structured in two parts: the first part focusses on the political orientation of 
clientelistic party supporters, the second part analyses the political orientation of clientelistic 
targets. In the conclusion I summarize the findings and propose avenues for further research. 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The Responsible Party Model 
Political representation is usually defined as the link between citizens’ policy preferences and 
the policy preferences or behavior of their elected representatives (see Manin, Przeworski, 
and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967). In a democratic political system, political representation is 
realized through repeated, free, open, secret, and fair elections. Yet another key feature of 
representative democracies is competition between political parties in these elections for 
public office and power. Political parties, thus, fulfill a central role in mediating between 
citizens and the state by channeling citizens’ policy preferences and selecting political elites 
for elected positions (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sartori 1976). From the perspective of 
the responsible party model, political competition between political parties for votes is 
  
 
believed to create desirable societal outcomes such as accountability and responsiveness 
(APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994). 
However, the responsible party model rests on the prevalent assumptions of policy-based 
competition between political parties and policy-based political behavior of the electorate. 
Thus, for the model to work effectively political parties have to distinguish themselves on the 
basis of policy programs and be cohesive or disciplined enough to implement their policy 
promises when elected (supply side). Furthermore, voters need to develop their own policy 
preferences, evaluate the policy programs of political parties, and relate them to their own 
preferences within a shared political space (demand side) (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994). 
Thereby, the responsible party model sets high requirements for both parties and voters in 
representative democracies. Nevertheless the model allows us to systematically study the 
process of political representation by using the requirements of the model to evaluate the 
effectiveness and the quality of political representation (see Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, 
16). 
The feasibility of the responsible party model depends on the specific configuration of supply 
and demand side factors. However, the weakest link of the model are its requirements on the 
voter side (Thomassen 1994, 252). Consistent policy preferences of voters are essential for 
substantive political representation. Free, competitive, and repeated elections are not 
sufficient to induce political parties to be responsive to their voters’ preferences. Voters need 
to select political elites on the basis of policy promises and perceive irresponsive behavior of 
political parties to be able to punish them in the next election (Bowler 1990). Consequently, 
programmatic party competition becomes more likely the higher the level of political 
orientation in the citizenry is (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Building upon this insight, this article 
systematically analyses determinants of citizens’ political orientation, in an effort to evaluate 
the quality of political representation in new democracies. 
  
 
Political Orientation and Clientelism 
Political orientation may be defined in two ways: in general, it refers to a citizen’s ability to 
develop consistent policy preferences (Converse 1975; Dalton and Klingemann 2007). In a 
more specific sense, the concept refers to a citizen’s ability to evaluate political parties’ 
policy programs and relate them to her own policy preferences (Huber 1989; Inglehart and 
Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1995). 
Comparative research on party politics usually assumes that political competition is 
organized in a low-dimensional way, i.e. a left–right ideological dimension that shall enable 
citizens to link themselves with political parties (Downs 1957; Huber and Inglehart 1995; 
Inglehart and Klingemann 1976).
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 Assuming that voters’ policy preferences are structured 
along a left-right ideological dimension is a strong reduction of the complex political reality, 
however, empirical studies show that political elites as well as citizens use the left-right 
schema exactly for the purpose of reducing the complexity of the political realm (Downs 
1957; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989).  
For Latin America recent research has tested the dimensionality of political competition and 
shown that political elites consistently differentiate themselves and their political parties on a 
general left–right dimension (Saiegh 2009; Zoco 2006). The same picture arises when experts 
are asked to assess the positioning of political parties on the same dimension (Altman et al. 
2009; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). However, different accounts arise when it comes to 
voters. On the one hand, Colomer (2005) states that a considerable degree of citizens locate 
themselves consistently on an ideologically structured left–right dimension. Recent studies, 
on the other hand, are more skeptical and show that left-right attitudes in Latin America vary 
across individuals and countries (Zechmeister 2006; Harbers, Vries, and Steenbergen 2012). 
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 A prominent strand of literature refers to three different components of such left-right self-
placements: values, social identities and party identification (e.g. Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; 
Huber 1989; Knutsen 1995). However, this literature is concerned with the specific location of 
citizens in the political space (i.e. left, center, right). 
  
 
To evaluate the quality of political representation in new democracies this article focusses on 
the general left-right orientation in the citizenry, i.e. citizens’ ability to position themselves 
on the left-right dimension. First descriptive evidence shows that the level of left-right 
orientation differs between established and new democracies: the mean proportion of 
respondents able to position themselves on a left-right scale in 2009 amounts to 84.5% in 
Western Europe as opposed to 78.6% in Latin America (Eurobarometer 2009 and 
Latinobarometer 2009). Differences between new and established democracies in the 
importance of the left-right dimension as a heuristic to make political decisions as well as 
differences within the group of new democracies are still understudied topics (Kitschelt et al. 
2010; Harbers, Vries, and Steenbergen 2012). Thus, it is important to identify which factors 
favor the development of left-right orientation. 
Classically the lack of general or specific political orientation has been ascribed to the 
ubiquitous uncertainty in the political realm (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Downs 1957). Since 
the two sides of the representational link are interrelated, the structuration of the supply side 
of political representation plays a decisive role for the reduction of such uncertainty and the 
development of substantive political orientation (i.e. the demand side). The political context 
in which individuals are embedded bears, for example, on the availability of information and 
the ambiguity of political signals (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Downs 1957; Zechmeister 
2006). Furthermore, dependent on the structuration of the supply side, citizens may rely on 
other information cues than ideological left-right short-cuts to make political decisions. Thus, 
the structuration of political competition plays an important role in the formation of clear and 
shared political perceptions. And this is exactly where clientelism gains relevance. 
As mentioned earlier, structures of competition between political parties in Latin America are 
to various extents shaped by clientelistic linkages between citizens and political parties. 
Though its decline has often been predicted, clientelism persists in many new democracies 
  
 
and has proven to be a highly adaptive strategy (see Gay 1998). Due to the long history of 
clientelistic structures and its adaptation to very different contexts, research on this topic is 
confronted with a variety of sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting definitions of 
the concept (see Hilgers 2011). For the purpose of the present article, clientelism is defined as 
a “direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to 
employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p. 2, italics original). 
Following Stokes, two subtype of clientelism can be distinguished: patronage and vote 
buying. The first is defined as “the proffering of public resources (most typically, public 
employment) by office holders in return for electoral support” (Stokes 2007, p. 606, italics 
original), while the second subtype refers to “a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, 
protections) for one’s own vote” (2007, p. 606, italics original). I follow this conception of 
clientelism as it focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon which directly relate to the 
electoral process in democratic political systems (see Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007; Piattoni 2001; Stokes 2007).  
Clientelism is, thus, understood as an electoral mobilization strategy based on the distribution 
of particularistic benefits for voters. It may be distinguished from other – more programmatic 
– forms of distributional strategies through the conditionality of the exchange relationship. 
Clientelistic parties target specific individuals and reward them with particularistic benefits 
conditional on their willingness to support the party – either with their votes or as activists 
(Stokes 2007). Opposed to such a conditional (direct) exchange, programmatic strategies 
such as allocational policies or pork-barrel spending are directed to groups or regions and 
therefore not exclusively targeted and conditional (Schaffer and Schedler 2007).  
But how is the relationship between clientelism and an individual’s political orientation 
established? The effect of clientelism on left-right orientation may be explained by two 
mechanisms on the micro-level. Clientelism may hinder an individual from developing clear 
  
 
and structured political perceptions either by increasing the uncertainty in the political realm, 
or by inducing the indifference of clientelistic voter groups towards the ideological spectrum. 
Concerning the first mechanism, clientelistic parties increase the uncertainty in the political 
realm by sending unclear policy signals that blur the distinctiveness between left and right. 
According to the responsible party model political elites ideally distinguish themselves 
through party differentials. If citizens receive clear policy signals, they are more able to 
inform themselves about the ideological spectrum of the political space in a differentiated 
way. However, clientelistic linkages as opposed to programmatic linkages “reduce parties to 
their most basic, self-referential political function: electing candidates from their ranks into 
public office” (Roberts 2002, 29). Therefore, clientelistic parties, unlike programmatic 
parties, do not provide for mechanisms of interest aggregation. On the contrary, they offer no 
orientation in the policy space, even cut across cleavages, and cater to highly heterogeneous 
clients (Gay 1998; Roberts 2002; Zechmeister 2006). Such ambiguity in the signaling process 
of political representation increases the uncertainty in the political realm.  
Concerning the second mechanism, clientelistic parties perpetuate or increase the indifference 
of their clients to the political space and other parties’ policy differentials. Citizens bound in 
clientelistic relationships do not care about the policy positions of political parties and 
potential future benefits through public policy; their only concern is the immediate material 
advantage that they might receive for their vote (Kitschelt 2000; Stokes 2007). Their political 
behavior is not built upon the evaluation of information and proximity calculations between 
their own position and policy programs of political parties within this space. Instead it rests 
on less time consuming information and bears lower costs for their involvement in political 
participation. The voting act thereby loses its capacity to signal policy preferences. However, 
from a client’s perspective the exchange of particularistic goods may be perceived as a viable 
  
 
solution to social problems (Auyero 1999; Hilgers 2009). In this sense, clientelism reduces 
the importance of the left-right dimension as a viable cue for political behavior.  
Both mechanisms lead to the following hypotheses, which are formulated at different 
analytical levels: 
Hypothesis 1 (meso): Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a 
clientelistic linkage strategy, the lower the probability of its supporters to locate 
themselves on the left-right continuum will be.  
Hypothesis 2 (micro): Ceteris paribus, the more often a citizen receives clientelistic 
inducements during elections, the lower the probability of this citizen to locate herself 
on the left-right continuum will be. 
To sum up, clientelism may have severe consequences for the quality of ideological 
representation. Where political competition is structured by clientelistic linkages between 
political elites and the electorate, it is more likely that citizens are unable to make political 
decisions based on their policy preferences. Figure 1 gives a graphical overview of the 
theoretical arguments on which these hypotheses are based. 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1: The Relationship between Clientelism and Left-Right Orientation 
 
 
Alternative Determinants of Political Orientation 
As these hypotheses are assumed to hold ceteris paribus, other classical explanatory factors 
influencing political orientation have to be specified and included into the statistical analysis 
as control variables. Three sets of control factors seem to be relevant: (1) party system 
characteristics, (2) party linkages, and (3) individual-level characteristics. 
The first set of control factors comprises two classic features of party systems, besides their 
clientelistic structuration, which may influence citizens’ left-right orientation in a country: the 
number of political parties in a party system and the polarization of party systems. The 
number of political parties is one of the most studied variables in comparative research on 
party politics (Dalton 2008; Rae 1971; Sartori 1976). On the one hand, a minimal number of 
two relevant parties is a necessary condition for competitive interaction as such (Sartori 
1976). On the other hand, the number of political parties raises the complexity of competitive 
interactions, i.e. the more parties there are in a party system the more interaction streams 
between political parties exist (Sartori 1976). Such a rise in complexity makes it more 
demanding for citizens to orient themselves in the political space and decide between the 
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offers made by several political parties (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jusko and Sively 2005). 
This may lead to a higher probability for citizens to either base their political decisions on an 
alternative rationale or abstain from voting, as getting informed about the substantive choices 
at hand is too time consuming to justify the effort of voting (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). 
Furthermore, party system fragmentation sets higher requirements for effective elite and voter 
coordination, like the building of viable electoral alliances or the identification of future 
governments (Cox 1997; Powell 2000). A high number of relevant political parties in a party 
system should exacerbate the development of clear and structured political orientation. 
Independent from the number of political parties, the polarization of party systems can 
influence citizens’ left-right orientation. Party system polarization may facilitate the 
differentiation between political parties due to a more meaningful use of ideological labels 
and an eased access to such information for voters (Dalton 2008; Zechmeister 2006). 
Furthermore, party system polarization increases the stakes of political competition. As 
political parties spread across the ideological dimension governmental programs may differ 
more drastically (Dalton 2008; Lachat 2007). Thus, with higher levels of polarization citizens 
should be more apt and willing to develop clear and structured left-right orientation. 
The second set of control factors includes the two classical linkage strategies political parties 
may pursue other than the clientelistic one: programmatic and personalistic linkages 
(Kitschelt 2000). In line with the literature on the responsible party model I assume a positive 
effect of a programmatic link between political parties and their supporters on the left-right 
orientation of the latter. With respect to the personalistic linkage strategy no systematic effect 
on the left-right orientation of a political party’s supporter is expected, since the policy 
pledges personalistic parties make usually remain opaque as their leaders do not want to limit 
their leverage on the party strategy (Weyland 1999; Ruth 2012).  
  
 
The third set of control factors refers to the influence of several individual-level factors on 
citizens’ left-right orientation. On the one hand, political sophistication plays a decisive role 
in the development of political orientation. On the other hand, political experience may 
further increase the probability of a citizen to develop clear and structured political 
orientation. Following Downs (1957, 77-79), political ignorance may be removed by 
education and the acquisition of information. Left-right orientation, in this respect, depends 
on the general political knowledge of a person and the costs of getting informed about 
politics. People with a higher level of education have a higher cognitive capacity to evaluate 
political information. Furthermore, a person’s willingness to pay for costly information 
depends on the motivational aspect of political sophistication, i.e. a person’s interest in 
politics (Luskin 1990). Furthermore, the evaluation of political parties’ policy positions may 
be more demanding for citizens in new democracies, as their democratic practice is shorter. 
Over time citizens get more experienced with their political system (e.g. electoral rules) and 
the choice set at their disposal, thereby, they gain more confidence in left-right short cuts as a 
basis for their political decisions (Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008).  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The following analysis focuses on the effect of clientelism on left-right orientation in Latin 
American democracies, while controlling for macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors. The 
hypotheses stated above will be tested by means of two different analyses, each based on a 
cross-sectional dataset measuring the main independent variable of clientelism on a different 
analytical level. In the first part of the empirical analysis clientelism is measured on the 
meso-level as a parties’ emphasis on a clientelistic linkage strategy. In the second part of the 
empirical analysis clientelism is measured on the micro-level as the direct involvement of 
  
 
individuals in a clientelistic exchange relationship with party officials during election 
times.
164
 
 
Case selection 
The focus on Latin American countries is advocated for two reasons: (1) Next to the variance 
regarding parties’ linkage strategies between new and established democracies, Kitschelt et 
al. (2010) have recently shown that there are also differences within this group of new 
democracies. This is especially true for the degree of clientelism in Latin America, which 
varies both between and within countries. (2) Latin American countries share similar socio-
economic contexts as well as institutional set-ups. For example, many Latin American 
countries experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s and 1980s and phases of re-
democratization in the 1990s (see for example Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005). In addition 
to this, all countries in this study are presidential regimes and thus share similar structures of 
horizontal accountability (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). For the present sample 
presidentialism represents a scope condition. Therefore, this study allows us to focus on the 
effect of clientelism while holding other contextual factors constant. 
The first part of the empirical analysis is based on a hierarchical dataset that combines 
information taken from the Latinobarometer survey (hereafter LAB) in 2009 (Corporación 
Latinobarómetro 2009) and the Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (hereafter DAES) 
2007-2008 (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009). In total this part covers individuals and 
political parties in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The second part of the empirical analysis is based 
on a hierarchical dataset that combines data from the Americas Barometer (hereafter LAPOP) 
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 Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix.  
  
 
in 2010 (LAPOP 2010) and the DAES. It includes information on individuals in the same 
countries as in the first part of the study with the exception of Honduras since the LAPOP in 
2010 does not report the respective survey item on clientelism for this country.
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Part I: Political Orientation of Clientelistic Party Supporters 
This section addresses Hypothesis 1 and focusses on the effect of clientelism, measured on 
the meso-level, on the ability of party supporters to possess political orientation.  
 
Operationalization 
The concept of political orientation is operationalized as an individual’s ability to locate 
herself on a left–right dimension. Therefore, the LAB provides a valuable database as it inter 
alia asks respondents to place themselves on a left–right scale (item Q69ST). To build the 
dependent variable for this part of the analysis the survey item is recoded into a dummy 
variable. Respondents that report their position on the 11-point scale obtain the value 1, 
indicating that they are able to locate themselves on the left-right scale. All other responses, 
such as ‘do not know’, ‘none’, and ‘no answer’, are coded 0, indicating that the respondent 
did not report any position on the left-right scale. To match respondents of the LAB with 
political party scores from the DAES I use the LAB item that asks respondents to report their 
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 Question wordings for all survey items used in this study are available online: Questionnaire LAB 
2009, http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp (accessed 7 August 2013); 
Questionnaire LAPOP 2010, 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/docs/2010_Core_Questionnaire_English.pdf (accessed 7 August 
2013); Questionnaire DAES, https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html (accessed 7 August 
2013).  
  
 
party preference (item Q35ST).
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 For all party supporters included in this part of the study 
the mean rate of selfplacement in 2009 is 84.5% (standard deviation 3.6).
167
  
With respect to the main independent variable, comparative research on clientelism has been 
confronted with a problem of data availability. Due to the lack of direct and reliable 
comparative measures on the party- or individual-level, until recently, research on political 
clientelism had to rely on more or less adequate proxy variables, such as indices of 
corruption, or was limited to qualitative case studies (e.g. Auyero 1999; Keefer 2007).  
However, recently comparative party-level data has become available. A new data set on 
democratic accountability mechanisms covering political parties in 18 Latin American 
countries provides a variety of measures of party-society linkages which are directly related 
to the concept of clientelism (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009). Experts have been 
asked to explicitly rank political parties’ emphasis with respect to several clientelistic 
practices. The questions are categorical and range from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating a 
more frequent use of the respective practice. Two indicators will be used in this first part of 
the study to operationalize several aspects of clientelism on the party-level: (1) the extent to 
which a political party offers preferential goods to attract voters (vote buying, item B2). (2) 
The extent to which a political party provides its voters with employment opportunities 
(patronage, item B3). An index of vote buying or patronage is derived taking the mean of the 
expert responses of the respective survey item. Both indicators are positively correlated with 
r>0.8 at a 99% confidence level.  
Additionally, three sets of control variables are included in the analysis: Due to the small 
sample size on the macro-level, the number of control variables on this level is confined to 
two: the fragmentation and polarization of party systems. The former will be measured on the 
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 Combining the LAB from 2009 with the DAES leads to a better match of political parties and party 
supporters and a higher number of micro-level units than with the LAPOP in 2010. 
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 Note that the value differs from the general level of left-right orientation for all respondents 
(78.6%) in the survey reported earlier. This hints to the conclusion that party supporters are on 
average more likely to position themselves on the left-right dimension. 
  
 
basis of seat shares using the index of the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) 
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979).
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 To account for an increasing effect of ENPP the variable 
will enter the regression in logarithmic form. Party system polarization will be measured by 
the Taylor-Herman index (Taylor and Herman 1971) and is calculated based on the DAES 
data on political parties’ left-right placement (item D6) and their seat shares in the national 
legislature. On the meso-level, I control for a political party’s emphasis on a programmatic or 
personalistic linkage strategy. Data is taken from the DAES survey which provides expert 
ratings with respect to both linkage strategies (items E2 and E1). The questions are 
categorical and range from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the 
respective linkage strategy. The mean expert rating of a party indicates its emphasis on each 
linkage type. On the micro-level, political sophistication will be measured by the 
respondent’s level of education and the level of political interest. Data on both variables stem 
from two different items in the LAB. Education is measured on a 7-point scale, with higher 
values indicating higher levels of education (item REEDUC1). Political interest is measured 
on a 4-point scale with lower values indicating higher levels of interest in politics (item 
Q32ST). Furthermore, political experience will be controlled for by the respondent’s 
electoral experience as well as the age of the respondent. The former is coded as a dummy 
variable where the value 1 indicates that the respondent voted in the last election and the 
value 0 refers to all other responses to the question (item Q37STM). The age of a respondent 
will enter the analysis in linear and squared form to account for a possible curvilinear 
relationship between age and the dependent variable (item S6).  
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Estimation Model 
Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable the statistical estimations rely upon a 
logistic regression model (e.g. Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Furthermore, the application of 
multilevel estimation techniques is recommended because the data set is structured 
hierarchically – with individuals nested in parties and countries (Steenbergen and Jones 
2002). Multilevel analysis accounts for such hierarchical data structures where observations 
within the same context are not necessarily independent from each other.  
Therefore, statistical estimations for the dependent variable of political perception rely upon a 
three-level logistic random intercept model (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Hox 2010). The 
model to test Hypothesis 1 is specified as follows: 
   (
    
       
)                           
Subscript i (=1,…,I) denotes the units on the individual-level, subscript j (=1,…,J) refers to 
the units on the party-level, and the subscript k (=1,…,K) refers to the country-level. The 
linear predictor of the log odds of an individuals’ probability of being able to position herself 
on the left-right scale are modeled by an intercept β0, a vector of coefficients on the 
individual-level (V), a vector of coefficients on the party-level (X), and a vector of 
coefficients on the country-level (Z). For the random effect      a normal distribution with a 
zero mean and a variance of σε
2
 is assumed. Individual-level residuals follow from the 
probability of y and are therefore not included in the equation (Snijders and Bosker 1999).
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 In line with a logistic distribution the residual variance of level-1 is π2/3 (Snijders and Bosker 
1999: 224). 
  
 
Table 1: Random-Intercept Logistic Regression Models, DV: Left-Right Orientation 
 Model 0 Model 1  Model 2  
  β (se) 
Marginal 
effects 
β (se) 
Marginal 
effects 
Country-Level 
 
    
Fragmentation 
 
-0.22 -0.03 -0.26 -0.03 
  (0.36) (0.04) (0.37) (0.04) 
Polarization 
 
0.09** 0.01* 0.10** 0.01** 
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Party-Level      
Vote buying 
 
-0.30** -0.04**   
  (0.12) (0.02)   
Patronage 
 
  -0.26** -0.03** 
    (0.13) (0.02) 
Programme 
 
-0.27 -0.03 -0.25 -0.03 
  (0.17) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) 
Personalism 
 
0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
  (0.12) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) 
Individual-Level      
Education 
 
0.19*** 0.02*** 0.19*** 0.02*** 
  (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Political Interest 
 
    
‘fairly’ 
 
-0.54*** -0.04*** -0.54*** -0.04*** 
  (0.15) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) 
‘a little’ 
 
-0.92*** -0.08*** -0.92*** -0.08*** 
  (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) 
‘not at all’ 
 
-1.35*** -0.15*** -1.35*** -0.15*** 
  (0.14) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) 
Voter 
 
0.12 0.01 0.12 0.01 
  (0.08) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) 
Age 
 
0.03*** 0.00*** 0.03*** 0.00*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age squared 
 
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Constant 1.84*** 2.87***  2.92***  
 (0.16) (0.85)  (0.91)  
Variance Level 1 0.42 0.37  0.37  
 (0.17) (0.14)  (0.15)  
Variance Level 2 0.06 0.02  0.02  
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02)  
Log Likelihood -3480.26 -3327.92  -3328.83  
BIC 6987.63 6791.43  6793.26  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. N (country) = 18, N (parties) = 58, N (individuals) = 
8431. Average marginal effects are reported. Political Interest reference category = ‘very 
interested in politics’.  
  
 
Results and Interpretation 
Table 1 presents results for the baseline model and one additional model for each of the two 
indicators of clientelism. Results for the baseline model are reported first (Model 0), followed 
by the coefficients and average marginal effects of the model which includes the effect of 
vote buying (Model 1), and the coefficients and average marginal effects for the model 
including the effect of patronage on the dependent variable (Model 2). 
I have hypothesized that with a higher emphasis of a political party on clientelistic practices 
the probability of its supporters to possess political orientation should be lower. For both 
models the analysis confirms a negative effect of a political party’s degree of clientelistic 
practices on the probability of party supporters to position themselves on the left-right 
dimension. Both effects are significant at the 95% confidence level. Thus, clientelistic parties 
seem to offer party supporters alternative cues on which they can base their political 
behavior. Comparing the average marginal effects in Model 1 with those in Model 2 we can 
further see that the effect of clientelism is more pronounced for vote buying practices than for 
patronage. This finding is intuitively plausible since the practice of vote buying targets a 
broader group of party supporters and thus has a broader scope than the practice of patronage, 
which is more exclusively directed to core supporters or party activists. Vote buying benefits 
are usually distributed during election time, while patronage may be seen as an indirect 
mobilization tool to provide party brokers or activists with public employment to secure their 
future support during election times (see Nichter 2008; Stokes 2007). The difference, 
however, is not very large: while the vote buying indicator in Model 1 has an average 
marginal effect of minus 4 percentage points on the probability of a party supporter to 
position herself on the left-right scale, the average marginal effect of patronage is only one 
percentage point smaller. Concerning the model fit, the model which includes the vote buying 
  
 
indicator fares best with respect to the reduction of the log likelihood and the BIC compared 
to both the baseline model as well as Model 2.  
Although the control variables are not the main focus of this analysis, they merit a closer 
look. With respect to the macro controls only the polarization of party systems has a 
significant effect on the dependent variable and the effect points in the expected direction. In 
line with the arguments made above the polarization of party systems seems to yield more 
meaningful cues for citizens with respect to the left-right dimension and therefore eases the 
development of political orientation for them. The effect of polarization is robust over both 
models and significant at the 95% confidence level. The effect of party system fragmentation 
is insignificant, however, the sign of the effect hints into the expected direction, i.e. a 
negative effect on the dependent variable. 
With respect to the meso-level factors the personalistic linkage type has no significant effect 
on the dependent variable, as expected. However, a surprising finding is the negative and 
insignificant effect of a political party’s emphasis of the programmatic linkage strategy on the 
dependent variable in both models. This pattern also arises in the bivariate model (not 
reported, available on request): the coefficient has a negative sign and does not reach 
common significance levels. While other studies found significant effects of programmatic 
party-society linkages or programmatic party system structuration on the specific placement 
of individuals on the left-right scale (Harbers, Vries, and Steenbergen 2012; Ruth 2012), the 
present findings indicate that this positive association does not hold with respect to the 
uncertainty or indifference of party supporters towards the left-right scale in general. Hence, 
this finding hints to the conclusion that programmatic parties should invest more in educating 
and helping voters to understand what the labels ‘left’ and ‘right’ mean and where they stand 
on this scale if they wish to attract supporters from clientelistic parties.  
  
 
With respect to the individual-level controls, the assumed effect of political sophistication is 
confirmed by the results. The coefficients are highly significant at the 99% confidence level 
and robust over both models. Higher levels of education increase the probability of 
respondents to position themselves on the left-right scale and politically interested party 
supporters are more likely to report their position on the left-right continuum than those with 
lower levels of political interest. For example, a respondents probability to report a position 
on the left-right dimension is on average 15 percentage points lower if the respondent is ‘not 
at all’ interested in politics compared to being ‘very’ interested in politics (see marginal 
effects in Table 1).  
Results for the effect of political experience, however, are less decisive. The distinction of 
party supporters in voters and non-voters in the last election shows no significant association 
with the dependent variable. The age of a respondent seems to have a bell-shaped curvilinear 
effect on a respondents’ probability of perceiving the left-right scale, indicating that young 
and old supporters are less likely to possess political orientation than middle aged supporters. 
However, this effect is very weak as can be seen by inspecting the average marginal effects in 
Model 1 and Model 2 for the respective indicators.  
To sum up, the results of this first empirical analysis confirm the main theoretical arguments 
made above: ceteris paribus, supporters of political parties that strongly pursue a clientelistic 
linkage strategy are less likely to report their position on the left-right dimension (H1).  
 
Part II: Political Orientation of Clientelistic Targets  
Finally, this section addresses Hypothesis 2 and focusses on the effect of clientelism, 
measured on the micro-level, on the ability of individuals to possess political orientation.  
 
  
  
 
Operationalization 
Similarly to the LAB the LAPOP asks respondents to place themselves on a left–right 
dimension (item L1), this time using a 10-point scale, which will be coded into the same 
binary dependent variable, with the value 1 indicating that the respondent was able to locate 
herself on the left-right scale and the value 0 indicating that the respondent did not position 
herself on the left-right scale. This time, however, not only party supporters are included in 
the analysis but all respondents of the survey. For the respondents included in this analysis 
the mean rate of left-right selfplacement in 2010 is 79.5% (standard deviation 4.0). 
Concerning the main independent variable, the LAPOP survey of 2010 for the first time 
included a unique item on clientelistic targeting in its questionnaire (item CLIEN1). By 
means of this question it is possible to operationalize the concept of clientelism on the micro-
level. Respondents have been asked how often they were offered any material inducements 
by party officials during elections in exchange for their votes. Three categories were available 
for the respondents: ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, and ‘never’. For the 17 Latin American countries 
covered in this part of the analysis approximately 5% of the respondents report that they have 
been often targets of vote buying, 8% report they have been sometimes targeted by party 
officials in an attempt of buying their votes, and 87% of the respondents report that they have 
never been targeted by political elites with a vote buying strategy. The variable will enter the 
analysis in its categorical form, with ‘often’ as the reference category.  
Since this part of the analysis includes all respondents of the survey, I will control for 
respondents’ party identification (item VB10). Several arguments in the literature predict a 
relationship between party identification or loyalty and the probability of being targeted by a 
clientelistic party. On the one hand, party identifiers may be less likely targets of clientelistic 
parties since they are assumed to be loyal to their party on other grounds, on the other hand, 
party identifiers are more easily monitored and therefore less risky targets for clientelistic 
  
 
parties (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1986; Stokes 2005). To control for this factor I code a 
dummy variable with the value 1 indicating that a respondent reports that she identifies with a 
political party and the value 0 for all other responses. First descriptive evidence hints to the 
conclusion that political parties target party identifiers more likely than non-identifiers (see 
Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Party Identifiers as Clientelistic Targets (LAPOP) 
 
Source: Calculations based on LAPOP data 2010.  
 
To ease comparability of the results in both parts of the empirical analysis, the 
operationalization of most of the control variables resemble those in the previous section: on 
the macro-level I control for party system fragmentation (ENPP) and polarization (Taylor-
Herman). Furthermore, since no meso-level is included in this part of the analysis, I use 
parties’ linkage scores from the DAES to calculate the programmatic and personalistic 
structuration of party systems on the macro-level (items E2 and E1). Therefore, party scores 
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are weighted with their seat shares in the national legislature.
170
 Due to the small sample size 
on the macro-level, stepwise inclusion of macro controls will be used and only those controls 
that are either significant in the bivariate or the multivariate case are included in the final 
model to limit the number of variables on this level. Parallel to the previous analysis, political 
sophistication will be measured on the micro-level through the respondent’s level of 
education and her level of political interest. The LAPOP reports the respondents’ level of 
education in years (ranging from 0 to 18) (item ED), while political interest is measured on a 
4-point scale with lower values indicating higher levels of interest in politics (item POL1). 
Furthermore, partly diverging from the previous analysis, political experience will be 
controlled for by the respondent’s age only (item Q2), since the LAPOP does not provide a 
question on voting experience for all countries included in this analysis. The age of a 
respondent will enter the analysis in linear and squared form.  
 
Estimation Model 
Since the dependent variable is measured in the same way as in the previous part of the 
analysis, estimations equally rely upon a logistic random intercept model (Snijders and 
Bosker 1999; Hox 2010), with the difference that this time only two hierarchical levels are 
modelled: the individual and the country-level. The model to test Hypothesis 2 is specified as 
follows: 
   (
   
      
)                    
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 Political parties included in the DAES cover on average 93.3% of seats in national legislatures. 
The lowest coverage is given in Colombia with 83.1% of legislative seats, while the highest coverage 
of 100% is given in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. 
  
 
Table 2: Random-Intercept Logistic Regression Model, DV: Left-Right Orientation 
 Model 0 Model 3  
  β (se) Marginal effects 
Country-Level 
 
  
Fragmentation 
 
-0.66** -0.09** 
  (0.32) (0.05) 
Polarization 
 
0.06 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.01) 
Programme 
 
- - 
    
Personalism 
 
- - 
    
Individual-Level    
Clientelistic Target 
 
  
‘sometimes 
 
0.29*** 0.04*** 
  (0.09) (0.01) 
‘never’ 
 
0.12 0.02 
  (0.07) (0.01) 
    
Party Identifier 
 
0.26*** 0.04*** 
  (0.04) (0.01) 
Education 
 
0.07*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Political Interest 
 
  
‘some 
 
-0.37*** -0.04*** 
  (0.07) (0.01) 
‘little’ 
 
-0.57*** -0.07*** 
  (0.07) (0.01) 
‘none’ 
 
-1.05*** -0.14*** 
  (0.07) (0.01) 
Age 
 
-0.01 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared 
 
0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
    
Constant 1.52*** 2.17***  
 (0.16) (0.51)  
Variance Level 1 0.43 0.30  
 (0.15) (0.11)  
Log Likelihood -13945.66 -13352.65  
BIC 27911.84 26838.76  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. N (country) = 17, N (individuals) = 28736. Average 
marginal effects are reported. Clientelistic Target reference category = ‘often’. Political 
Interest reference category = ‘a lot interested in politics’. The variables Programme and 
Personalism were excluded from the model due to their insignificant effects in both the 
bivariate and the full model.  
  
 
Results and Interpretation 
Table 2 reports the results for the baseline model and the coefficients and average marginal 
effects for Model 3, including the effect of being a target of clientelistic practices on the 
probability of reporting a position on the left-right dimension.  
Concerning the effect of clientelism on the dependent variable the analysis partly confirms 
the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 2. The variable Clientelistic Target compares the 
effect of ‘often’ receiving clientelistic benefits during election time – the reference category – 
to the two other categories ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ receiving such benefits. For both 
comparisons the effect shows the expected positive sign, i.e. individuals that are less often 
involved in a clientelistic exchange relationship are more likely to report their position on the 
left-right scale. The effect is highly significant for the comparison with the ‘sometimes’ 
group (p<0.01) and just narrowly under conventional levels of significance for those who 
‘never’ receive clientelistic benefits (p=0.103). Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of the 
predicted probabilities for each group with respect to the dependent variable. 
 
Figure 3: Clientelistic Targets and Left-Right Orientation (LAPOP) 
 
Source: Calculations based on LAPOP data 2010.  
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The highly significant difference with respect to respondents’ left-right orientation between 
the ‘often’ and the ‘sometimes’ category as well as the nearly significant effect comparing the 
‘often’ category to the ‘never’ category confirm arguments in the literature that clientelistic 
targets are likely to be uncertain or indifferent with respect to the left-right dimension (e.g. 
Stokes 2007). Furthermore, the low significance level of the effect of the ‘never’ category 
may result from the quality of the survey item itself, since questions on political attitudes and 
behavior face the ‘social desirability bias’ when respondents do not report their own but a 
socially expected behavior, which in our case would be not to sell their votes (e.g. Holbrook 
& Krosnick 2010). Thus, the category of ‘never’ having received any clientelistic benefits 
may include some degree of noise, which may account for the lower level of left-right 
orientation of this group compared to the ‘sometimes’ category and the insignificance of the 
effect compared to those who ‘often’ received clientelistic benefits.  
Furthermore, with only a few exceptions the effects of the control variables mirror those of 
the previous analysis. On the macro-level, this time the picture is reversed with a significant 
effect of fragmentation and an insignificant effect of the polarization of party systems. In line 
with the theoretical expectations party system fragmentation is negatively related with a 
respondents’ ability to position herself on the left-right dimension. Arguments made 
concerning the effect of polarization cannot be confirmed by the analysis. The control 
variables for the programmatic and personalistic structuration of party systems were finally 
excluded from the analysis since they showed no significant effects in both the bivariate and 
the full models. 
In line with the descriptive inspections made earlier party identifiers are more likely to 
position themselves on the left-right dimension. The effect is highly significant on the 99% 
confidence level. With respect to the other individual-level control variables, only the 
insignificant effect of the age of the respondents diverges from the results of the previous 
  
 
analysis. Both effects of education and political interest are highly significant and with their 
signs in the expected direction. Furthermore, as can be seen by the average marginal effects, 
the size of both control variables on the dependent variable is nearly identical to the first part 
of this empirical analysis. With each additional year of education a respondent’s probability 
to possess a position on the left-right dimension increases by one percentage point. Moreover, 
a respondent’s probability to position herself on the left-right scale with no interest in politics 
is on average 14 percentage points lower than the probability of a respondent with ‘a lot’ of 
interest in politics.  
To sum up, the results confirm that, ceteris paribus, individuals that are often targeted by 
clientelistic parties during election time are less likely to report their position on the left-right 
dimension (H2).  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study marks a first step on the way to evaluate the relationship between clientelism and 
the ability of citizens to develop clear and structured political perceptions. From a political 
science perspective this topic is of specific relevance as consistent perceptions of the political 
space in the citizenry are a precondition for the development of responsible and responsive 
political parties, because only then are citizens able to evaluate and punish irresponsive 
behavior of political parties (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994). By offering citizens alternative 
clues on which they can base their political behavior their votes lose the capacity to signal 
policy preferences. Thereby the overall incentive for political parties to act responsively in 
substantive terms is. Consequently, by hindering the development of left-right orientation in 
the citizenry, clientelism may have severe consequences for the quality of political 
representation. 
  
 
In two analyses based on different hierarchical datasets I was able to confirm the expected 
negative effect of clientelism on individuals’ left-right orientation. Firstly, a political party’s 
emphasis on clientelistic practices negatively influences the ability of its supporters to 
position themselves on the left-right scale.  Secondly, those individuals that are often 
involved in clientelistic exchanges during election times are less likely to report their position 
on the left-right scale. 
Based on these findings this article offers various avenues for future research. The next step 
to disentangle the relationship between clientelism and political orientation would be to focus 
on citizens’ specific positions on the left-right scale. For example, respondents inclined to 
answer the survey question but with no clear opinion concerning the substantive meaning of 
left and right may tend to answer the question by positioning themselves in the center of the 
scale (Alvarez and Franklin 1994). Furthermore, the effect of clientelism on citizens’ 
evaluations of political parties’ positions on the left-right continuum and possible distorting 
effects on the congruence between actual and perceived party positions are worth further 
studying. 
 
  
  
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics part I 
Variable Number Mean SD Min Max 
Country-level      
Fragmentation 18 3.67 1.94 2.05 9.32 
Polarization 18 4.08 3.63 0.02 13.83 
Party-level      
Vote Buying 58 3.08 0.59 1.40 3.93 
Patronage 58 3.13 0.49 1.40 3.86 
Programme 58 3.22 0.36 1.86 3.81 
Personalism 58 3.15 0.51 1.40 4.00 
Individual-level      
Left-Right Orientation 8431 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Education 8431 3.66 1.71 1 7 
Political Interest 8431 2.77 0.99 1 4 
Voting Experience 8431 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Age 8431 41 17 16 98 
Sources: Calculations based on LAB 2009 and DAES. 
 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics part II 
Variable Number Mean SD Min Max 
Country-level      
Fragmentation 17 4.28 2.07 2.05 9.32 
Polarization 17 4.77 3.31 0.42 13.83 
Programme 17 3.08 0.32 2.29 3.63 
Personalism 17 3.12 0.46 2.11 3.76 
Individual-level      
Left-Right Orientation 28736 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Clientelistic Target 28736 2.82 0.50 1 3 
Party Identification 28736 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Education 28736 9.52 4.45 0 18 
Political Interest 28736 2.88 0.98 1 4 
Age 28736 39 16 16 98 
Sources: Calculations based on LAPOP 2010 and DAES. 
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